[EM] A few more Bucklin variants, because why not?
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-elmet at munsterhjelm.no
Thu Sep 26 09:46:51 PDT 2024
On 2024-09-21 13:53, Etjon Basha wrote:
> Dear gentlemen,
>
>
> A while ago I did write here about the Iterated Bucklin
> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Iterated_Bucklin> method on which I’ve
> recently had a chance to think and generalize about a bit more. Maybe
> some of the below could be novel or otherwise of interest.
>
>
> First, and for our purposes today, let's define the *Serious Candidates
> Set* in the context of a ranked ballot, to include those candidates who
> would win an approval count if they served as the approval cutoff across
> all ballots.
>
>
> In the [2:A>B, 3:C>A, 4:A>B] election as an example, the Set would
> include A and B only, as applying the cutoff at C would still elect B.
>
>
> I’ve been checking some random simulations from Kevin Venzke’s
> votingmethods.net <http://votingmethods.net>, and here are some
> properties of this Set that I *suspect*:
>
> 1.If there is a Condorcet Winner, this Set should always include them.
I think that should hold, at least with strict ranks. Suppose A beats B
pairwise. Then if we set the approval cutoff to A inclusive, every
ballot that has B>A will give a point to B and A, whereas every ballot
that has A>B will give a point only to A. Since A beats B pairwise, the
number of A>B ballots exceed the number of B>A ballots. Thus A must have
a higher approval score than B.
Since A is the CW, this reasoning holds for all other B. A must obtain a
higher approval score than B for any other B. Hence A is the winner and
belongs to the SCS.
> 2.Otherwise, this Set should always partially overlap with the Smith Set.
The reasoning above gets us part of the way. Suppose A is in the Smith
set. For any non-Smith member B, A must obtain more points than B for
the same reason as above. So the non-Smith members can't win.
What we have to show is that it's impossible for e.g. A to be the winner
when the approval cutoff is set at B, B be the winner when it's set at
C, and C be the winner when it's set at A. I'm not sure how to prove
that, though.
-km
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