[EM] Better Choices for Democracy

[Chris Benham]

Ralph,

In the YouTube video Marcus linked to, only the "Instant Runoff 
Resolution" is mentioned:

https://youtu.be/tMVLU63Ws9A?t=201

Presumably they will (or on the evidence of the video already have) 
settle on a single resolution method for their public proposal. Of the 
three they list I consider the "Instant Runoff Resolution" to be the 
least bad.

The first (judging by what they call it, because that is the only clue 
they give to exactly what they mean by "smallest")  is presumably 
Margins, which fails the Plurality criterion and has especially 
egregious failures of Later-no-Help.

The second is Copeland//Margins. We know that Copeland fails Clone 
Independence and when there is no CW is usually indecisive.

> My biggest question is why they included instant runoff as one of the 
> resolution methods, especially because on their FAQ page, they explain 
> why it isn't a good method

Their criticism of  "instant runoff" is essentially that it can 
eliminate a "Consensus Choice" (aka CW).  But since they way are using 
it here that can't happen, that criticism is redundant.

Chris Benham



https://www.betterchoices.vote/faqs

On 20/06/2025 6:42 am, Ralph Suter via Election-Methods wrote:
>
> You've oversimplified what they advocate. Their website says:
>
>
> "In almost all large-scale elections, the process of comparing pairs 
> of candidates will identify the Consensus Choice, a single candidate 
> who wins all their head-to-head matchups. In the unlikely event that 
> no Consensus Choice exists, the ultimate winner can be determined by 
> one of the following resolution methods:
>
>     "Margin of Loss Resolution: If there is no Consensus Choice, the 
> candidate whose largest head-to-head loss is smallest is declared the 
> winner.
>
>     "Number of Wins & Margin of Loss Resolution: The candidate with 
> the most head-to-head wins is declared the winner. In the event that 
> multiple candidates tie for most head-to-head wins, the tie is broken 
> in favor of the one whose largest head-to-head loss is smallest.
>
>     "Instant Runoff Resolution: If there is no Consensus Choice, 
> Instant Runoff Voting is used to determine the winner."
>
> My biggest question is why they included instant runoff as one of the 
> resolution methods, especially because on their FAQ page, they explain 
> why it isn't a good method:
>
> "Instant Runoff Voting
>
> "Under Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), voters rank candidates in order of 
> preference. Initially, only first-choice votes are counted. If no 
> candidate has a majority (>50%), the candidate with the fewest 
> first-choice votes is eliminated, and votes for that candidate are 
> transferred to the voters’ next-ranked candidates. This process 
> repeats until one candidate receives a majority of the remaining votes.
>
> "Under Consensus Choice, voters rank candidates similarly, but instead 
> of using sequential elimination rounds, we use rankings to directly 
> compare each candidate against every other candidate in head-to-head 
> matchups. The candidate who wins against every other candidate 
> individually is declared the winner.
>
> "Consensus Choice selects the candidate with the broadest support 
> across the entire electorate.
>
> "As a result, Consensus Choice discourages divisive campaigning 
> because winners must appeal broadly, not just to a faction or a 
> particular base of supporters.
>
> "Example:
>
>     "IRV: Candidate A initially leads but doesn't have a majority. 
> Candidate C is eliminated, and votes transfer primarily to Candidate 
> B, making B the winner—even if Candidate D (already eliminated) could 
> have beaten B head-to-head.
>
>     "Consensus Choice: Candidate B might have the most pairwise wins 
> against all others directly, immediately making B the winner without 
> needing multiple rounds of eliminations.
>
> "Why it matters:
>
> "Because it eliminates candidates one at a time, Instant Runoff may 
> eliminate a candidate early who would have broader appeal overall.
>
> "Consensus Choice encourages candidates to build broader support among 
> voters to reduce toxic polarization. Under Instant Runoff Voting, the 
> winning candidate only needs to beat the last remaining competitor 
> head-to-head, which doesn't necessarily mean that the IRV winner has 
> majority support when compared to other candidates.
>
> "In short, IRV focuses on sequential elimination rounds, while 
> Consensus Choice evaluates comprehensive head-to-head comparisons to 
> select the candidate most broadly supported by the electorate."
>
> -Ralph Suter
>
> On 6/19/2025 3:02 PM, election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com wrote:
>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
>> 	election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>>
>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>> 	http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>>
>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>> 	election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com
>>
>> You can reach the person managing the list at
>> 	election-methods-owner at lists.electorama.com
>>
>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."
>>
>>
>> Today's Topics:
>>
>>     1. Better Choices for Democracy (Markus Schulze)
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 1
>> Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2025 18:17:35 +0200
>> From: Markus Schulze<markus.schulze8 at gmail.com>
>> To:election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>> Subject: [EM] Better Choices for Democracy
>> Message-ID:<465e498b-a7f2-40e8-9083-3cd518c7729d at gmail.com>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
>>
>> Hallo,
>>
>> in May 2025, "Better Choices for Democracy", a new Condorcet
>> advocacy group, has launched its website:
>>
>> https://www.betterchoices.vote
>>
>> This group consists of people like Nic Tideman, Eric Maskin,
>> Charles T. Munger Jr. and James Green-Armytage.
>>
>> They promote a Condorcet method called "Consensus Choice
>> Voting": If there is a Condorcet winner, that candidate
>> is the winner of Consensus Choice Voting. Otherwise, the
>> winner is determined by IRV. See:
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tMVLU63Ws9A
>>
>> Interestingly, this Condorcet method doesn't even satisfy
>> independence of clones.
>>
>> Let's say that candidate A is a Condorcet winner, but
>> doesn't receive any first preferences. Consensus Choice
>> Voting then selects candidate A.
>>
>> Now, let's say that candidate A is replaced by clones A1,A2,A3
>> and that none of these clones is a Condorcet winner. Then, IRV
>> kicks in and first eliminates A1, A2 and A3.
>>
>> Markus Schulze
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Subject: Digest Footer
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Election-Methods mailing list
>> Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 251, Issue 1
>> ************************************************
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20250624/f34af9b9/attachment.htm>