[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

[Michael Garman]

I also don’t see a “like/dislike” binary as a useful way to approach this
question. Let’s take the Joe/Jill/Donald three-way race we were discussing
some ways back.

I don’t care for Joe or Donald, but I’d much rather the former win than the
latter, so I rank the three candidates 2-1-3 in the order I listed them
above.  Joe wins, and even  though I dislike him, I’m pleased he won
because the guy I dislike the most lost.

You can’t guarantee that a candidate you “like” or feel warm and fuzzy
about will win an election. That’s why no one ever tells a voter, “This
method will only elect candidates you personally affirmatively like.” That
would be absurd.


On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 1:44 PM Michael Garman <
michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:

> And where have they “lied” about that? Stated that your vote will never
> count for anyone you dislike even if you rank them?
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 12:33 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 04:15 Michael Garman <
>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>
>>> > So FairVote meant to guarantee that, when the candidates you like or
>>> want are gone, “We guarantee that one of the remaining ones,  that you
>>> don’t like, will get your vote.”
>>>
>>> No one you dislike will ever get your vote unless you rank them. Your
>>> vote only counts for candidates if you rank them. Don’t rank candidates you
>>> don’t like.
>>>
>>>
>> That’s poor instrumental-strategy in Hare. Other than making a
>> principled-statement by refusing to rank someone, you should rank all of
>> the ones that you don’t like in order of preference. …because, by the time
>> your vote reaches any of them, the ones that you like better are already
>> gone. So you can only improve your outcome, when you rank all the way to
>> the bottom.
>>
>> Anyway if you didn’t rank anyone below the candidates you like—say your
>> 1st & 2nd choices— your unappealing guarantee doesn’t even apply.
>>
>> …&, when it does, it’s no guarantee at all.
>>
>> So the question becomes: Why did FairVote make the distinctly unappealing
>> guarantee that you claim that they were making ??
>>
>> Answer: Of course they didn’t. Your latest story doesn’t hold up.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 11:24 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 02:46 Michael Garman <
>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> > Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next  or 2nd  choice
>>>>> *among  the  un-eliminated candidates.”
>>>>>
>>>>> Well, yes. That’s intuitive. And it’s how we explain it when we talk
>>>>> to real people. They get it! They’re not deliberately obtuse like some
>>>>> folks online. We also use “next choice” — which we explain is shorthand for
>>>>> “next highest remaining choice” — to avoid this confusion.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Aside from the fact that Michael G.’s interpretation sounds like
>>>> something that would be said by a caught FlimFlam-man, it also has a big
>>>> hole in it.
>>>>
>>>> If FairVote only meant what Michael G. said, & if the targeted audience
>>>> interpreted it that way, then it doesn’t guarantee *squat*.
>>>>
>>>> So FairVote meant to guarantee that, when the candidates you like or
>>>> want are gone, “We guarantee that one of the remaining ones,  that you
>>>> don’t like, will get your vote.”
>>>>
>>>> :-D
>>>>
>>>> “Oh the tangled webs we weave…”
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> > Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
>>>>> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
>>>>> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>>>>>
>>>>> > Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he also
>>>>> promised to publicly retract it.)
>>>>>
>>>>> Cool story! Have you got any evidence? This stretches credibility.
>>>>>
>>>>> > I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote.
>>>>>
>>>>> The only difference between Wolk and Richie is one pushes a reform you
>>>>> like more. You can’t call one a “propagandist” and not the other. This
>>>>> isn’t evidence — it’s hearsay.
>>>>>
>>>>> > Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise has
>>>>> happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington & Alaska.
>>>>>
>>>>> Whose ballots didn’t count for their next choices? If I were an Alaska
>>>>> voter and I ranked Begich first, my vote would go to whomever I ranked
>>>>> second. If I were a Palin or Peltola voter, it would still count for my
>>>>> first choice.
>>>>>
>>>>> > Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
>>>>> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>>>>>
>>>>> > …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>>>>>
>>>>> if the only other option is an even bigger piece of shit, then yes.
