<html><head></head><body>Forest Simmons wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:Pine.HPP.3.95.1010424173830.4834B-100000@orion.cc.pcc.edu"><pre wrap="">If I understand correctly, this tactic will neither help nor hinder our<br>friends. It will not hinder our friends because the method is monotonic.<br>It will not help our friends, because you cannot fool the system by<br>putting in insincere utilities.</pre>
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More precisely, you cannot fool the system into giving you better results, but<br>
you could always fool it into giving you worse results (e.g., by reversing some<br>
of your preferences). But yes, I think your statement is correct with that<br>
modification.<br>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:Pine.HPP.3.95.1010424173830.4834B-100000@orion.cc.pcc.edu"><pre wrap="">Another thing. It seems to me that if Cranor advised me to approve AB<br>but the election went to E (skipping over C and D), I would be pretty<br>upset, especially if it turned out that everyone voted precisely as<br>advised by Cranor.<br><br>Therefore I assume that once Cranor figures out that E is going to win,<br>she is going to advise me approve down to E.</pre>
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I'm not sure. If E and G are front runners, and you like E better, then probably<br>
so. I think the central program needs to be making a probabilisitic rather than<br>
a deterministic prediction. One way it could do this is by only statistically<br>
sampling the inputs to make the next prediction. Then it never "figures out that<br>
E is going to win", or at least if it does it doesn't feed this fact back to the<br>
individual strategizers. All the individual strategizers should see is a matrix<br>
of probabilities calculated by the central algorithm.<br>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:Pine.HPP.3.95.1010424173830.4834B-100000@orion.cc.pcc.edu"><pre wrap=""> Whether I am advised to<br>approve E itself or not would depend on whether my (faction's ?) failure<br>to support E would result in someone I considered below E winning.<br><br>Suppose that E is destined to win (if everyone votes their optimum<br>strategy) and that everyone who is advised to vote down to and including E<br>follows that advice, but that the other folks rebel and refuse to vote<br>down to just above E. Then E would still have to win, because no other<br>candidate increases in approval.</pre>
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I agree with that analysis.<br>
<br>
On the other hand, if some of the "including E" voters foolishly try to fool<br>
the system, it could backfire on them. They will either increase support for<br>
another candidate, or reduce support for E, or have no effect at all. Rarely<br>
would this result in a candidate they like better than E getting elected, unless<br>
the system's original prediction about E was inaccurate in the first place. If<br>
a enough of these voters actually preferred C to E for this strategy to work,<br>
then it seems unlikely the system would have projected E in the first place.<br>
<br>
Richard<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:Pine.HPP.3.95.1010424173830.4834B-100000@orion.cc.pcc.edu"><pre wrap=""></pre>
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