[EM] Mono-add-top method suggestion

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 2025-08-10 07:44, Chris Benham via Election-Methods wrote:
> I think if there was an informed honest debate on the relative merits 
> (for public political elections) of Hare versus one of the best 
> Condorcet methods I think Hare's compliance with Mono-add-Top would be a 
> big point for it.
> 
> MinMax Margins is a Condorcet method that meets Mono-add-Top, but pays 
> too heavy a price for that to qualify as a good Condorcet method.   Hare 
> meets Mono-add-Top and so does Approval.
> 
> This is my (not too fanciful thought experiment) idea for a method that 
> meets Mono-add-Top and is more Condorcet efficient than Hare (but more 
> complicated) using ranked ballots with explicit approval cutoffs ...

This is a generally interesting idea: suppose properties X and Y are 
incompatible. How close to Y can we get while retaining X?

But it's also, generally, a very hard question to answer. The closest I 
can think of something that tries to do that is River's ISDA (as an 
approximation to independence of covered alternatives without losing 
monotonicity), and I don't think River was deliberately designed to pass it.

-km