>>>>> That’s how democracy works — you vote for the best option you’ve got.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 10:39 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 01:38 Michael Garman <
>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You keep crying about “fraud” without producing a shred of evidence
>>>>>>> for your claims. What, exactly, are the “lies,” and how can you prove that
>>>>>>> there is intent to deceive behind these alleged “lies”?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Evidently Michael G. has forgotten that we’ve been over this many,
>>>>>> many times.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If Michael G. would have a look at his cult’s promotional-material,
>>>>>> he’d find that it promises , throughout, that “RCV” doesn’t have a
>>>>>> spoiler-problem, because, if your favorite doesn’t win, then your vote will
>>>>>> count for your 2nd (or next) choice.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Maybe.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Oops!!! The Jim Jones KoolAid Company forgot to say “maybe”.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But here’s where it really begins to get good !!:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How do cult-followers answer that?:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> “Obviously they must have only meant ‘your next  or 2nd  choice
>>>>>> *among  the  un-eliminated candidates.”
>>>>>>
>>>>>> :-D
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …& no, I didn’t make that up !!
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ok, & by that bizarre contorted & hilarious definition of 2nd or next
>>>>>> choice then:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Wait, even if your 2nd choice is still there he’s no longer your 2nd
>>>>>> choice—He’s your *first* choice among the in-eliminated candidates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …& later, if your next-to-last choice gets eliminated, & transfers to
>>>>>> the last remaining candidate,  your last choice, tthen now your last choice
>>>>>> has become your 1st choice !!!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …because now he’s your 1st choice among the un-eliminated candidates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When I told that to a cult-follower here, what could he do, but try
>>>>>> to evade by changing the subject.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You asked how I can say for sure that it’s a lie, & not just an
>>>>>> honest mistake.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Well Howabout the fact that we in the single-winner reform community
>>>>>> have been explaining it to the cult-leadership for 35 years.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Additionally, at a meeting of the leaders of some
>>>>>> enactment-organizations…probably EqualVote, CES, & FairVote, the others
>>>>>> confronted Rob Richie about the lie (the one that I referred to above).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Richie promised to stop telling the lie. (I don’t know if he also
>>>>>> promised to publicly retract it.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …but Richie’s organization was soon continuing the use of the lie.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Does anyone believe that that was honest mis-statement?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Now, when I reported that in the discussion, the IRVist said he
>>>>>> didn’t believe it, & asked for support of it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I’d heard about it from Sara Wolk, director of EqualVote. So I asked
>>>>>> her. She said it was at a meeting of electoral-reform
>>>>>> enactment-organizations, in New Orleans.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If you want more details ask her. She probably told me the year, but
>>>>>> I don’t remember that detail.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is Michael G. going to claim that she made it up?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then there’s the fact that the violation of the false-promise has
>>>>>> happened right in front of FairVote’s face, at least in Burlington & Alaska.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The answer given to that is that twice isn’t much. But our
>>>>>> candidate-system has long discouraged anyone but a certain two.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …& I didn’t notice “usually” in FairVote’s false-promise.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You keep twisting yourself into knots in order to justify opposing a
>>>>>>> reform that, while imperfect, represents a step forward.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What it represents is a bizarre caricature of electoral-reform.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don’t criticize Hare, which might be okay if offered honestly.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don’t criticize the use of humungous money to push it through
>>>>>> everywhere.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ..except when lying is used in order to improve the chance of
>>>>>> enactment.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Your ideal system isn’t on the ballot — this one is. You can’t call
>>>>>>> yourself a reformer and encourage people to vote against reform.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Do, did you hear that? You aren’t a reformer unless you support
>>>>>> fraudulent “reform” & get line behind the big bucks, & march with the cult.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …& if a piece of sh*t is on the ballot, we have to support it?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 8:42 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 23:32 Michael Garman <
>>>>>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Ah yes, Oregon and Nevada should vote to keep an inferior system,
>>>>>>>>> because Michael Ossipoff on the Internet can’t handle not getting exactly
>>>>>>>>> what he wants and believes in letting the perfect be the enemy of the good.
