[EM] Unifying Random Ballot and Score Voting
Joshua Boehme
joshua.p.boehme at gmail.com
Wed Apr 1 04:37:32 PDT 2026
In honor of today, some silly results (believed to be correct but probably
useless) about elections with cardinal ballots: it's possible to unify
random ballot with score voting via a single parameter.
First, the naive way: interpolate between the random ballot lottery and
score voting's (degenerate) lottery. The parameter is the weight to give one
of them.
There's also a more interesting way: pick a nonnegative parameter alpha.
Draw a weight vector for the n voters via a symmetric n-dimensional
Dirichlet(alpha/n) distribution. Select the candidate with the highest
weighted score.
The limit as alpha goes to zero is random ballot. The limit as alpha goes to
infinity is score voting. This comes from the behavior of the Dirichlet
distribution, which gets "spikey" for very small parameters and converges to
an equal weighting for very large parameters.
This process gives a realization from an underlying lottery, which can be
thought of as the expectation over the entire Dirichlet distribution
The 1/n scaling is to preserve the lottery if you duplicate the voters. [1]
Fun property: all of these methods, for both the naive approach and the
interesting one, satisfy participation. To see this for the latter, pretend
that a trusted oracle draws and commits to the weight vector in advance of
the election, but keeps it secret until after the votes are cast. For any
given weight vector, it's always in a voter's interest to participate.
Also, the second family is not just a repackaging of the first. Consider:
A B C D E
10 0 0 7 6
0 10 0 7 6
0 0 10 0 6
Random ballot gives 1/3 probability to each of A, B, and C. Score voting
gives 100% to E. However, for intermediate values of alpha, there's a
nonzero probability that D is chosen, since the first two voters could get
almost all of the total weight.
[1] You can see this from the method of generating a realization from an
n-dimensional Dirichlet distribution via n realizations from a gamma
distribution. The sum of the gammas has a shape parameter equal to the sum
of the individual gammas' shapes, since their scales are all equal. The 1/n
scaling factor means that if each voter in election A corresponds to m
identical voters in election B, then each voter in election A's weight is
distributed the same as the sum of m voters' weights in election B.
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