<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1">
<title></title>
</head>
<body>
<br>
<br>
-------- Original Message --------
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">Subject: </th>
<td>Re: Election-methods digest, Vol 1 #63 - 3 msgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">Date: </th>
<td>Fri, 04 Apr 2003 13:05:32 +0930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">From: </th>
<td>Chris Benham <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:chrisbenham@bigpond.com"><chrisbenham@bigpond.com></a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">To: </th>
<td><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com">election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com</a>, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:asmall@physics.ucsb.edu">asmall@physics.ucsb.edu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th valign="baseline" align="right" nowrap="nowrap">References: </th>
<td><a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:20030403200213.30036.18824.Mailman@geronimo.dreamhost.com"><20030403200213.30036.18824.Mailman@geronimo.dreamhost.com></a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<br>
<br>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1">
<title></title>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid20030403200213.30036.18824.Mailman@geronimo.dreamhost.com">
<pre wrap="">
On Thu, 3 Apr 2003, Chris Benham wrote:
</pre>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
--__--__--
From: "Alex Small" <a
class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:asmall@physics.ucsb.edu"><asmall@physics.ucsb.edu></a>
To: <a
class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com"><election-methods@electorama.com></a>
On Thu, 3 Apr 2003, Chris Benham wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Forest,
My answer to your question "Is there a simpler method that factors
all of the strategy away from the rankings or ratings of the
candidates?" is yes. Voters can rank and also Approve whichever
candidates they please, not even neccessarily approving the candidate
they rank as number1. The method is to have an IRV-like count, except
that the candidates who are in turn eliminated are those who are the
least approved.
For example, in a 3 candidate race in which you doubt that Favourite
can beat Worst in a runoff, you might number the candidates 1.
Favourite 2. Middle 3. Worst , but only Approve Middle .
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
Is this any different from Approval Runoff, where you eliminate all but
the two most approved candidates in the first round, and the second round
is a single pairwise contest?
</pre>
</blockquote>
Chris Benham: Yes, completely different.<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid20030403200213.30036.18824.Mailman@geronimo.dreamhost.com">
<pre wrap=""> I ask because you say "the candidates who
are eliminated in turn...", which (to me) implies a sequential process.
I'm trying to see how you can get a sequential process only using approval
information.
</pre>
</blockquote>
Chris Benham: I don't see how you can, but in this case we also have the
candidates ranked in order of preference information.<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid20030403200213.30036.18824.Mailman@geronimo.dreamhost.com">
<pre wrap="">It seems like the key insight needed for Strong FBC is that Strong FBC can
only be satisfied when rankings are only used to resolve a single
2-candidate contest.
So, if we use a rated method to eliminate all but 2 candidates, we can
then use the rankings without any incentive to rank insincerely.
One interesting thing about Approval Runoff is that strategically it
satisfies the Majority Criterion: When there is a candidate whom a
majority of the voters consider their first choice then he should win.
With adequate polling data, the majority will be aware of one another, and
they'll approve only their favorite. He's guaranteed to be one of the top
2, and he'll also automatically win the pairwise contest.
</pre>
</blockquote>
C.B: "With adequate polling data" plain Approval and even Plurality are
ok in this respect.<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid20030403200213.30036.18824.Mailman@geronimo.dreamhost.com">
<pre wrap="">One possible downside: The largest single organized group of voters (not
necessarily a majority, nor a group that has a common favorite) can
guarantee a candidate's victory by only approving him and a freak. If
their favorite is a serious candidate he'll automatically beat the freak
in a pairwise contest.</pre>
</blockquote>
C.B: This version of Approval Runoff is hopeless. If each of the competitive
parties fields only one candidate,<br>
then the first round will be dominated by strategy. Voters who want to
maximise the chances of their favourite<br>
will approve their favourite plus candidates that they think their favourite
can beat (as in your example).<br>
Voters who think that their favourite can't win and whose main concern is
to stop Worst, will approve only those <br>
acceptable candidates who they think can beat Worst, not neccessarily including
their favourite.<br>
If a party thinks that it can win the first round, then it can just field
two candidates.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid20030403200213.30036.18824.Mailman@geronimo.dreamhost.com">
<pre wrap="">Alex
--__--__--
_______________________________________________
Election-methods mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
href="mailto:Election-methods@electorama.com">Election-methods@electorama.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com">http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com</a>
End of Election-methods Digest
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>