[EM] Automatic LIIA Independent of Locking Order

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Gustav,

Le vendredi 8 mai 2026 à 20:17:37 UTC−5, Gustav Thorzen via Election-Methods <election-methods at lists.electorama.com> a écrit :
> > > Yes,like always electing Majority-Beat Condorcet winners of the ballots when one exist.
> > > Conditioning on resticted voter preferences seem to be a problem in general,
> > > but many implicit assumptions are often made.
> > > Probably the most common one is that voters prefer electing any candidate over
> > > a no winner scenario, no matter how terrible they think that candidates are.
> >
> > Strange if this is common.
> 
> It is the only reason I ever found when I tried to figure out
> why randomness is not for obtaining strategyfree systems.
> On one hand randomness is treated like a plague of ilegitimacy,
> to the point it must be exterminated by any and all means,
> right until the candidate symmetry+no randomness impossibility theorem
> imples the system must permit at least one of a no winner or everyone wins scenario,
> at which point suddenly some candidate must win no matter what,
> even in hypotheticals where only a signle candidate runs and
> brags about how they will make themself a dictator and every voter
> think they must not win.
> The rare few people I have talked with who did not get,
> lets just say, angry, at me for the mere consideration of a no winner scenario,
> all ended up answering that the assumption that every voter preferes
> all candidates strictly above a no winner outcome was the only reason randomness,
> usually in the form of tiebreaking perfect ties,
> could every be considered when otherwise considered ilegitimate.
> 
> Skimming thourgh the archives of this list was such a stark contrast
> to all my previous experience (a plesant discovery)
> that I am open to the possibility I just had terrible luck.
> But unless thats the case then it really does appear to be a common assumption.
> It is the only answer I ever heard as to why it could make sense to always elect some candidate.

Better answers are possible I think. First of all "no winner" to me is not the same
as "(semi-)random winner."

A theorist is likely to reject "no winner" (as in "nobody wins at all") because in
practical terms we don't know what this means. Probably somebody does have to fill
the position at some point.

I think a theorist would likely reject a high rate of semi-random outcomes because
the method becomes difficult to sell. And it could be seen as not doing a good
enough job to try to identify the best candidate.

I think your interlocutors are too rigid in their thinking if they express "I cannot
sell this method to the public" as "voters have low utility for semi-random election
outcomes." The latter would seem to have implications that I doubt are justified,
regarding how voters would vote in elections with this possibility.

> > > If AFB+Mono+LN-Help+Mutual Majority are held by some version
> > > allowing for unlimited rankorder are allowed,
> > > then I say I do think an LN-Harm counterpart can be found,
> > > though I can't say it won't be like what Disapproval is to Approval
> > > without knowing the definition of the system in question,
> > > since "Bucklin" clearly is not one system,
> > > but a category of (rankorder? cardinal?) ones.
> >
> > At one point on this list there was an attempt to unify rank and cardinal Bucklin
> > under a single (different!) name. However, Bucklin is usually thought of as a *rank*
> > ballot method. The rating methods should be called "median rating" or something
> > else, in my opinion.
> 
> Yeah, providing a rankorder ballot or multiple ordered approval ballots...
> I can see why its considered "rank".
> Though I still don't see the point of limiting the rankorder.

"Limiting the rankorder" meaning "using ranks" I assume.

> Approval uses the binary to achieve its honesty criteria, so it has a clearl justification,
> But I don't see what the point is for Bucklin,
> if this is somehow supposed to be simpler to the voter,
> then just allow only two tiers on the rankorder and simulate Approval.

I could see saying Bucklin doesn't add enough over Approval.

>From a criteria standpoint Bucklin has majority favorite and mutual majority. No
rank ballot interpretation of Approval satisfies mutual majority.

> Guess MMPS was already taken then, will have not make notes of that.
> I did not expect it to statisfy LN-Help.
> That proposed change sounds similar to the tied & toped rule of ICA
> (though I think you called it "tied at the top" though),
> well, tied not/unless bottom, I suppose.
> It really is not obvious how it satisfies LN-Help in general though.

It's because when you add a new preference for some X, it can only improve the score
of X, no one else's score. And it doesn't hurt the score of anyone below X.

Yes, it's a similar principle to ICA.

Kevin
votingmethods.net