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Adam Tarr wrote<BR>
<BR>
A>B>C 42%<BR>
B>A>C 5%<BR>
B>C>A 7%<BR>
C>B>A 46%<BR>
<BR>
So here we have a more realistic "turkey" scenario. A candidate with a <BR>
core support of only 12% manages to win an election. Compare that, if you <BR>
will, to the nightmare scenario of IRV:<BR>
<BR>
10% FarRight>Right>Centrist>Left>FarLeft<BR>
10% Right>FarRight>Centrist>Left>FarLeft<BR>
15% Right>Centrist>FarRight>Left>FarLeft<BR>
16% Centrist>Right>Left>FarRight>FarLeft<BR>
15% Centrist>Left>Right>FarLeft>FarRight<BR>
13% Left>Centrist>FarLeft>Right>FarRight<BR>
11% Left>FarLeft>Centrist>Right>FarRight<BR>
10% FarLeft>Left>Centrist>Right>FarRight<BR>
<BR>
Centrist has the most first place votes, the most second place votes, and <BR>
the most third place votes. Centrist is the only candidate who does not <BR>
appear fourth or fifth on any ballot. Centrist would win in a landslide <BR>
over any other candidate in a two-way race. Centrist is quite obviously <BR>
the popular choice by ANY reasonable measure.<BR>
<BR>
In Condorcet, plurality, top two runoff, or really any reasonable method, <BR>
Centrist wins. But in IRV, Centrist is eliminated before the final runoff, <BR>
and Right wins in a squeaker.<BR>
<BR>
To me, the IRV nightmare scenario is obviously far worse. In my nightmare <BR>
scenario for Condorcet, no voter has any real reason to regret their vote <BR>
after the election, while in the IRV vote a solid third of the electorate <BR>
have good reason to regret their strategy.<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
Consider the following plurality nightmare:<BR>
<BR>
Florida November 2000<BR>
<BR>
Bush 2,912,790<BR>
Gore 2,912,253<BR>
Nader 97,488<BR>
<BR>
Bush wins the 25 electoral college votes of Florida and thus the presidency.<BR>
<BR>
Or the top two runoff nightmare:<BR>
<BR>
First round of the French presidential election 21.04.2002<BR>
<BR>
Chirac (RPR, right) 19.9%<BR>
Le Pen (FN, extreme right) 16.9%<BR>
Jospin (PS, left) 16.2%<BR>
other left ( 6 candidates) 21.3%<BR>
other ( 7 candidates) 25.6%<BR>
<BR>
Divisions between candidates on the left propel a candidate of the extreme right into the second round ensuring Chirac's victory as the only acceptable candidate. A 3% fall in Chirac's support could have lead to a Le Pen / Jospin run-off leaving the main stream right without a second round candidate.<BR>
<BR>
The Condorcet nightmare :<BR>
<BR>
470 A>>>>B>C<BR>
40 B>A>C<BR>
30 B>C>A<BR>
460 C>>>>B>A<BR>
<BR>
B a low utility compromise candidate wins.<BR>
<BR>
All single seat methods are capable of producing bad results.<BR>
<BR>
This is why I believe that single member methods should only be used for single offices ( mayor, governor, president, etc) and that multi-member bodies should be elected by proportional representation. There is nothing and can be nothing that is proportional about the allocation of a single seat. My preferred single member method is IRV.<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
Forest Simmons wrote<BR>
<BR>
> David Gamble wrote:<BR>
><BR>
> > Due to the nature of the Condorcet method- which considers lower<BR>
> preferences<BR>
> > before the fate of higher preferences is decided- condorcet would appear<BR>
> to me<BR>
> > to be a turkey electoral system.<BR>
<BR>
Question: When IRV "decides the fate" of a candidate while leaving other<BR>
candidates in the running, what does it do to that candidate?<BR>
<BR>
Answer: It eliminates that candidate.<BR>
<BR>
Question: In view of this process of elimination, why would you want to<BR>
decide the fate of an "higher candidate" before the fate of a "lower<BR>
candidate?"<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
My answer to this point is as follows:<BR>
<BR>
My preferred multi-member method is the single transferable vote. It is considered an important principle in STV that lower preferences should neither help nor harm higher preferences. The reason for this is that if by casting a lower preference you can defeat a higher preference you are given a powerful incentive not to cast lower preferences.<BR>
<BR>
For example:<BR>
<BR>
44 A>B>C<BR>
7 B>A>C<BR>
7 B>C>A<BR>
42 C>B>A<BR>
<BR>
The election was to close to call, before the votes were counted it was uncertain whether A or C would obtain the most first preferences ( and also irrelevant considering A and C supporters second preferences).<BR>
<BR>
Under Condorcet by casting a second preference for compromise candidate B both A and C voters have effectively defeated their first choice and elected B.<BR>
<BR>
Yes, I am aware that B is the most generally preferred candidate and that by voting for B C supporters have also defeated A.<BR>
<BR>
If a A and C voters had not expressed a 2nd preference and voted<BR>
<BR>
44 A<BR>
7 B>A>C<BR>
7 B>C>A<BR>
42 C<BR>
<BR>
A would have won, or if two votes had been cast differently C would have won.<BR>
<BR>
42 A<BR>
7 B>A>C<BR>
7 B>C>A<BR>
44 C<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
Forest also wrote<BR>
<BR>
Question: Why do IRV supporters believe that IRV is superior to Coombs?<BR>
<BR>
I'm not saying that Coombs is any better than IRV, but the IRV supporter<BR>
arguments seem to support Coombs over IRV?<BR>
<BR>
Speaking entirely for myself and not "IRV supporters in general" I dislike Coombs for the same reason I dislike Condorcet namely it can give victory to a possibly low utility candidate who is the second choice of most people but the first choice of very few.<BR>
<BR>
For example <BR>
<BR>
49 A>B>C<BR>
3 B>C>A<BR>
48 C>B>A<BR>
<BR>
First count vote A 49, B 3, C 48. Under the Coombs rule eliminate the candidate with the highest number of last preferences candidate A. Final result B 52, C 48.<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
David Gamble<BR>
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