[EM] A set of clone independence criteria more applicable to multiwinner

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 2025-10-25 22:14, Markus Schulze via Election-Methods wrote:
> Dear Kristofer,
> 
> I was thinking of multi-winner election methods
> that have some dose of proportionality. In this
> case, I believe that it is inevitable that an
> additional clone D2 could create a cycle like
> {A,B,C,D1,E} > {A,B,C,D1,G} > {A,B,C,D1,D2}
>  > {A,B,C,D1,E} that will finally be resolved in
> favour of {A,B,C,D1,G}.
> 
> In other words: I believe that the sheer existence
> of winning sets with more than one clone could act
> as a spoiler.

I think I understand what you're saying. Since you mention cycles, do 
you think that the independence of such spoilers are incompatible with 
reasonable proportionality criteria like the DPC, or just with 
multiwinner generalizations of Condorcet?

-km