[EM] Better Choices for Democracy

[Chris Benham]

Markus,

> Interestingly, this Condorcet method doesn't even satisfy
> independence of clones. 

Yes.  They could have avoided that by using the somewhat more simple 
method that James-Green Armytage named "Benham" in his "Condorcet-Hare 
Hybrids" paper:

> Benham method:14 Eliminate the plurality loser until there is a 
> Condorcet winner. 
http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/voting-matters/ISSUE29/I29P1.pdf

He describes three other methods in his paper, but they are all more 
complicated without any justification.

I think this method would be usually easier to operate than the 
Condorcet//Hare method they suggest, and generally less clunky.

Chris Benham


On 20/06/2025 1:47 am, Markus Schulze via Election-Methods wrote:
> Hallo,
>
> in May 2025, "Better Choices for Democracy", a new Condorcet
> advocacy group, has launched its website:
>
> https://www.betterchoices.vote
>
> This group consists of people like Nic Tideman, Eric Maskin,
> Charles T. Munger Jr. and James Green-Armytage.
>
> They promote a Condorcet method called "Consensus Choice
> Voting": If there is a Condorcet winner, that candidate
> is the winner of Consensus Choice Voting. Otherwise, the
> winner is determined by IRV. See:
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tMVLU63Ws9A
>
> Interestingly, this Condorcet method doesn't even satisfy
> independence of clones.
>
> Let's say that candidate A is a Condorcet winner, but
> doesn't receive any first preferences. Consensus Choice
> Voting then selects candidate A.
>
> Now, let's say that candidate A is replaced by clones A1,A2,A3
> and that none of these clones is a Condorcet winner. Then, IRV
> kicks in and first eliminates A1, A2 and A3.
>
> Markus Schulze
>
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