[EM] Simplest Condorcet method to hand count?

[Etjon Basha]

Hi Robert,

Yes, that setup seems foolproof to me, as long as the link exists between
the ballots and individual machine counted and the actual bag.

The comment re serial numbers was not meant to be applied to the optical
scan method, but to the method where you vote on a machine and get a
printout to cast as a backup. You'd get this once you're out of the booth,
and would only be able to verify in full view of the volunteers. The font
one ID in the back would be too small to take a picture of anyway in this
limited time, and once the ballot is cast would make linking to the actual
voter impossible (assume a properly random ID).

Optical scams are better though, less to go wrong with them.

Regards,

 Etjon



On Fri, 23 May 2025, 6:38 am robert bristow-johnson via Election-Methods, <
election-methods at lists.electorama.com> wrote:

>
>
> > On 05/22/2025 12:21 PM EDT Etjon Basha via Election-Methods <
> election-methods at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Hi Steve,
> >
> > I think the weak link is between the auditable voter action and what I
> see tallied as a result. As long as there is some way to connect the two,
> an electronic count is as foolproof as a hand count. If not, it's not.
> >
> > voting on paper ballots which are then input into a machine for fast
> counting would do it, and I've seen it done.
>
> It's what any state that uses optical-scan technology does.  The actual
> ballot that the voter marked is the "paper backup".  Unlike the stupid
> computer card ("butterfly ballots") in which the physical instrument can be
> misaligned in the jig that is in the voter booth (then it's possible that
> the hole that is punched out is not for the candidate that the voter
> intended) and the true intent of the voter is lost to the record, with
> optical-scan, the true intent of the voter can always be discerned by
> looking directly at the ballot that the voter marked.
>
> > There must be a way to link the entry with the ballot though, otherwise
> an after-the-fact audit is impossible.
>
> Why is that?
>
> It's not the individual ballots, but we can link a particular sealed and
> numbered ballot bag with a particular tally of the ballots (like with a
> particular voting machine that voters insert their ballots into).  We can
> confirm that the pairwise totals from the machine tally match the pairwise
> totals in the recount.  In the U.S. the right to vote by secret ballot is a
> big deal and we want **no** serial number, no identifying marks at all, on
> the voted ballot that can possibly be traced back to the checklist and
> identify the voter.
>
> >
> >
> > On Fri, 23 May 2025, 12:27 am Steve Eppley via Election-Methods, <
> election-methods at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
> > > Hi Etjon,
> > > Because of the high stakes, there's also an opposite incentive, to
> keep an initially foolproof election system foolproof.
> > > Nearly anyone could verify the result of a disputed machine count in
> which a copy of the ballots verified by independent or multi-partisan
> observers is published online in a downloadable format. I'm assuming the
> tallying software is open source, available for free installation on
> smartphones, and has been audited by some public interest groups you trust.
> If you're really paranoid, you could shuffle the downloaded ballots and
> globally replace the candidate IDs with dummy IDs, to check whether this
> changes the result. People you trust could publish examples and their
> expected results, to test your software.
> > >
> > > If you can't trust independent or multi-partisan observers to verify
> the accuracy of a copy of the ballots, I don't understand how could you
> have more trust in a hand-count.
> > >
> > > Regarding simplicity of explanation... The voting system that I
> believe is best (Maximize Affirmed Majorities) on the criterion I think is
> most important (create a strong incentive for politicians to support
> majority-preferred policies) seems simple enough to explain with the aid of
> two simple examples: "Count all the head-to-head majorities. Then process
> the head-to-head majorities one at a time, from largest majority to
> smallest majority, placing each majority's more-preferred candidate ahead
> of their less-preferred candidate in the order of finish." (To my eye,
> Nanson isn't simpler.) The first example would have 3 candidates (perhaps
> named Left, Center and Right) and a Condorcet winner (Center). The second
> example would have 3 candidates (perhaps named Rock, Scissors and Paper)
> and a majority cycle.
> > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, 22 May 2025, 10:07 pm Steve Eppley via Election-Methods, <
> election-methods at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Etjon, you didn't say why you think hand-counting is important. If
> your goal is to allow an election to be counted by a society that can't
> even afford a cheap smartphone, I don't think this cost is a show-stopping
> barrier, since smartphones are ubiquitous. So why settle for an inferior
> tallying algorithm?
> > > > >
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
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