>>>>>>>>> Shame on you.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Evidently Michael Garman thinks that fraud is good.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hare is questionable, but might be okay….if people know what
>>>>>>>> they’re getting when they enact it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> .., unlikely when someone is getting it enacted by lying about what
>>>>>>>> it is & will do.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I’ve repeatedly asked the “RCV” organizations to choose honesty.
>>>>>>>> But no, not if that might reduce the chances of enactment.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That’s called lying & fraud.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hare’s worst problem is its dishonest promoters.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 2:54 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hare might not manifest its problem for the reason I gave, if
>>>>>>>>>> voters know what they’re doing. But its fraudulent promotion works against
>>>>>>>>>> that hope.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Given the consistent fraudulent promotion, with enactments based
>>>>>>>>>> on an intentional lie regarding what “RCV” is & will do, we shouldn’t be
>>>>>>>>>> expected to trust that it will work.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Given the fraudulent promotion, Oregon & Nevada should reject
>>>>>>>>>> “RCV”.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Principle doesn’t support fraud.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Fraudulently-achieved “progress” isn’t progress.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 17:10 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>>>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the
>>>>>>>>>>>> keep values,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt you
>>>>>>>>>>>> could go
>>>>>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how
>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek works.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a
>>>>>>>>>>>> method with
>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I think there's two things to distinguish here:
>>>>>>>>>>> 1. Trusting the voting machines/computers—this is just an
>>>>>>>>>>> American thing, really, because of 2020. That rules out anything that's not
>>>>>>>>>>> precinct-summable, though I think it means we *really* need some
>>>>>>>>>>> kind of verifiable voting.
>>>>>>>>>>> 2. Trusting the voting *method*. The key here is that even
>>>>>>>>>>> educated, high-information voters don't care about details and won't
>>>>>>>>>>> understand them, but they need to have a high-level overview of your
>>>>>>>>>>> system. The educated, high-information voters are the key, because they're
>>>>>>>>>>> the ones on all the talk shows, telling their friends to support referenda,
>>>>>>>>>>> etc. These people are smart, but they aren't math nerds. We can (and
>>>>>>>>>>> should) hand-wave and use imprecise but familiar language to get your point
>>>>>>>>>>> across.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> As an example, here's my explanation of ranked pairs for the
>>>>>>>>>>> educated voter: "For every pair of candidates, we check which candidate is
>>>>>>>>>>> ranked higher by more voters. If somebody wins every matchup, they get
>>>>>>>>>>> elected. If nobody wins every one-on-one matchup, we ignore some of the
>>>>>>>>>>> matchups that are closest to being tied. This is the fairest way to have an
>>>>>>>>>>> election because if most people want someone to win, that candidate should
>>>>>>>>>>> win. That's just democracy. We can ignore elections that are basically tied
>>>>>>>>>>> since they don't really matter much."
>>>>>>>>>>> "Hmm, makes sense, but what's wrong with IRV?"
>>>>>>>>>>> "Well, in Alaska, they say Nick Begich lost because he got too
>>>>>>>>>>> many votes. It's called a 'monotonicity failure.' But something's wrong
>>>>>>>>>>> with Alaska's elections if you can somehow lose because you got too many
>>>>>>>>>>> votes."
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> This glosses over a lot of details about equal-ranking, what
>>>>>>>>>>> "closest to tied" means, etc. They might even confuse the description I
>>>>>>>>>>> gave with minimax. That's fine. They don't care. (There's never going to be
>>>>>>>>>>> a >3-candidate cycle in real life anyways.) They're willing to delegate
>>>>>>>>>>> details to mathematicians and economists, as long as they understand
>>>>>>>>>>> why this system makes sense, and they want to be able to give an overview.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The same goes for IRV—IRV has gotten so popular because it just
>>>>>>>>>>> keeps getting explained as "eliminate all the spoiler candidates, reassign
>>>>>>>>>>> their votes to the next-highest candidate, and then pick whoever got the
>>>>>>>>>>> most votes."
