<html><head></head><body>LAYTON Craig wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:29AAAADC67DED11189120000F87A36500211CB43@ADD-EX1"><pre wrap="">While I do think that this is a disadvantage, that wasn't my point. My<br>argument was based on a criteria type approach to approval, where approval<br>passes all these strategy criteria by virtue of never having to<br>order-reverse. I was pointing out that this was a non-argument, because the<br>only reason it is true is that the preferences you can express are<br>constrained. With more detail, any system will fail these tests.</pre>
</blockquote>
It is the nature of the constraints that interests me. I am willing to accept<br>
Approval's constraints because I believe they are beneficial or at least<br>
benign. I do not like the constraints imposed by most other methods because<br>
they are not always benign.<br>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:29AAAADC67DED11189120000F87A36500211CB43@ADD-EX1"><pre wrap="">It is worth noting that there is no way of ensuring a consistently high SU<br>result. There are bad SU scenarios in any method - in Approval (with all<br>voters using zero info above mean strategy);<br><br>Sincere Utilities (out of 100);<br>20% A-60; B-40; C-40; D-0 Approval vote ABC<br>20% A-100; D-40; C-20; B-5 Approval vote A<br>60% D-6; B-3; C-2; A-0 Approval vote DB<br><br>B wins in Approval, followed by D then A, then C. B is the worst SU<br>candidate, and D is the second worst. A (who comes third in Approval) has<br>an SU rating which is nearly as high as all of the other candidates<br>combined. Obviously the worst case scenario is pretty much the same for any<br>election method.</pre>
</blockquote>
Given your SU rankings (A > C > D > B), it strikes me that you are using a<br>
different definition of SU than I am. When I speak of SU, I am referring to<br>
an L1-normalized SU. Does this contradict an accepted definition of SU?<br>
If we calculate SUs according to this method, then we get (D > B > A > C).<br>
So Approval picked the second-highest SU.<br>
<br>
Note that B was acceptable to the ABC and DB voters by a fairly small margin,<br>
which is why the top SU candidate was not picked. If slightly more than 20% of<br>
the voters (either faction) had found B to be less acceptable, then D would have<br>
been the winner.<br>
<br>
I suspect you are using absolute SU calculations. If we accept this method then<br>
we would indeed conclude that B has a poor SU in spite of appealing to two<br>
factions of voters who otherwise have no common candidates (so B succeeds as<br>
a compromise).<br>
<br>
As I stated in my earlier rebuttal, SU is not the central theme of my campaign<br>
for Approval voting (expressing intensity of preference is). However, I think<br>
the tendency towards higher SU in Approval voting (using normalized utilities)<br>
is a direct by-product of Approval's expressivity.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:29AAAADC67DED11189120000F87A36500211CB43@ADD-EX1"><pre wrap="">This is also one of my criticisms of CR. Even when it is "sincere", the<br>utilities are generally weighted to give one candidate 100 and one candidate<br>0, which may bear no resemblance to actual utility values, but I won't go<br>into the problems with this.</pre>
</blockquote>
I will. Using absolute utilities seems to be begging for a dilemma. If we accept<br>
the utilities in the example as absolute, then a "fair-minded" person would<br>
conclude that the A voters should be given a lot more weight than the DB voters.<br>
I don't think we are ready for this, no matter what election method we choose.<br>
I could exaggerate my utilities to the point of declaring that candidate X is a<br>
1000 and candidate Y is a zero. But I may have less real interest in the outcome<br>
than another voter who is using a scale of 1 to 5. Nobody would ever know.<br>
<br>
Except in mechanical systems (such as computer simulations) or where the outcome<br>
has a directly measurable payoff to the voters (such as a monetary reward), I don't<br>
believe in absolute utilities. They just don't make sense where human passions are<br>
involved. Absolute utilities are the flip side of the "one man one vote" argument,<br>
and just as specious.<br>
<br>
Richard<br>
<br>
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