<html><head></head><body>LAYTON Craig wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:29AAAADC67DED11189120000F87A36500211CB4A@ADD-EX1"><pre wrap="">The reason I use absolute SU calculations is because absolute utility is<br>what is actually important. It is important to note that absolute can<br>diverge significantly from weighted utilities. I am suspicious of the<br>assumption that it will all even out in the end. I strongly suspect that<br>some factions of voters are much more likely to have a particular pattern of<br>utilities than others. What I mean for example is that Candidate C's<br>supporters (voting C,B,A,D), on the whole, might have very low expected<br>utilities (average 5,3,1,0) while Candidate D's supporters (voting D,A,B,C)<br>have very high expected utilities (99,95,94,92). It isn't unreasonable to<br>suggest that factions who vote in different ways have very different actual<br>utility patterns and values.<br><br>This is, of course, not a very useful concept, because it makes discussions<br>like which voting method is best for social utility not very productive.<br>>From the sense of reported absolute utilities, it is very difficult to be<br>able to measure your own utilities against the utilities of others, if not<br>epistemologically impossible.</pre>
</blockquote>
Two questions arise from absolute SUs. How do you get inside another voter's<br>
head to determine how strongly he/she really feels? And if absolute SUs (ASUs)<br>
really are meaningful, how can they be made a policy goal without actually<br>
requiring that some voters carry more weight than others?<br>
<br>
ASU assumes all costs and benefits are tangible. As soon as intangibles come<br>
into play, ASU is a myth, because you can never determine whose intangible<br>
needs are more important. Social choices involving only tangible elements<br>
tend to be zero-sum games (exceptions occur if one or more alternatives<br>
is wasteful: "How should we invest this huge pile of cash -- stocks, bonds,<br>
or lottery tickets?"). So if ASU is valid, we are dealing with only tangible<br>
payoffs and are probably in a zero-sum game. What good is ASU if it is<br>
is the same for every outcome?
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:29AAAADC67DED11189120000F87A36500211CB4A@ADD-EX1"><pre wrap=""></pre>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:29AAAADC67DED11189120000F87A36500211CB4A@ADD-EX1"><pre wrap="">As normalised utilities are simply distorted absolute utilities, that are<br>increasingly separated from the goal of utility maximisation, it doesn't<br>make sense to say that one should pay attention to normalised utilities, but<br>not the real utilities they were derived from. If the goal is utility<br>maximisation, you have to accept that the ultimate goal is absolute utility<br>maximisation. If you can't accept this, then you should not support a<br>method on the basis of SU maximisation (I note that Richard didn't claim to<br>support Approval solely on SU maximisation).<br><br>Qualification: I don't totally disregard SU arguments, I'm just pointing out<br>the problems.<br></pre>
</blockquote>
Normalized SUs do not open the philosophical can of worms that absolute<br>
SUs do. I agree that SU is a lousy policy goal because it cannot be reliably<br>
measured, but ASU is worse than normalized SU.<br>
<br>
However, normalized SUs are useful in theoretical work because they<br>
assume all voters should have an equal opportunity to express their<br>
preferences, as do the methods we are considering. If we are going to<br>
discuss SU when evaluating methods, let us at least avoid the mythical<br>
absolute SU.<br>
<br>
>From an applied standpoint, I judge these methods based on what set of<br>
constraints I, as a voter, would accept. I find Approval's constraints<br>
the most acceptable because I can decide which of my preferences<br>
is the most important one, and draw the line there. In ranked methods<br>
I cannot emphasize one preference over another. Of course, some of<br>
the hybrid methods such as Dyadic Approval and now Approval<br>
Completed Condorcet are showing us how the constraints can be<br>
relaxed without throwing that away. I hesitate to fully endorse those<br>
methods until I understand how they impact voter strategy.<br>
<br>
Richard<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:29AAAADC67DED11189120000F87A36500211CB4A@ADD-EX1"><pre wrap=""></pre>
</blockquote>
</body></html>