[EM] Detailed stats for the ordinal methods
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_elmet at t-online.de
Thu May 9 10:45:40 PDT 2024
On 2024-05-09 18:08, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
> Bravo Kristofer! Thank you for doing these valuable calculations!!
>
> IMO it reveals two important points:
>
> * The methods that get the highest resistance to strategic/tactical
> voting are methods that combine pairwise vote counting with IRV-style
> counting. Specifically the lowest failure rates are for:
>
> ** RCIPE (IRV with pairwise eliminations)
> ** Benham (IRV except stop when pairwise winner)
> ** Smith-IRV (Woodall)
> ** Schwartz-IRV (Schwartz-Woodall)
> ** IRV.
In particular, strategy resistance seems to be linked to the resistant
set I defined last year. https://electowiki.org/wiki/Resistant_set
Here's a rough example showing just that, with Resistant,Borda. 5k
elections so it won't take so long to calculate, but the other details
are as in my previous simulations: 99 voters, 4 dimensions, and 4
candidates:
Ties: 0.001 (5)
Of the non-ties:
Burial, no compromise: 123 0.0246246
Compromise, no burial: 72 0.0144144
Burial and compromise: 147 0.0294294
Two-sided: 48 0.00960961
Other coalition strats: 1 0.0002002
================================================
Manipulable elections: 391 0.0782783
Worked in 391 (0.0752, 0.0828) out of 4995 for [Inner burial
set],[ER-Borda] ties: 5
Going from 0.70 to 0.08 by restricting to a particular set is pretty
respectable.
The IRV hybrids you listed elect from the resistant set because they
pass a "proper order criterion": if X disqualifies Y, then X is never
eliminated before Y.
I don't quite know *why* electing from the resistant set seems to grant
general strategy resistance. I've only been able to prove burial
resistance, though in practice it limits other strategies too.
-km
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