[EM] Some ways to extend social rankings to scores

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 2026-02-10 19:22, robert bristow-johnson via Election-Methods wrote:
>> On 02/10/2026 8:02 AM EST Kristofer Munsterhjelm via Election-Methods <election-methods at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>>
>>   
>> Suppose we want to make a method return not just who won (and the order
>> of finish), but how well each candidate did - how close to each other
>> the candidates were - by also returning a score for each.
>>
>> (See the end of the post for 2009 Burlington results :-)
>>
> 
> A couple of years ago, I did an analysis of STAR (where everyone
> votes  5-1-0) applied to Burlington 2009.  (I didn't worry about Smith or
> Simpson, while I *will* say Smith was not insignificant, he was
> eliminated before the big three that demonstrated the Center Squeeze.
> Simpson and Write_in *are* insignificant, I wouldn't bother with any
> other keystrokes regarding Simpson or Write-In.)  Turns out it makes the
> same mistake as IRV (when people score 5-1-0).
> 
> https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/1bbq6hu/heres_a_good_hypothetical_for_how_star_fails/
> 
> Sorry Kristofer, I'm just reacting.  I haven't read through your post, yet.  It looks complicated, but I'll get through it.

I was talking about scores as outputs, not inputs :-)

I.e. a Condorcet method that doesn't just say "Montroll is in first, 
Kiss is in second", but whether Montroll's win was comfortable or close 
(and similarly, if Wright was close to passing Kiss, Simpson close to 
Wright, etc.)

The voters would still use plain old ranked ballots.

The method would just return more detailed information -- like how FPTP 
shows the strength of victory on a scale (as percent of first 
preferences gained), even though FPTP isn't a cardinal method.

As for STAR strategy, it makes sense that STAR would behave that way if 
everybody does 5-1-0, because that's more or less reproducing the logic 
of IRV/TTR (first preferences count a lot, other preferences don't). I 
suspect that STAR strategy is less unbalanced, though; that some times, 
5-4-0 is good, other times 5-1-0 is good, and you don't get skewered the 
same way you can in Approval if you get it wrong.

-km