[EM] Manipulability stats for (some) poll methods

Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com
Fri May 17 14:51:53 PDT 2024


>
> It might be easier to deal with complexity if/when better methods gain a
> reputation for being good. Some countries use very complex methods, but
> it works because the people generally trusts them. E.g. Meek in New
> Zealand, or the greedy top-up seat algorithm used here in Norway for
> national proportionality (or Pukelsheim's in Switzerland for that
> matter, which, IMHO, is better than the greedy method).
>
I don't think anyone cares about the fine details like Meek vs. Gregory.
Very few people in countries using party-list PR could explain how
apportionment works. What matters is whether voters get the gist of it. You
don't need to know how surplus votes are reallocated if an eliminated
candidate has their ballots transferred to an already-elected candidate.
All you need to know is "IRV is when you kick out the candidate with the
least votes, then repeat the election. STV is that but proportional."

On Thu, May 16, 2024 at 4:27 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 2024-05-16 02:33, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> >
> >
> >> On 05/15/2024 2:30 PM EDT Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On 2024-05-15 17:04, Filip Ejlak wrote:
> >>> śr., 15 maj 2024, 10:47 użytkownik Michael Ossipoff
> >>> <email9648742 at gmail.com <mailto:email9648742 at gmail.com>> napisał:
> >>>
> >>>>      Yes, then, as you suggest, “manipulability” doesn’t tell us
> anything
> >>>>      of interest. I agree.
> >>>
> >>>>      Then how much do those manipulability numbers mean, in regards to
> >>>>      the strategic merit of the methods. Nothing?
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> I can't agree at all. IMO the primary goal of a good voting method is
> to
> >>> make voters not regret voting honestly.
> >
> > Yes.  But it also has to be perceived by Joe Sixpack as fair and "right".
> >
> > The method needs to be principled and these principles few in number and
> concise in expression.
>
> If it weren't for this part, my fpA-max fpC method would've been quite
> good. Its strategy resistance is around that of Condorcet,TTR, but it's
> monotone. But alas, its scoring function is pretty hard to understand
> because it was found by a computer search.
>
> It might be easier to deal with complexity if/when better methods gain a
> reputation for being good. Some countries use very complex methods, but
> it works because the people generally trusts them. E.g. Meek in New
> Zealand, or the greedy top-up seat algorithm used here in Norway for
> national proportionality (or Pukelsheim's in Switzerland for that
> matter, which, IMHO, is better than the greedy method).
>
> >>> While it's useful to be able to
> >>> use a defensive strategy after analysing expected poll outcomes,
> >>> frontrunners etc., the best voting method would be the one that does
> not
> >>> create the need to take these things into the account at all.
> >>> Chances of being able to vote honestly, with no strategic burden to
> >>> bear. That's what the manipulability numbers are about.
> >>
> >> Thank you for saying that much more succinctly than I did.
> >>
> >
> > That says something.  (I have credited Kristofer before for succinct
> analytical judgements and statements.)
> >
> >> Although I would say that winner quality given honesty also matters :-)
> >> At least to avoid the kind of outcomes that lead people to repeal the
> >> method.
> >
> > I dunno how to measure, in a non-partisan manner, "winner quality".
>
> In a real election, we can't. But the spatial model I use for the
> manipulability test gives each voter a quality measure of each
> candidate. So we can just use those utilities directly.
>
> See
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Social_utility_efficiency&oldid=1222909293
> for more information.
>
> James Green-Armytage has also done some investigations into the
> trade-off between strategy resistance and utilitarian efficiency.
> https://www.jamesgreenarmytage.com/strategy-utility.pdf Figure 1, e.g.
>
> Though for the models derived from real sources, we should keep in mind
> that if the voting method gets better at protecting candidates, the
> candidate landscape may change.
>
> -km
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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