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment
>>>>>>>>>>>> method. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be better). I
>>>>>>>>>>>> suspect
>>>>>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it
>>>>>>>>>>>> works. Over
>>>>>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles
>>>>>>>>>>>> top-up
>>>>>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while also
>>>>>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that an
>>>>>>>>>>>> average
>>>>>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it, so
>>>>>>>>>>>> there's
>>>>>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding: personally
>>>>>>>>>>>> I'd favor
>>>>>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Here's another example of "glossing over details is ok":
>>>>>>>>>>> Huntington-Hill is where you take every state's population, divide by the
>>>>>>>>>>> size of a congressional district to get the correct number of districts,
>>>>>>>>>>> and then you round to the integer with the smallest % error (whereas
>>>>>>>>>>> Webster rounds to the nearest integer). (Which is how the Census Bureau
>>>>>>>>>>> describes it on their website!)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Explaining that "% error" involves natural logs or geometric
>>>>>>>>>>> means isn't important, nor is iteratively picking better divisors.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 5:27 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
>>>>>>>>>>> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-03-18 02:03, Rob Lanphier wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> > Hi Kristofer,
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > I have a detailed reply below.  In short, I'm still pretty
>>>>>>>>>>>> sure Michael
>>>>>>>>>>>> > Ossipoff is worth listening to every so often (even though
>>>>>>>>>>>> many of his
>>>>>>>>>>>> > emails are thoughtless stream-of-consciousness that would get
>>>>>>>>>>>> him banned
>>>>>>>>>>>> > in most places, and I haven't ruled that out if it becomes
>>>>>>>>>>>> clear he's
>>>>>>>>>>>> > driving people away).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> That may be, but I feel he's rather too irascible to deal with,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and that
>>>>>>>>>>>> he gets his partisan preferences in the way of discussing
>>>>>>>>>>>> methods.
>>>>>>>>>>>> (Other readers, feel free to skip to "voting method stuff
>>>>>>>>>>>> below".)
>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's from the discussion that ultimately led to the plonkage:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2023-09-21, Mike argued in favor of IRV by (as I understood
>>>>>>>>>>>> it)
>>>>>>>>>>>> essentially saying that, given that IRV has compromising
>>>>>>>>>>>> failure, any
>>>>>>>>>>>> electorate that knew this and still went for IRV were tough
>>>>>>>>>>>> enough not
>>>>>>>>>>>> to compromise to begin with. The reasoning went that, as they
>>>>>>>>>>>> know of
>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV's compromising failure, they wouldn't choose a method that
>>>>>>>>>>>> had
>>>>>>>>>>>> compromising failure unless they were determined to avoid
>>>>>>>>>>>> triggering
>>>>>>>>>>>> that failure. Quoting:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> > So I’m sure that I’ll propose & recommend good Condorcet
>>>>>>>>>>>> versions
>>>>>>>>>>>> > (even if I don’t yet know which ones & how many) over IRV.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > …but I’ll nonetheless include IRV among the methods that I
>>>>>>>>>>>> offer,
>>>>>>>>>>>> > because it’s better than a lot of people believe.   …though
>>>>>>>>>>>> its merit &
>>>>>>>>>>>> > workability strongly depend on the electorate & the
>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate-lineup.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > I.e. Because it isn’t Condorcet-complying, it’s necessary
>>>>>>>>>>>> that the
>>>>>>>>>>>> > electorate aren’t timid lesser-evil giveaway voters.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > But an electorate that has just enacted IRV in a referendum
>>>>>>>>>>>> didn’t
>>>>>>>>>>>> > do so because they want to rank Lesser-Evil over their
>>>>>>>>>>>> favorite. They
>>>>>>>>>>>> > enacted it because they want to rank sincerely, to express &
>>>>>>>>>>>> fully help
>>>>>>>>>>>> > their favorite.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Emphasis on the last sentence. Source
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004912.html.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> At the time I found this very strange, and it seemed to me that
>>>>>>>>>>>> using
>>>>>>>>>>>> such reasoning could lead to absurdity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, on the 25th., he said that Coombs had too much of a
>>>>>>>>>>>> burial
>>>>>>>>>>>> incentive to be useful.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> > Some academic authors have high praise for Coombs. One say
>>>>>>>>>>>> that, with
>>>>>>>>>>>> > sincere ranking, & fewer than 5 candidates, Coombs always
>>>>>>>>>>>> elects the CW.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial strategy.
