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matt@tidalwave.net wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite>My conjecture is: <b>If you
give multiple unranked candidates 1/2 vote each then both wv and margins
have the no strategic truncation incentive (NSTI) property</b>.
</blockquote><br>
Sorry matt, it's not true. If you give equally ranked candidates
half a vote against one another (which, I think, is what you are
suggesting), then you effectively turn winning votes into margins.
This is, more or less, what margins does. The reason you see no
truncation incentive in this example is just because this particular
example has no truncation incentive. Try this example (which I call
"my standard example" because it has proven so
illustrative). Sincere preferences are as follows:<br><br>
49%: George>Al>Ralph <br>
12%: Al>George>Ralph <br>
12%: Al>Ralph>George <br>
27%: Ralph>Al>George<br><br>
Al is the Condorcet winner. If the George voters truncate in a
margins method (or winning votes with half votes for and against equal
ranked candidates), then George wins the election. Try it
out.<br><br>
-Adam</html>