<html><head></head><body>Forest Simmons wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:Pine.HPP.3.95.1010418135918.19100B-100000@orion.cc.pcc.edu"><pre wrap="">In the unlikely case that all candidates are approved by all voters and<br>there is no "beats all" candidate, then the winner shall be chosen from<br>the Smith set by random ballot.<br><br>Since none of these candidates were disapproved by any voter, all voters<br>should be content (if not ecstatic) about the outcome. </pre>
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I agree, in theory. In practice, this becomes another voter education issue:<br>
Voters should understand that (truncation == disapproval) and that<br>
(ranking == approval). Many will probably understand the first premise<br>
intuitively but I don't expect a lot of voters to grasp immediately that if<br>
they rank a candidate last, they are still approving that candidate (in terms<br>
of the completion algorithm, that is). <br>
<br>
Richard<br>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:Pine.HPP.3.95.1010418135918.19100B-100000@orion.cc.pcc.edu"><pre wrap=""><br><br>Forest<br><br>On Tue, 17 Apr 2001, Richard Moore wrote:<br><br></pre>
<blockquote type="cite"><pre wrap="">Is something missing here? Suppose nobody truncates and there is no pairwise<br>"beats all" winner?<br><br>Richard<br><br><br>Forest Simmons wrote:<br><br></pre><blockquote type="cite"><pre wrap="">I would like to nominate Approval Completed Condorcet as a method, and<br>give a campaign speech in favor of it.<br><br>In this version of Approval Completed Condorcet, regular preference<br>ballots are used with no special marks.<br><br>All ranked candidates are considered approved and all unranked (truncated)<br>candidates are considered unapproved (and for pairwise comparison<br>purposes, below all of the ranked candidates).<br><br>If pairwise comparisons yield a "beats all" winner, then that's our<br>guy/gal.<br><br>Otherwise, the most truncated (least approved) candidates are eliminated<br>from the contest one by one (starting with the worst) until there remains<br>a unique "beats all" winner.<br><br>Campaign Speech:<br><br>This method has the main advantages of Condorcet and Approval without<br>their main commonly perceived disadvantages:<br><br>It is the only Condorcet method satisfying the Favorite Betrayal Criterion<br>while allowing more expressivity than plain Approval (the only other<br>contender that satisfies the FBC).<br><br>Majority defense by truncation works as well in this method as any other.<br>Even the low utility accidental Condorcet Winners will be cut off by the<br>natural disapproval manifest in truncation.<br><br>No complicated, confusing Condorcet completion method needs to be sold to<br>the voting public.<br><br>The strategy is easy: just sincerely rank all of the candidates down to<br>and including the one you would vote for under plurality. Be sure to leave<br>the most evil front runner unranked.<br><br>This is the only method in the running so far that completely solves the<br>spoiler problem in the psychology of Green IRVies, since they think that<br>having to approve Gore as well as Nader (under plain Approval) is a form<br>of spoilage.<br><br>Vote for the best, vote ACC !<br><br>Forest<br></pre></blockquote></blockquote>
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