<html><head></head><body>I understand the question and it does seem paradoxical. Since I don't know<br>
the details about the method I can only speculate.<br>
<br>
Imagine that each voter is given a computer which is running a standard piece<br>
of software that implements a standard strategy algorithm. The software<br>
takes a voter's ratings input and runs it through the strategizer, which<br>
calculates the voter's ideal approval ballot based on current statistical<br>
information (initially a zero-info strategy). The result is forwarded to<br>
a central computer which counts the votes and then predicts the likelihood<br>
of various outcomes in the next round. This could be done by treating the<br>
current round as a statistical sampling, for instance. The information is<br>
sent back to the voters' computers, which then adjust their approval<br>
ballots, and the process is repeated until a winner is converged upon.<br>
<br>
If I were to give my computer insincere ratings, I am in effect claiming<br>
to be a better strategizer than the system is. If instead I give it sincere<br>
ratings, I am trusting the system to be a better strategizer than I am.<br>
Since the strategizing software is continuously making adaptations to<br>
the political environment, as reported by the central computer, I suspect<br>
that I would be wrong to think I could do a better job.<br>
<br>
Also, I don't think such a system would perfectly maximize utilities, but<br>
would do as good a job as Approval would do if all voters voted optimum<br>
Approval strategy. So the system is more of a "strategy assistant" to the<br>
voters than it is a "result optimizer". Plus, the system could also collect<br>
the presumably sincere ratings after the fact to determine how strong the<br>
winner's mandate really is (in an SU sense, that is).<br>
<br>
Richard<br>
<br>
<br>
Forest Simmons wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:Pine.HPP.3.95.1010419175822.9685B-100000@orion.cc.pcc.edu"><pre wrap="">This is more of a query about Lori Cranor's method than anything else.<br><br>If it really gives no strategic incentive for distorting ratings, it<br>sounds like the ideal way to use CR ballots.<br><br>Here's what puzzles me. On the one hand, it seems like any method like Ms<br>Cranor's that uses CR ballots to formulate optimal Approval Strategies<br>should be able to do so in a way that would give the win to the candidate<br>with the greatest average rating.<br><br>If that is the case, then it seems like any strategy that would improve<br>the average rating of your favorite on the CR ballot would be tempting. In<br>other words, one would be tempted to distort ratings. <br><br>On the other hand, if the method doesn't give the win to a maximally rated<br>candidate, then it probably isn't much better than plain old Approval in<br>social utility.<br><br>Can you shed any light on this?<br><br>Forest<br></pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body></html>