[EM] Are LIIA, majority, determinism, and neutrality incompatible?
Joshua Boehme
joshua.p.boehme at gmail.com
Thu Jan 30 17:56:47 PST 2025
As a post-script, I realized at the last minute that you mentioned
determinism in the subject. The fact that my counterexample relies on a
distribution might actually be another piece of evidence in favor of
your argument.
On 1/30/25 8:51 PM, Joshua Boehme wrote:
>
> The centrifugal margins solutions to this election seem like a
> reasonable counterexample to me.
>
> These are distributions over potential orderings. Alternatively, you can
> think of these as if the method sometimes returns tied orderings it was
> indifferent between and throws the decision to the tiebreaking mechanism
> (in other words, the tiebreaking becomes external to the method instead
> of internal).
>
> {A, B, C}: 50% A > C > B, 50% C > B > A
> {A, B}: 50% A > B, 50% B > A
> {A, C}: 50% A > C, 50% C > A
> {B, C}: 100% C > B
>
>
> Centrifugal margins satisfies majority and Smith (the latter in the
> "successive Smith set" way that ranked pairs does). I'm not sure whether
> or not it always satisfies LIIA, though.
>
>
> On 1/23/25 08:32, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> > Someone check my reasoning here, because I might have found out why
> LIIA methods like ranked pairs are so intertwined with their tiebreakers.
> >
> > Suppose we have a method that passes majority and also LIIA. (It thus
> has to pass Smith and ISDA.) Consider the following election:
> >
> > 4: A > B > C
> > 5: A > C > B
> > 1: B > A > C
> > 4: B > C > A
> > 1: C > A > B
> > 5: C > B > A
> >
> > A ties both B and C pairwise, and C beats B: A=B, A=C, C>B.
>
>
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