[EM] Part 3 of Approval vs Condorcet

[Michael Ossipoff]

Obviously I can't prove it, but look how incomparably much easier Approval
is to describe, propose & implement at zero cost.

On Fri, Mar 22, 2024 at 3:12 AM Michael Garman <
michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:

> >> If Approval had been the proposal over that period, it would be in use
> in all 50 states by now.
>
> I find it incredibly hard to believe that there wouldn’t be a partisan
> backlash the first time approval cost one or the other — or both — the
> election. The major parties famously love giving third parties a fair shot.
> Not denying that it’s a fine system that ought to be used in more places
> than it currently is, but this claim is absurd.
>
> On Fri, Mar 22, 2024 at 8:07 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Part 3:
>>
>> …
>>
>> Part 2 didn’t send. I wrote it on my phone, & it failed to send.
>> Hopefully a copy will be returned to me, so that I can try again to send
>> it. But I’m writing this Part 3 on the desk-computer, so that I can save it
>> in Word, so that, whatever happens with unsuccessful sending, I’ll have it
>> to resend.
>>
>> …
>>
>> Approval-Advantages continued:
>>
>> …
>>
>> Let’s talk about enactment:
>>
>> …
>>
>> The incomparably easier implementation makes Approval much more
>> enactable. Let me say more about easy implantation: Approval can be
>> implemented with no new balloting-equipment, & also without even any
>> software-modifications. Here’s a way:
>>
>> …
>>
>> The existing Plurality-count software is designed for collecting  a
>> single vote in a race. So tell the count-program that there are many 2-way
>> races (one for each candidate). The ballot has a line for each candidate’s
>> name & voting-bubble. But, alternating with those lines, are blank lines,
>> where the count-program expects votes for the nonexistent other candidate
>> in the fictitious 2-way race.
>>
>> …
>>
>> So, when the counting is done, the count-program will report the results
>> for all those fictitious 2-way races, including 0 for each of the
>> vote-totals for the nonexistent opponents, & also the vote-totals for each
>> actual candidate.
>>
>> …
>>
>> In that way, the existing Plurality count-software will give the totals
>> for each actual candidate, summed over all the ballots.
>>
>> …
>>
>> So that’s why I said that Approval can be implemented at zero cost. No
>> software modification needed.
>>
>> …
>>
>> Now, what does FairVote (under various names) have to show for its 35
>> years of expensively promoting IRV (under various names)?  Two states &
>> some cities.
>>
>> …
>>
>> Two states.
>>
>> …
>>
>> Sorry, but I don’t call that success. Sure, if the people of Oregon &
>> Nevada have been well-enough deceived, there could be two more states this
>> year. But 4 out of 50 sounds more like failure for a 35-year effort.
>>
>> …
>>
>> If Approval had been the proposal over that period, it would be in use in
>> all 50 states by now.
>>
>> …
>>
>> Critreria:
>>
>> …
>>
>> Just as an added bonus:
>>
>> …
>>
>> Approval passes several criteria that Condorcet fails:
>>
>> …
>>
>> Participation, Consistency, & IIAC (all without loss of Pareto).
>>
>> …
>>
>> I don’t include FBC, because Condorcet’s FBC-failure that we discussed at
>> EM a long time ago is so rare as to be strategically-irrelevant.
>>
>> …
>>
>> If burial is a problem, then FBC-failure comes back when we need
>> favorite-burying drastic defenses to try to protect CW from burial. But the
>> wv Condorcet-versions are so burial-deterrent, in 2 separate ways
>> (Minimal-Defense & autodeterrence*), that burial can be ignored when voting.
>>
>> …
>>
>> *Even without any defensive-truncation, burial’s backfire is 10 times
>> more likely than its success.
>>
>> …
>>
>> [Conclusion of this short Part 3]
>>
>> …
>>
>> If Part 2 hasn’t been sent yet, & doesn’t automatically get sent,
>> hopefully a copy will be returned to me, & I’ll then send it along.
>>
>> …
>>
>> I have to say that, from now on, anything long will be written in word on
>> the desktop computer instead of on the phone, for safekeeping of long
>> messages in case they fail to send & are lost.
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
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