>>>>>>>>>>>> In particular,
>>>>>>>>>>>> > trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of a “
>>>>>>>>>>>> lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > Sure, after that betrayal, they’d hopefully never have any
>>>>>>>>>>>> support from
>>>>>>>>>>>> > their victims again.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > But 1) Again we’re talking about resolution at least an
>>>>>>>>>>>> election-cycle
>>>>>>>>>>>> > later; & 2) It could devolve to never-ending routine mutual
>>>>>>>>>>>> burial.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > Coombs doesn’t sound very promising to me.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Source:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-September/004941.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> So I thought I would respond by poking a bit of fun at it, and
>>>>>>>>>>>> indirectly show how the IRV reasoning proved too much and could
>>>>>>>>>>>> lead to
>>>>>>>>>>>> absurdity:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> >> But Coombs is obviously vulnerable to east burial strategy.
>>>>>>>>>>>> In
>>>>>>>>>>>> >> particular, trust & betrayal perpetrated by the voters of a
>>>>>>>>>>>> “ lesser”-evil.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > Clearly then, knowing this fact, the voters who propose and
>>>>>>>>>>>> enact Coombs
>>>>>>>>>>>> > must be tough voters who would never ever bury. Therefore
>>>>>>>>>>>> Coombs' burial
>>>>>>>>>>>> > incentive is no problem wherever it would be proposed.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > I jest :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Apparently he got quite offended. He responded:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> >> I jest :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > …&, by so doing, you waste our time, & space at the
>>>>>>>>>>>> postings-page, & send
>>>>>>>>>>>> > your substandard attempt at humor to everyone’s e-mail.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > …
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > You’re aware that your bullshit is going to the e-mail of
>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>> > list-subscriber, right?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> > The only absurdity is in his sloppy attempt at an analogy,
>>>>>>>>>>>> which has
>>>>>>>>>>>> > nothing in common with what it’s supposed to be an analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>> for.   …& his
>>>>>>>>>>>> > equally sloppy & absurd conclusion from it (which he
>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed as a serious
>>>>>>>>>>>> > “real point”, rather than as “jest”);
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I enjoy these sorts of replies about as much as the next guy,
>>>>>>>>>>>> which is
>>>>>>>>>>>> to say not at all, so that was that. Now, he did say in his
>>>>>>>>>>>> post that
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> > Perhaps Kristofer didn’t read my posts that said that RCV’s
>>>>>>>>>>>> > disadvantage is that it strongly depends on the electorate
>>>>>>>>>>>> not being timid
>>>>>>>>>>>> > lesser-evil giveaway-voters.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> which suggests that his point was not so much "electorates who
>>>>>>>>>>>> propose
>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV must necessarily have precommitted themselves to not do
>>>>>>>>>>>> compromising" as "IRV will fail if the electorate hasn't". But
>>>>>>>>>>>> if so,
>>>>>>>>>>>> there are definitely better ways to to say "I think your joke
>>>>>>>>>>>> is off the
>>>>>>>>>>>> mark, you must have misunderstood".
