[EM] Better Choices for Democracy

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 2025-06-24 19:49, robert bristow-johnson via Election-Methods wrote:

> I think the simplest augmentation to IRV that makes it Condorcet is
> BTR-IRV.
> I used to sorta like this method since it was a Condorcet-consistent 
> "single-method system" and is the least possible modification to
> Hare IRV.  But I have since become convinced from state legislators
> and the legislative counsel (these are the lawyers employed by the
> state legislature that assist legislators in writing law) that "the
> law should say what it means and mean what it says".  So we're doing
> a "two-method system"; straight-ahead Condorcet and a "completion
> method" to deal with the contingency that there is no Condorcet
> winner.  That is simple and straight-forward code and everyone can
> see, simply, what the intent of the law is and how it pans out in
> unusual situations.

What do you mean by that "the law should say what it means and mean what 
it says"?

Consider a method like IRV. Procedurally, it is simple: repeatedly 
eliminate the Plurality loser until somone has a majority. But in 
practice, it can exhibit chaotic behavior, nonmonotonicity, and so on. 
How its procedure works doesn't seem to tell you much about how it behaves.

So if IRV is the standard, then the required connection between what the 
law says (the procedure it defines) and what it means (what happens as a 
consequence) doesn't seem very strict, and it doesn't seem like BTR-IRV 
would be any worse in that respect.

-km