[EM] Novel Electoral System

[Daniel Kirslis]

Hi Chris,

Yes, that is correct. I have created a simplified version of the paper that
attempts to explain the method in the most concise possible way. It's only
two pages:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1F_I2ZBUKXKbmcS-uSvMAf_gNdNO8m0GB/view?usp=drive_link

It skips over a lot of the background that explains why I view this as a
compromise between the Borda count and Condorcet methods and just focuses
on explaining the method itself. Once you see how the plotting works, it is
like Bocce Ball - closest to the target ball wins.

Thank you for your engagement on this. I should have started with this
version of the paper!

On Mon, May 19, 2025 at 12:32 PM Chris Benham via Election-Methods <
election-methods at lists.electorama.com> wrote:

>
> It seems like the short version is that the winner is the candidate with
> the smallest sum of SQUARES of non-victories (defeats plus ties) against
> their opponents.
>
>
> I take that these numbers you are squaring are the candidate's opposing
> and tying vote scores, and not simply the number of such results. Is that
> right?
>
> Because otherwise that would often be very indecisive, like Copeland.
>
>
> On 19/05/2025 1:40 am, Andrew B Jennings (elections) via Election-Methods
> wrote:
>
> Hi Dan,
>
> Great paper. Thank you for posting!
>
> It seems like the short version is that the winner is the candidate with
> the smallest sum of SQUARES of non-victories (defeats plus ties) against
> their opponents.
>
> Taking the square root and dividing can make it meaningful by scaling it
> to [0,1] or [0,s] (where s is the number of voters), but doesn't change the
> finish order.
>
> It does seem like an interesting attempt to "square the circle" (great
> pun) and compromise between Borda and Condorcet. I hadn't realized that
> Borda and Minimax are minimizing the one-norm and infinity-norm in the same
> geometric space. The two-norm certainly seems like it should be explored.
>
> I would love to see the proof of non-favorite-betrayal.
>
> Best,
>
> ~ Andy
> On Thursday, May 15th, 2025 at 4:25 PM, Daniel Kirslis via
> Election-Methods <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> <election-methods at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>
> Hello!
>
> I am a newcomer to this mailing list, so please forgive me if this message
> violates any norms or protocols that the members of this list adhere to.
>
> I have recently developed a novel method for tabulating ranked-choice
> elections that attempts to reconcile the concerns of Borda and Condorcet. I
> believe that it maintains the simplicity and mathematical elegance of the
> Borda count while incorporating Condorcet's concern with pairwise
> dominance. Intuitively, it can be understood as ordering candidates by how
> close they come to being unanimously selected when plotted in Cartesian
> coordinate space. Here is a link to the paper:
>
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/152eNheS2qkLHJbDvG4EwW3jdO4I_NwcX/view?usp=sharing
>
> Given its simplicity, I have been very surprised to discover that this
> method has never been proposed before. I am hoping that some of you all
> will take a look at the paper and share your comments, questions, and
> critiques. Ultimately, it is my hope that ranked-choice voting advocates
> can arrive at a consensus about the best method for RCV and thus strengthen
> efforts to adopt it and deliver much needed democratic improvements. But
> even if you don't find the system itself compelling, you may find the
> method of plotting electoral outcomes elucidated in the paper to be useful
> for the analysis of other electoral systems.
>
> Thank you!
>
> -Dan
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20250519/c018642e/attachment.htm>