<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1" http-equiv=Content-Type>
<META content="MSHTML 5.00.2314.1000" name=GENERATOR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY bgColor=#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>> Here are some concerns, assuming I understand
the method properly.<BR>> Consider the following example:<BR>><BR>> 45
A B C<BR>> 25 B C A<BR>> 30 C B A<BR>><BR>> A 45*2+6*0=90<BR>> B
25*2+26*1=76<BR>> C 30*2+21*1=81<BR>><BR>> So, A wins. Plurality
would also pick A. Condorcet's method picks<BR>> B. IRV would
pick C.<BR>><BR>> I see a few problems with A being the
winner.<BR>><BR>> First, A is ranked last by a majority.<BR><BR>You are
absolutely correct. I was trying to get around one Borda problem<BR>(being
ranked first by a majority and still losing) and left another (being<BR>ranked
last by a majority and still winning). Um, my new additional rule is<BR>if there
is a majority ranking you last, you can't win! Yeah, that's the<BR>ticket! (Just
kidding)<BR><BR>><BR>> Assuming sincere rankings, if these same voters
were asked to pick<BR>> the worst candidate, candidate A would also win for
worst candidate<BR>> by the same method. However, no candidate can be
both best and<BR>> worst.<BR>><BR>> Note that every voter placed B and
C together on their ballot (A<BR>> never comes between). It is
therefore possible that B and C<BR>> represent some similar ideology or
party. We can therefore consider<BR>> this an example of vote
splitting.<BR><BR>One possibility is to allow multiple votes for first choice
(making it even<BR>more like an Approval ballot). The desire to get your first
choice into<BR>office would then fight with the desire to strategically vote
your biggest<BR>competitor down -- if you give Nader and Gore first place
ballots and you<BR>prefer Nader, Gore might win because of it. If you rate Nader
above Gore,<BR>Bush might win because of it. I don't see of a way to keep out
strategic<BR>voting while still fully counting negative votes (unless it's with
the rule<BR>"If a candidate gets a majority of last place votes, he cannot be
voted into<BR>office), but a kind of dynamic tension might keep a balance
between strategy<BR>and truthfulness. (grin)<BR><BR>> By the way, I recommend
you check out my Electoral Methods Resource.<BR>> It isn't an official FAQ,
but it tries to fill that kind of role.<BR>><BR>> <A
href="http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/harrow/124">http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/harrow/124</A><BR>><BR>--<BR>>
Blake Cretney<BR>><BR><BR>Thank you for the response and the
link!<BR><BR>Michael Rouse<BR><A
href="mailto:mrouse@cdsnet.net">mrouse@cdsnet.net</A><BR><BR>PS Has anyone
played with fractional valuations of the Borda count? Like<BR>(for instance) all
first place votes are 1, all second place votes are 1/2,<BR>all third place are
1/3 (if you are using 1/n) or 1/4 (if you are using<BR>1/2^(n-1)), etc? I'm
wondering what strange voting results might occur with<BR>such methods. (I'm
thinking of using a golden-mean method where the ratio<BR>between each number
remains constant, but that might be too
complicated!)<BR></FONT></DIV></BODY></HTML>