[EM] Better Choices for Democracy

Sun Jun 22 15:56:59 PDT 2025

More than a "roadmap" or strategy is needed. As impressed as I am with 
the arguments that RBJ, Better Choices for Democracy, and others have 
made in support of Condorcet methods as opposed to IRV, they aren't 
persuasive enough.

First, Condorcet advocates need to explain that the reason IRV was 
adopted many years ago in Australia and elsewhere is because it can 
easily be implemented with hand-counted ballots. Condorcet methods would 
have been impractical until 20 or so years ago (i.e., 5 or 10 years 
AFTER FairVote was formed), even for elections with relatively few 
voters and candidates. The reason they are practical now is because 
computerized voting machines and scannable ballots (which can easily be 
audited with small amounts of hand counting) have made them so.

Second, now that Condorcet methods can much more easily be implemented, 
they have several important advantages over IRV:

   - They are "precinct summable," which simply means that unlike IRV, 
there's often no need to wait till all votes are counted before an 
almost certain winner can be determined. It's rarely necessary to wait 
days (sometimes even weeks) to be pretty certain of the winner, as it 
sometimes is with IRV. This also addresses a complaint commonly made by 
IRV opponents (mostly conservatives) who have opposed IRV and even 
sponsored legislation in many states to make IRV illegal.

   - This advantage also makes Condorcet methods much more useful for 
polling. It would be much easier to do accurate polling of candidates in 
Condorcet elections than it is to poll for candidates in IRV elections. 
Using Condorcet methods would also make it possible to do accurate 
polling of three or more possible policy options (e.g., three or more 
different proposed ways to to improve on the current Electoral College 
system for electing US presidents). In addition, Condorcet methods would 
make it possible to have referendums with three or more options (e.g.: 
1) elect presidents by direct popular vote, 2) keep the electoral 
college but reform it to end the spoiler problem and make elections 
fairer for voters in all states, 3) have the House of Representatives 
elect presidents and enable it to replace a president with a vote of 
confidence, as was recently proposed by law professor Max Stearns in his 
book  "Parliamentary America"). Using IRV for referendums would not be a 
good idea.

Third, better ways in addition to the above are needed to explain 
Condorcet voting and its advantages over IRV. One long used rhetorical 
device is to describe Condorcet methods (a term that makes no intuitive 
sense to people who aren't familiar with the history of voting methods) 
as forms of "Instant Round Robin Voting" or IRRV and explaining that 
IRRV methods simply involve examining ranked ballots to determine how 
each candidate in an election would fare in one-to-one contests with 
each other candidate, which is hard to do with hand counting but easy to 
do with computerized voting machines or scannable ballots. Few if any 
people would disagree that if one candidate would defeat every other 
candidate in one to one contests, as would almost always be the case, 
that candidate should be declared the winner. You can then explain that 
in the rare instances where there isn't a candidate who defeats all the 
others, there are usually persuasive ways to decide which candidate is 
the most preferred overall and should be declared the winner.

Better Choices for Democracy uses the term "consensus choice voting" 
instead of IRRV to describe Condorcet methods. Only experimentation with 
different terms and explanatory methods will determine which terms and 
methods are most effective. Maybe there are alternatives to both IRRV 
and consensus choice voting that would be more effective than either.

If and when Condorcet advocates really get their act together, as I hope 
they soon do (BCD is at best a good start), I think it's very likely 
that they will decisively win out over IRV advocates in the long run if 
not in the very near future. I don't mean that as a put-down of IRV 
advocates. I agree with Michael Garman that IRV is an improvement over 
plurality and that if "perfect" Condorcet methods were unachievable, 
less than perfect IRV would still be better than plurality and worth 
adopting for that reason alone.

-Ralph Suter

Note: I'm copying this to the Better Choices for Democracy address. If 
anyone from BCD reads this and would like to look at other posts in this 
discussion thread, just visit:

