[EM] Better Choices for Democracy
Ralph Suter
RLSuter at aol.com
Thu Jun 19 14:37:42 PDT 2025
That's a pretty ridiculous put-down given that they're just getting
started. I can't imagine, judging from the descriptions of the people on
their staff, board of directors, and advisory board, that they're so
stupid as to think that "tell your friends" is anything but the
beginning of a much more sophisticated and well-planned long-term
strategy. One way they're likely to promote their efforts is with op-ed
articles in New York Times, Washington Post, and other major
publications, as Rob Richie of FairVote and other IRV advocates have
often done. My guess is that we'll begin seeing such articles very soon,
maybe in the next week or two.
-Ralph
On 6/19/2025 4:17 PM, Michael Garman wrote:
> It would be neat if they set out an actual theory of change instead of
> just “tell your friends about our cool idea.”
>
> On Thu, Jun 19, 2025 at 5:13 PM Ralph Suter via Election-Methods
> <election-methods at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>
> You've oversimplified what they advocate. Their website says:
>
>
> "In almost all large-scale elections, the process of comparing
> pairs of candidates will identify the Consensus Choice, a single
> candidate who wins all their head-to-head matchups. In the
> unlikely event that no Consensus Choice exists, the ultimate
> winner can be determined by one of the following resolution methods:
>
> "Margin of Loss Resolution: If there is no Consensus Choice,
> the candidate whose largest head-to-head loss is smallest is
> declared the winner.
>
> "Number of Wins & Margin of Loss Resolution: The candidate
> with the most head-to-head wins is declared the winner. In the
> event that multiple candidates tie for most head-to-head wins, the
> tie is broken in favor of the one whose largest head-to-head loss
> is smallest.
>
> "Instant Runoff Resolution: If there is no Consensus Choice,
> Instant Runoff Voting is used to determine the winner."
>
> My biggest question is why they included instant runoff as one of
> the resolution methods, especially because on their FAQ page, they
> explain why it isn't a good method:
>
> "Instant Runoff Voting
>
> "Under Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), voters rank candidates in
> order of preference. Initially, only first-choice votes are
> counted. If no candidate has a majority (>50%), the candidate with
> the fewest first-choice votes is eliminated, and votes for that
> candidate are transferred to the voters’ next-ranked candidates.
> This process repeats until one candidate receives a majority of
> the remaining votes.
>
> "Under Consensus Choice, voters rank candidates similarly, but
> instead of using sequential elimination rounds, we use rankings to
> directly compare each candidate against every other candidate in
> head-to-head matchups. The candidate who wins against every other
> candidate individually is declared the winner.
>
> "Consensus Choice selects the candidate with the broadest support
> across the entire electorate.
>
> "As a result, Consensus Choice discourages divisive campaigning
> because winners must appeal broadly, not just to a faction or a
> particular base of supporters.
>
> "Example:
>
> "IRV: Candidate A initially leads but doesn't have a majority.
> Candidate C is eliminated, and votes transfer primarily to
> Candidate B, making B the winner—even if Candidate D (already
> eliminated) could have beaten B head-to-head.
>
> "Consensus Choice: Candidate B might have the most pairwise
> wins against all others directly, immediately making B the winner
> without needing multiple rounds of eliminations.
>
> "Why it matters:
>
> "Because it eliminates candidates one at a time, Instant Runoff
> may eliminate a candidate early who would have broader appeal overall.
>
> "Consensus Choice encourages candidates to build broader support
> among voters to reduce toxic polarization. Under Instant Runoff
> Voting, the winning candidate only needs to beat the last
> remaining competitor head-to-head, which doesn't necessarily mean
> that the IRV winner has majority support when compared to other
> candidates.
>
> "In short, IRV focuses on sequential elimination rounds, while
> Consensus Choice evaluates comprehensive head-to-head comparisons
> to select the candidate most broadly supported by the electorate."
>
> -Ralph Suter
>
> On 6/19/2025 3:02 PM,
> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com wrote:
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>> Today's Topics:
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>> 1. Better Choices for Democracy (Markus Schulze)
>>
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>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 1
>> Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2025 18:17:35 +0200
>> From: Markus Schulze<markus.schulze8 at gmail.com> <mailto:markus.schulze8 at gmail.com>
>> To:election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>> Subject: [EM] Better Choices for Democracy
>> Message-ID:<465e498b-a7f2-40e8-9083-3cd518c7729d at gmail.com> <mailto:465e498b-a7f2-40e8-9083-3cd518c7729d at gmail.com>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
>>
>> Hallo,
>>
>> in May 2025, "Better Choices for Democracy", a new Condorcet
>> advocacy group, has launched its website:
>>
>> https://www.betterchoices.vote
>>
>> This group consists of people like Nic Tideman, Eric Maskin,
>> Charles T. Munger Jr. and James Green-Armytage.
>>
>> They promote a Condorcet method called "Consensus Choice
>> Voting": If there is a Condorcet winner, that candidate
>> is the winner of Consensus Choice Voting. Otherwise, the
>> winner is determined by IRV. See:
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tMVLU63Ws9A
>>
>> Interestingly, this Condorcet method doesn't even satisfy
>> independence of clones.
>>
>> Let's say that candidate A is a Condorcet winner, but
>> doesn't receive any first preferences. Consensus Choice
>> Voting then selects candidate A.
>>
>> Now, let's say that candidate A is replaced by clones A1,A2,A3
>> and that none of these clones is a Condorcet winner. Then, IRV
>> kicks in and first eliminates A1, A2 and A3.
>>
>> Markus Schulze
>>
>>
>>
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