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I usually don't poke fun to press the absurdity of a point, so
>>>>>>>>>>>> I think
>>>>>>>>>>>> he had already got under my skin at that point. All the more
>>>>>>>>>>>> reason to
>>>>>>>>>>>> stay away.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Anyway,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> === voting method stuff below ===
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> > Credible voter models show that approval voting
>>>>>>>>>>>> > and Condorcet consistency are practically compatible, even if
>>>>>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>>>>>> > aren't strictly compatible.  A system that "computers can
>>>>>>>>>>>> count, even if
>>>>>>>>>>>> > people can't" is not viable in our lifetimes, because people
>>>>>>>>>>>> are more
>>>>>>>>>>>> > complicated than computers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The example I like to use here is Meek in New Zealand local
>>>>>>>>>>>> elections.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek's method uses a fixed point iteration to determine the
>>>>>>>>>>>> keep values,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and thus necessarily has to be counted by computer. I doubt you
>>>>>>>>>>>> could go
>>>>>>>>>>>> to an average New Zealand voter and get them to explain how
>>>>>>>>>>>> Meek works.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Yet they use it, so it's possible for the voters to trust a
>>>>>>>>>>>> method with
>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized counting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> And I suppose that's the point: trust. It's harder to trust a
>>>>>>>>>>>> computerized system when it hasn't built up a reputation for
>>>>>>>>>>>> good
>>>>>>>>>>>> results, or when previous complicated systems have failed (if
>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV is to
>>>>>>>>>>>> be considered both a complicated system and one that failed).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Another example would be the Huntington-Hill apportionment
>>>>>>>>>>>> method. It's
>>>>>>>>>>>> not just complex but needlessly so (Webster would be better). I
>>>>>>>>>>>> suspect
>>>>>>>>>>>> the average voter would be hard pressed to explain how it
>>>>>>>>>>>> works. Over
>>>>>>>>>>>> here in Norway we also have a greedy algorithm that handles
>>>>>>>>>>>> top-up
>>>>>>>>>>>> leveling seats to improve national proportionality while also
>>>>>>>>>>>> maintaining regional proportionality. Again, I doubt that an
>>>>>>>>>>>> average
>>>>>>>>>>>> voter could explain how it works; but they mostly trust it, so
>>>>>>>>>>>> there's
>>>>>>>>>>>> little problem. (Bizarre outcomes notwithstanding: personally
>>>>>>>>>>>> I'd favor
>>>>>>>>>>>> a change of algorithm, but that's another matter.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree that Approval wins by a mile in the bang for the buck
>>>>>>>>>>>> category.
>>>>>>>>>>>> If your summability is restricted to one number per candidate,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Approval/Range is the best you can get, but mostly because the
>>>>>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>>>>>> contenders make it no contest. But I can't shake the "manual
>>>>>>>>>>>> DSV" and
>>>>>>>>>>>> rb-j objections, that plain honest voters will be annoyed that
>>>>>>>>>>>> they have
>>>>>>>>>>>> to collapse their expressions into "yay? or boo?", and that the
>>>>>>>>>>>> small
>>>>>>>>>>>> risk of disastrous returns from misjudged strategy will
>>>>>>>>>>>> eventually blow up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Admittedly, I have no proof of this, since Approval hasn't been
>>>>>>>>>>>> used
>>>>>>>>>>>> much. I just know that's how I would think if my area switched
>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>> Approval. (We don't actually have single-winner elections, but
>>>>>>>>>>>> you get
>>>>>>>>>>>> my point :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> >> I've got Mike plonked, so I don't see his posts,
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > That's too bad.  Michael is frequently annoying, but he's
>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently
>>>>>>>>>>>> > correct.  This mailing list was started in large part because
>>>>>>>>>>>> of a
>>>>>>>>>>>> > mailing-list conversation I had with Michael in 1995, where
>>>>>>>>>>>> he was being
>>>>>>>>>>>> > obnoxious on another list.  I thought I'd be able to show
>>>>>>>>>>>> that he was a
>>>>>>>>>>>> > crank.  Turns out he taught me about center squeeze.  You
>>>>>>>>>>>> should
>>>>>>>>>>>> > consider unplonking him.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> There are definitely things I disagree with him about, and that
>>>>>>>>>>>> I would
>>>>>>>>>>>> tell him were he, say, Forest. But I don't fancy getting my
>>>>>>>>>>>> head bitten
>>>>>>>>>>>> off again. Maybe I will, but I'm not sure yet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     but I would like to add this:
>>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     - If a lack of summability is not a problem, then
>>>>>>>>>>>> BTR-IRV isn't that
>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     much more complex than IRV. And at the cost of slightly
>>>>>>>>>>>> more complexity
>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     than that, Benham can preserve IRV's strategy resistance
>>>>>>>>>>>> and do away
>>>>>>>>>>>> >>     with most of its exit incentive.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > Having volunteered as a poll worker for the first time in a
>>>>>>>>>>>> city that
>>>>>>>>>>>> > uses RCV for some elections, it changed my perspective on
>>>>>>>>>>>> election
>>>>>>>>>>>> > security.  I appreciated how much process there was, but also
>>>>>>>>>>>> how much
>>>>>>>>>>>> > of the process was shrugged off when it was a little
>>>>>>>>>>>> inconvenient.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > There weren't any RCV races in the March 5 election here, so
>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't
>>>>>>>>>>>> > have to perform any tech support for RCV, but having voted in
>>>>>>>>>>>> many RCV
>>>>>>>>>>>> > races, I could see what a goat rodeo that can become for poll
>>>>>>>>>>>> workers.