http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/
> Message: 1
> Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2025 18:43:31 -0400 (EDT)
> From: robert bristow-johnson<rbj at audioimagination.com>
> To:election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Better Choices for Democracy
> Message-ID:<1895035084.613977.1750545811399 at privateemail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
>
>
>
>> On 06/21/2025 3:49 PM EDT Michael Garman<michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> ?If we're gonna "correct" First-Past-The-Post, let's make sure that the correction itself is as correct as it can possibly be
>> I, for one, don?t believe in making the perfect the enemy of the good.
>>
> The "as correct as it can possibly be" is not perfect.  I acknowledge the existence of Arrow's theorem and of the Condorcet paradox.  Nothing is perfect.
>
> But bad outcomes (such as thwarted majority causing unequal votes and spoiled election that harms voters for voting sincerely which then incentivizes tactical voting) due to unnecessary flaws are less correct than unavoidable bad outcomes.  I, for one, believe in correcting unnecessary flaws.
>
> These unnecessary flaws are a consequence of an RCV method based on the wrong principles, more precisely the lack of principles.  IRV is procedure someone thought up (and Condorcet did 40-some years before Hare and rejected the idea because he knew what could happen) with intent to solve a problem, essentially the spoiler effect (or IIA) when there are three or more candidates.  Hare proposes a method without really telling us what principle the method is based on.  Or, perhaps, Hare thinks that IRV gives voters a second-choice vote if their favorite candidate cannot be elected.  But that's not true.  It never applies to the voters behind the loser in the final round.  Most of the time that doesn't change the outcome of the election, but when it does, it's always bad; spoiled election and all the bad things that come outa that.
>
> So IRV is a procedure without a principle.  It just says "Count the highest-ranked votes for candidates that have not yet been defeated, then defeat the candidate with the least votes.  Rinse and repeat."  That's simple, but not a principle.
>
> Condorcet says "When more voters rank A over B than than to the contrary, B is not elected."  That's also simple.  The procedure is derived from that principle.  The thing that IRV apologists have to justify is why *should* B be elected?  Why is it a good thing that B is elected?  What principle or what public good is it?
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2025 18:45:00 -0400
> From: Michael Garman<michael.garman at rankthevote.us>
> To: robert bristow-johnson<rbj at audioimagination.com>
> Cc:election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Better Choices for Democracy
> Message-ID:
> 	<CANAGaDdct93zz3PaEghYfteu5as0AMpL5ANcCgPSrfT8-KwxPw at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> When you have a plan for a viable political movement for a Condorcet method
> superior to IRV, I will cheer it on and help you build it.
>
> On Sat, Jun 21, 2025 at 6:43?PM robert bristow-johnson via Election-Methods
> <election-methods at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>
>>> On 06/21/2025 3:49 PM EDT Michael Garman<michael.garman at rankthevote.us>
>> wrote:
>>>> If we're gonna "correct" First-Past-The-Post, let's make sure that the
>> correction itself is as correct as it can possibly be
>>> I, for one, don?t believe in making the perfect the enemy of the good.
>>>
>> The "as correct as it can possibly be" is not perfect.  I acknowledge the
>> existence of Arrow's theorem and of the Condorcet paradox.  Nothing is
>> perfect.
>>
>> But bad outcomes (such as thwarted majority causing unequal votes and
>> spoiled election that harms voters for voting sincerely which then
>> incentivizes tactical voting) due to unnecessary flaws are less correct
>> than unavoidable bad outcomes.  I, for one, believe in correcting
>> unnecessary flaws.
>>
>> These unnecessary flaws are a consequence of an RCV method based on the
>> wrong principles, more precisely the lack of principles.  IRV is procedure
>> someone thought up (and Condorcet did 40-some years before Hare and
>> rejected the idea because he knew what could happen) with intent to solve a
>> problem, essentially the spoiler effect (or IIA) when there are three or
>> more candidates.  Hare proposes a method without really telling us what
>> principle the method is based on.  Or, perhaps, Hare thinks that IRV gives
>> voters a second-choice vote if their favorite candidate cannot be elected.
>> But that's not true.  It never applies to the voters behind the loser in
>> the final round.  Most of the time that doesn't change the outcome of the
>> election, but when it does, it's always bad; spoiled election and all the
>> bad things that come outa that.
>>
>> So IRV is a procedure without a principle.  It just says "Count the
>> highest-ranked votes for candidates that have not yet been defeated, then
>> defeat the candidate with the least votes.  Rinse and repeat."  That's
>> simple, but not a principle.
>>
>> Condorcet says "When more voters rank A over B than than to the contrary,
>> B is not elected."  That's also simple.  The procedure is derived from that
>> principle.  The thing that IRV apologists have to justify is why *should* B
>> be elected?  Why is it a good thing that B is elected?  What principle or
>> what public good is it?
>>
>> --
>>
>> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _rbj at audioimagination.com
>>
>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>>
>> .
>> .
>> .
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
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> Message: 3
> Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2025 22:46:54 -0400
> From: robert bristow-johnson<rbj at audioimagination.com>
> To: Michael Garman<michael.garman at rankthevote.us>
> Cc:election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Better Choices for Democracy
> Message-ID:<2v7c5t4dh4vj8p1bviqtkphh.1750560180228 at email.lge.com>
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>
> Powered by Cricket Wireless------ Original message------From: Michael GarmanDate: Sat, Jun 21, 2025 18:45To: robert bristow-johnson;Cc:election-methods at electorama.com;Subject:Re: [EM] Better Choices for Democracy>When you have a plan for a viable political movement for a Condorcet method superior to IRV, I will cheer it on and help you build it.?Then connect with the Better Choices people.? ?Because, Michael, we're on the right side of history.? FairVote ans RankTheVote ain't quite.
>
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> Message: 4
> Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2025 08:45:15 -0400
> From: Michael Garman<michael.garman at rankthevote.us>
> To: robert bristow-johnson<rbj at audioimagination.com>
> Cc:election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Better Choices for Democracy
> Message-ID:
> 	<CANAGaDc7BNr34GZUM2JEvGkSXAeNXh9ijkfCt1N=dMtP870Uaw at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> That?s a bold claim to make about a group that as of now still appears to
> have little more than some erudite supporters and a slick website. Show me
> the roadmap, and I?ll get in the vehicle.
>
> On Sat, Jun 21, 2025 at 10:46?PM robert bristow-johnson <
> rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>
>> *Powered by Cricket Wireless*
>>
>> ------ Original message------
>> *From: *Michael Garman
>> *Date: *Sat, Jun 21, 2025 18:45
>> *To: *robert bristow-johnson;
>> *Cc: *election-methods at electorama.com;
>> *Subject:*Re: [EM] Better Choices for Democracy
>>
>>> When you have a plan for a viable political movement for a Condorcet
>> method superior to IRV, I will cheer it on and help you build it.
>>
>> Then connect with th e Better Choices people.   Because, Michael, we're on
>> the right side of history.  FairVote ans RankTheVote ain't quite.
>>
>>
>>
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