[EM] Novel Electoral System

[Chris Benham]

Dan,

I had a look at your paper and (probably partly due to my lack of 
academic maths background) I found it almost completely opaque.

And the bits I do understand sound very unpromising.  Why should we be 
interested in the "concerns" of Borda (whatever they are)? And so much 
that we should embrace a method that fails the Condorcet criterion?

Do you propose allowing above-bottom equal ranking or truncation?

> Importantly, the K-count satisfies the ‘sincere favorite’ criterion: a 
> voter is
> never incentivized to place their favorite candidate in any position 
> other than
> 1st. This is a particularly perverse form of strategic voting that the 
> K-count
> avoids. Notably, it is not avoided by one of the most popular ranked 
> choice
> methods, instant runoff.

That somewhat increases my interest in finding out how this method 
works. Meeting that criterion is difficult for methods trying to be 
better than simple Approval.

Who does your method elect in this example?

46 A
44 B>C
10 C

Chris Benham

On 16/05/2025 8:54 am, Daniel Kirslis via Election-Methods wrote:
> Hello!
>
> I am a newcomer to this mailing list, so please forgive me if this 
> message violates any norms or protocols that the members of this list 
> adhere to.
>
> I have recently developed a novel method for tabulating ranked-choice 
> elections that attempts to reconcile the concerns of Borda and 
> Condorcet. I believe that it maintains the simplicity and mathematical 
> elegance of the Borda count while incorporating Condorcet's concern 
> with pairwise dominance. Intuitively, it can be understood as ordering 
> candidates by how close they come to being unanimously selected when 
> plotted in Cartesian coordinate space. Here is a link to the paper:
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/152eNheS2qkLHJbDvG4EwW3jdO4I_NwcX/view?usp=sharing
>
> Given its simplicity, I have been very surprised to discover that this 
> method has never been proposed before. I am hoping that some of you 
> all will take a look at the paper and share your comments, questions, 
> and critiques. Ultimately, it is my hope that ranked-choice voting 
> advocates can arrive at a consensus about the best method for RCV and 
> thus strengthen efforts to adopt it and deliver much needed democratic 
> improvements. But even if you don't find the system itself compelling, 
> you may find the method of plotting electoral outcomes elucidated in 
> the paper to be useful for the analysis of other electoral systems.
>
> Thank you!
>
> -Dan
>
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