>>>>>>>>>>>> > My hunch is that the more complicated the election, the
>>>>>>>>>>>> easier it would
>>>>>>>>>>>> > be to have steps of the process shrugged off as poll workers
>>>>>>>>>>>> get
>>>>>>>>>>>> > frazzled as the day wears on.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > I think "summability" is really just shorthand for "vaguely
>>>>>>>>>>>> makes sense
>>>>>>>>>>>> > for someone who really really cares about the end result to
>>>>>>>>>>>> keep track
>>>>>>>>>>>> > of the election in real time".  Strict Condorcet methods are
>>>>>>>>>>>> admittedly
>>>>>>>>>>>> > difficult on this count.  Approval is drop-dead simple on
>>>>>>>>>>>> this count.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> That's more or less what I've come to think too. Summability
>>>>>>>>>>>> primarily
>>>>>>>>>>>> is about interpretability, and secondarily that people
>>>>>>>>>>>> transporting the
>>>>>>>>>>>> data have a chance to see if it's been tampered with. In both
>>>>>>>>>>>> cases it's
>>>>>>>>>>>> related to transparency.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Computer wise, it's possible to store full rankings for a
>>>>>>>>>>>> worldwide
>>>>>>>>>>>> election and a reasonable number of candidates on an SD card,
>>>>>>>>>>>> even with
>>>>>>>>>>>> 100% turnout of 8.1 billion voters. So summability is not for
>>>>>>>>>>>> storage
>>>>>>>>>>>> purposes alone, unless you're doing a manual count (which again
>>>>>>>>>>>> ties
>>>>>>>>>>>> into transparency).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The interpretability point is weakened as you go from first
>>>>>>>>>>>> order to
>>>>>>>>>>>> second to third... and by the time you're doing real-time IRV
>>>>>>>>>>>> sankey
>>>>>>>>>>>> diagrams, all meaning is lost.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> >> If computers do the counting, then relatively laborious
>>>>>>>>>>>> steps aren't
>>>>>>>>>>>> >> any problem, as long as the public understands why they're
>>>>>>>>>>>> there.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > I think that's an easy thing for those of us who are good
>>>>>>>>>>>> with computers
>>>>>>>>>>>> > to say.  Computers are taking over the world, but there's a
>>>>>>>>>>>> limit to how
>>>>>>>>>>>> > much people trust computers and the people who write the
>>>>>>>>>>>> software for
>>>>>>>>>>>> > computers.  Many people "trust" computers only as far as they
>>>>>>>>>>>> can throw
>>>>>>>>>>>> > a datacenter.  Granted, it's possible to wire up many
>>>>>>>>>>>> computers in a
>>>>>>>>>>>> > small box that most healthy adults can throw and call that a
>>>>>>>>>>>> > "datacenter", but I'm talking about the brick-and-mortar
>>>>>>>>>>>> datacenters
>>>>>>>>>>>> > often placed near power generation plants.  Most people have
>>>>>>>>>>>> given up
>>>>>>>>>>>> > the fight, and welcome our robot overlords, but our robot
>>>>>>>>>>>> overlords
>>>>>>>>>>>> > don't really care if we understand elections, and may prefer
>>>>>>>>>>>> to do away
>>>>>>>>>>>> > with elections and take control themselves.  :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm definitely not going to propose that large language models
>>>>>>>>>>>> call
>>>>>>>>>>>> elections :-)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> > In seriousness, I'm guessing this mailing list skews heavily
>>>>>>>>>>>> "math
>>>>>>>>>>>> > literate" in addition to skewing heavily "computer literate",
>>>>>>>>>>>> and I
>>>>>>>>>>>> > think that those of us that are literate in those way have a
>>>>>>>>>>>> hard time
>>>>>>>>>>>> > relating to people that aren't as literate in those areas:
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/math-hard-easy-teaching-instruction/2021/06/25/4fbec7ac-d46b-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> And that's a good point: the curse of knowledge is very real.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    BTR-IRV's
>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    safeguarding step follows directly from your concept that
>>>>>>>>>>>> "if more
>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    people prefer A to B than vice versa, then B must not be
>>>>>>>>>>>> elected".
