[EM] wv autodeterence obtains with bigger faction-size differences too.

[Michael Ossipoff]

Typo:

That paragraph should start:

“ I consider the merit-difference between Acceptables *& Unacceptables* …”

On Sat, May 4, 2024 at 04:20 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Sat, May 4, 2024 at 02:41 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
>> Mike O.,
>>
>> One or two examples might be interesting.
>>
>
> Of course, & In the morning (or early afternoon) I’ll post some examples
> from the 48-case test.
>
> It’s late ⏰ in my timezone. The only reason I’m up now is because I
> stayed-up inadvisably-late. But tomorrow I’ll post those examples.
>
>>
>> Say there is a defensive strategy that those who prefer the sincere CW
>> to the favourite of would-be buriers can employ and it will be effective
>> if all of them use it.
>
>
> Yes. There is, because the wv Condorcet methods meet Minimal-Defense.
>
> Don’t rank anyone you don’t like. If the CW’s voters don’t, then no one
> that they don’t like will be able to take-away the CW’s win via burial (…&
> offensive truncation by one faction won’t work anyway.) …& if anyone
> attempts such a burial, it will backfire.
>
> I think it would be interesting to know how well this works in different
>> methods when those voters don't all use it. In other words, for some
>> given method, how high does the proportion of voters who prefer the
>> sincere CW to the BF using the defensive strategy have to be for it to
>> work?
>
>
> I don’t know the details, but yes, it’s definitely a problem….or would be,
> without autodeterence.
>
> It’s the reason why the wv Condorcet methods’ autodeterence is so
> important.
>
> Without autodeterence, if I can’t count on enough CW voters using
> defensive-truncation, then they might let an Unacceptable win by burial.
>
> I consider the merit-difference between Acceptables to be incomparably
> greater than any merit differences *among* the Acceptables or among the
> Unacceptables. Therefore not electing an Unacceptable is, for me, is what
> matters in the election.
>
> That means *fully* & *maximally* protecting the Acceptables.
>
> So, just in case the CW voters don’t protect their candidate, I must try
> my best to.
>
> To do my best to not help buriers make an Acceptable pairbeat the CW, I
> must not rank any of them over the likely CW. I must rank all of the
> Acceptables together in 1st place.
>
> But what if insufficiently many people do that? It will be ineffective.
> So, again, I can’t count on that.
>
> So I must, instead, rank the Acceptables in order of how likely they are
> to be the CW. …so that I’m doing my best to try to *actively-oppose* any
> burial-attempt.
>
> That likely will mean burying my favorite.
>
> (In fact, of course it’s even worse with a Condorcet method that doesn’t
> even meet Minimal-Deterrence at all—which is why I say that such methods
> share IRV’s serious FBC-failure…for very similar reason.)
>
> But, with autodeterence, even without defensive-strategy use, burial is
> well-deterred.
>
> …& so no defensive strategy is really needed. We have no need to do other
> than rank sincerely. That fulfills the promise of Condorcet.
>
>  …& the ideal of rank-methods.
>
> …&, in fact, the very ideal of perfection for voting-systems.
>
> I’m not saying that I wouldn’t do defensive-truncation anyway—as part of
> *maximal* defense of the acceptables.
>
> But, if I really like some Acceptables better than others, I wouldn’t
> consider it necessary to not rank them in order of preference. Due to the
> autodeterence, it would be safe to benefit from the full Condorcet promise.
>
> …if I feel sufficiently strongly about the merit-differences among the
> Acceptables.
>
> I should have mentioned that, not only might the CW-voters not protect
> hir, but, also, their idea of what they like or is acceptable might be
> different from mine—like when Jill’s other preferrers vote for Joe. :-(
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> Chris B.
>>
>> On 4/05/2024 7:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>> > Chris—
>> >
>> > As you suggested, I tested wv Condorcet with greater faction-size
>> > disparity.
>> >
>> > Instead of placing the faction-sizes as closely as possible, this time
>> > I spaced them from eachother by a factor of 3/2.
>> >
>> > That’s about as much disparity as possible without giving someone a
>> > majority.
>> >
>> > The relative faction-sizes were 4, 6, & 9.
>> >
>> > Of course that could mean 40, 60, & 90…etc.
>> >
>> > The result was the same: Burial’ backfire was 10 times more likely
>> > than its success.
>> >
>> > Nothing like that has been said for any other Condorcet-complying
>> method.
>> >
>> > ----
>> > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
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