[EM] The Equal Vote Coalition and robla

[Richard]

On 4/24/25 02:20, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:

 > What would happen if there were three such voters, all voting B=D? To be
 > fair, it would seem you would have to place one and a half voter in B's
 > line and the other in D's. But your constraints say you can't divide the
 > voters into fractions.

If the conference-hall simulation matched actual election counting 
rules, the third voter would not vote in that round.

If a fourth voter also has the B=D equal preference, then that's two 
pairs of voters cooperating.

If decimal numbers were used, the counts would be rounded down to the 
nearest integer.  This correctly simulates the pairing approach. 
Specifically, with three voters having the B=D preference, the count of 
three would be divided by the number of candidates involved, which is 2 
(B and D), that yields 1.5 and that's rounded down to 1, which is the 
number of votes going to candidate B and the number of votes going to 
candidate D.

The difference between what I'm suggesting and what you're suggesting is 
when division occurs.  I'm suggesting it happens once, after counting 
the ballots that share the same pattern.  You're suggesting that a 
ballot can be split into 0.5 votes for candidate B and 0.5 votes for 
candidate D without waiting to see if there are an odd number of voters 
with that ranking pattern.  This means your approach does division at 
each ballot, instead of just once at the end of a counting round.

(BTW, if the election was actually happening in a large convention hall, 
the unpaired voter could choose to stand in line behind either B or D. 
They would not be required to stand aside, even though that's what the 
algorithm essentially does.)


 > On 2025-04-22 02:33, Richard via Election-Methods wrote:

 >> * When software developers write IRV code to correctly count
 >> overvotes, usually they use decimal numbers, such as giving one 
ballot ....

 > What makes this a shortcut and why is it not acceptable?

Using your example of three voters having the B=D preference, it's a 
shortcut if division is done at each ballot instead of first counting 
the total number of B=D voters and then doing the division.

It's not acceptable because voters don't trust decimal numbers for 
single-winner elections.  Even if the results are reported as 
rounded-down integers.

 > I imagine that
 > what that is must be specific to the US, since some local governmental
 > elections in NZ use Meek STV which can produce keep values with no
 > closed form. However, I don't know what it is.

Here in Portland the city-council elections use STV with decimal 
numbers.  Clarification: Here it's called "proportional ranked choice 
voting" rather than STV.  Voters don't mind these decimal numbers in 
these multi-winner elections.  Partially because they are already 
confused by the general STV approach.

Plus, the surplus votes expressed in decimal numbers in the recent 
election were quite small.

Also, a popular video explaining "proportional ranked choice voting" -- 
using actual doughnut preferences of news reporters at the big local 
newspaper -- had very small decimal numbers.  Voters recognize these 
small numbers won't make much difference in STV counting.


 > If it's a matter of numerical precision, then for overvotes (but not
 > Meek) one can use exact fractional arithmetic.

We could.  But that complicates the code.  Which the Republican party 
would use as an excuse to villify.

The Republican party strongly opposes RCV of any kind.  Recently they 
banned Approval voting in North Dakota, where Approval voting already 
was being used in the city of Fargo.

Using 0.33333333 as a ballot weight would be mathematically close 
enough, but some voters would be taught not to trust the lack of full 
accuracy.

For context, the Republican party teaches Republican voters to distrust 
anything other than "one person one vote."  "One person one ballot" is 
villified.

As a further US context, there are still lots of voters who believe 
cheating was involved in the 2008 presidential election.  (Even though 
there is no evidence of any cheating beyond cases such as a few people 
who marked the ballot sent to a recently deceased family member.)  The 
slogan "stop the steal" expresses that distrust.  Of course it's really 
a racial slogan because lots of voters cannot believe a black man could 
have won without any cheating.

The broader perspective is that single-winner elections attract more 
suspicion compared to multi-winner elections.

Thanks for your questions!

Richard Fobes



On 4/24/25 02:20, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> On 2025-04-22 02:33, Richard via Election-Methods wrote:
> 
>> * When software developers write IRV code to correctly count 
>> overvotes, usually they use decimal numbers, such as giving one ballot 
>> half strength for one equal-ranked candidate and half strength for the 
>> voter's other equal-ranked candidate.  This shortcut yields the 
>> correct result, in the sense that the correct candidate gets elected.  
>> However this decimal-number shortcut is not acceptable for 
>> governmental elections.
> 
> What makes this a shortcut and why is it not acceptable? I imagine that 
> what that is must be specific to the US, since some local governmental 
> elections in NZ use Meek STV which can produce keep values with no 
> closed form. However, I don't know what it is.
> 
> If it's a matter of numerical precision, then for overvotes (but not 
> Meek) one can use exact fractional arithmetic.
> 
>> * Here's how to correctly count overvotes in governmental elections, 
>> without departing from the principle of one voter supporting only one 
>> candidate in each round of voting.  First, imagine IRV is being used 
>> in a huge convention hall filled with all the voters and all the 
>> candidates.  Each voter lines up behind their first-choice candidate. 
>> The candidate with the shortest line is eliminated.  The voters in 
>> that shortest line then move to stand in line behind their second 
>> choice. (All other voters stay where they are.)  Now imagine there 
>> were two voters in that shortest line who have an equal preference for 
>> candidates B and D as their second choice.  These two voters agree 
>> that one of them will stand in line behind candidate B, and the other 
>> voter will stand in line behind candidate D.  This "pairing" approach 
>> easily extends to five candidates being marked in the same "rank" 
>> column.  (More than five "equal ranks" can be calculated, but not as 
>> easily, and not as fast.)
> 
> What would happen if there were three such voters, all voting B=D? To be 
> fair, it would seem you would have to place one and a half voter in B's 
> line and the other in D's. But your constraints say you can't divide the 
> voters into fractions.
> 
> -km