[EM] 28 years of progress and a wakeup call

[robert bristow-johnson]

> On 05/23/2024 11:03 AM EDT Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
> 
>  
> I think Condorcet//IRV would work fine, and surely could get some 
> support from IRV supporters.
> 
> > What's the one-sentence principle (that's actually true) that describes IRV?
> *Until one candidate remains, one-at-a-time eliminate the favorite 
> (among remaining candidates) of the fewest.*
> 
> The palaver about a "majority" is just to shorten the counting process, 
> and also fits in with the marketing.
> 
> Since you are obsessed with "clear and simple language"  am I right in 
> assuming that for you selling and explaining the concept of the "Smith 
> set" (or top cycle) is out?

Can you imagine legislative language, first defining the Smith set and then the actual reference to the Smith set in the verbiage of the law?

> What is your problem with  Condorcet//Approval?    If you don't like the 
> "implicit" version (where all candidates ranked above bottom are 
> considered approved), then what about the "explicit" version?

I just want Condorcet in law, that spells out plainly who the Condorcet winner is and how that candidate is identified from the ballot data.  Now, being a two-method system, the law will also have to spell out what to do when there is no Condorcet winner.  Condorcet-Approval is pretty simple and implicitly defining any ranked candidate as having received an Approval vote is simple enough.  Perhaps it could be a better law than Condorcet-Plurality or Condorcet-TTR.

What are the tactical/strategic voting implications of Condorcet-Approval?  How is it better to disincentivize strategic or tactical voting?  What are the pitfalls?

I'm a bit concerned about the loss of voter expressivity in the case of a cycle, with Condorcet-Approval.

I am a little concerned about two candidates, say George W Bush and Donald Trump, neither whom I approve, but I may very well rank W one rung higher than the corrupt, criminal, mendacious, narcissistic demagogue.  So I would have to rank W which would imply approval if the election goes into a cycle.

> But several other ballot styles have been suggested for this type of 
> method.  Someone liked having a Yes/No box next to every candidate.  The 
> approval cutoff being a "virtual candidate" has been suggested, a 0-100 
> score ballot with scores above 50 counting as approval and so on.  I 
> suggested that the voters could mark the lowest ranked candidate they 
> approve, and so that candidate plus the ones they rank not below that 
> candidate are counted as approved.

I think anything more than just asking voters to rank their preferences is asking too much.  It requires or burdens the voters to think tactically.

I'm still thinking perhaps Condorcet-TTR might be best.  It's within epsilon of Condorcet-IRV (like that California bill from a few years ago) but it doesn't carry the semantic baggage of all of the IRV elements (like "active candidates" or "continuing candidates" or transferred votes, etc.).

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r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

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