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Firstly my example, yes Adam and Kevin your analysis is correct. A casting a second preference for B serves only to defeat C and elect B and vice versa.<BR>
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The collective result however of these two strategies under Condorcet is that neither A or C supporters get their first choice. If both A and C express a single preference each has a 50% chance of getting their first choice. As it is B wins with 14% support under Condorcet.<BR>
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Adam Tarr wrote<BR>
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Can you really put the Condorcet "nighmare" scenario I wrote in the same <BR>
ballpark as the IRV nightmare scenario? My Condorcet scenario ends with <BR>
the compromise candidate winning, and nobody regretting their vote. In the <BR>
IRV scenario I showed, the clearly, indisputably pre-eminent candidate <BR>
loses, and a third of the electorate is kicking themselves on election night.<BR>
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No I don't put the Condorcet "nightmare" in the same ballpark as the IRV "nightmare" I feel it is worse. I am not at all happy- for all sorts of "turkey" reasons explored extensively in previous posts- with any single member system that can elect candidates with a low first preference vote. I see your nightmare IRV scenario as an acceptable scenario which could occur in a close race where the electorate is divided into three approximately equal factions- no method is perfect and elections will sometimes be close.<BR>
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Adam also wrote<BR>
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That's a pretty big non sequitur there. Why IRV? Simply because that's <BR>
what the largest US electoral reform group supports?<BR>
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No not at all. I'm not prone to supporting things simply because certain groups or people say so. My argument in favour of IRV is as follows:<BR>
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1/ IRV prevents a minority winning an election because the majority divides its support between 2 or more candidates.<BR>
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2/ IRV ( compared to plurality) tends to elect moderate compromise candidates who enjoy general support.<BR>
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But doesn't Condorcet do these things as well, in fact doesn't Condorcet do these things much better ?<BR>
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The answer is of course yes. Condorcet does them better, Condorcet does them too well. In a 3 party ( right, centre, left) election with no absolute majority the centre candidate must come at least second to win under IRV. Under Condorcet s/he could win from third.<BR>
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Considering this result in isolation from previous elections and the possible outcome of future ones Condorcet seems to be the better method.<BR>
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Now to what could happen with Condorcet in practice. Condorcet favours centrist candidates and parties, in my opinion to too great a degree. Under Condorcet a centrist party would be very difficult to defeat. Swapping the Democrat/Republican duopoly for a centrist monopoly would not be good. Effective one party states (like Mexico and India were for decades) are generally a bad thing. Periodic change in government is necessary for a healthy democracy. The Democrat/ Republican duopoly bears testimony to the dangers of excessive stability and stagnation.<BR>
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IRV appears to strike a balance between ensuring that a candidate reflects the consensus and enjoys general support and the alternation of government necessary for a healthy democracy.<BR>
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David Gamble <BR>
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