[EM] Better Choices for Democracy

[Abel Stan]

I find it curious why was a Smith method not chosen?
If Condorcet is the Consensus Choice it would follow that follow that even
when there is not one candidate who wins, the winner would preferably be
from the set of candidates who are all preferred to every single candidate
outside of that set.
While there are good arguments for integrating IRV in one way or the other,
it is still surprising that it would override the natural extension of the
Condorcet rule, thereby also leading to the weird possible outcome below.

I have to assume the main reasons, intentions behind this initiative are:
-To have incremental progress by moving from IRV to Condorcet, where
possible, since this is just an easy extra step. If that is the case, I
wonder why not go with BTR-IRV though... (but Smith//IRV would also be just
one step further)
-To provide an alternative for Ranked Choice Voting as a brand. In this
case, it is also questionable, if for nothing else, because it is to mosr
people, going to seem like just a variant of the former. Moreover, calling
it "consensus" choice might be overselling it. It is a consensus of simple
majorities, not a qualitative consensus process or a quantitative consensus
such as one aiming for some sort of supermajority as legitimacy. I guess it
makes sense regarding center squeeze, and aimong for a median, but then
"compromise" would be more accurate. However, of course that also may not
seem correct to some, since any candidate who is the favorite of the
absolute majority will not really seem like a compromise.

-Abel

On Thu, Jun 19, 2025, 18:17 Markus Schulze via Election-Methods <
election-methods at lists.electorama.com> wrote:

> Hallo,
>
> in May 2025, "Better Choices for Democracy", a new Condorcet
> advocacy group, has launched its website:
>
> https://www.betterchoices.vote
>
> This group consists of people like Nic Tideman, Eric Maskin,
> Charles T. Munger Jr. and James Green-Armytage.
>
> They promote a Condorcet method called "Consensus Choice
> Voting": If there is a Condorcet winner, that candidate
> is the winner of Consensus Choice Voting. Otherwise, the
> winner is determined by IRV. See:
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tMVLU63Ws9A
>
> Interestingly, this Condorcet method doesn't even satisfy
> independence of clones.
>
> Let's say that candidate A is a Condorcet winner, but
> doesn't receive any first preferences. Consensus Choice
> Voting then selects candidate A.
>
> Now, let's say that candidate A is replaced by clones A1,A2,A3
> and that none of these clones is a Condorcet winner. Then, IRV
> kicks in and first eliminates A1, A2 and A3.
>
> Markus Schulze
>
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> info
>
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