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    - If, on the other hand, lack of summability *is* a
>>>>>>>>>>>> problem, then that
>>>>>>>>>>>> >>    disqualifies IRV outright and we're done.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > I'm supportive of BTR-IRV, but I'll concede that summability
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> > reporting results in an easy-to-understand form (in real
>>>>>>>>>>>> time) is a big
>>>>>>>>>>>> > problem.  I think it's important for voters (on election
>>>>>>>>>>>> night) to be
>>>>>>>>>>>> > able to see a television reporter say "Results from the
>>>>>>>>>>>> precincts on the
>>>>>>>>>>>> > southwest side of town were just reported, and CandB took the
>>>>>>>>>>>> lead over
>>>>>>>>>>>> > CandA.  Let's turn it over to our analysts at the elections
>>>>>>>>>>>> desk to
>>>>>>>>>>>> > explain what happened!"  The pre-election polling and exit
>>>>>>>>>>>> polling
>>>>>>>>>>>> > should provide a reasonably understandable explanation.  I
>>>>>>>>>>>> fear we're
>>>>>>>>>>>> > due for a lot of election fraud if most people don't
>>>>>>>>>>>> understand what
>>>>>>>>>>>> > happened (and honestly, having lived in San Francisco since
>>>>>>>>>>>> 2011 and
>>>>>>>>>>>> > seen how some close elections have turned out, it wouldn't
>>>>>>>>>>>> surprise me
>>>>>>>>>>>> > at all if there's some consequential electoral fraud here).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm no fan of IRV either. I'm just saying "if IRV, then
>>>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet-IRV".
>>>>>>>>>>>> That is, the return on including some Condorcet provision if
>>>>>>>>>>>> you're
>>>>>>>>>>>> going to do IRV anyway is high enough that you really ought to
>>>>>>>>>>>> do it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> As far as reporting goes: does anyone here know how Australia
>>>>>>>>>>>> does it?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I suppose their above-the-line voting makes IRV much more like
>>>>>>>>>>>> largest
>>>>>>>>>>>> remainders party list, but I've heard that optional voting is
>>>>>>>>>>>> becoming
>>>>>>>>>>>> more common, which could lead more voters to manually rank the
>>>>>>>>>>>> candidates.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I also have the impression that polls include pairwise data
>>>>>>>>>>>> ("two-party-preferred") showing the relative support between
>>>>>>>>>>>> the two
>>>>>>>>>>>> party blocs (Labour and LibNat). But I don't want to mess up
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> details, so I'll leave them to someone who actually lives in
>>>>>>>>>>>> Australia.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> French presidential polls seem to include hypothetical expected
>>>>>>>>>>>> pairwise
>>>>>>>>>>>> results between the candidates who have some chance of getting
>>>>>>>>>>>> into the
>>>>>>>>>>>> final. See
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.politico.eu/article/5-charts-to-help-you-read-the-french-presidential-election/,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> figure near the bottom. So if we look more broadly, pairwise
>>>>>>>>>>>> reporting
>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't completely unheard of.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> > I hear you, and I read what Forest wrote.  Ultimately, I
>>>>>>>>>>>> think it's
>>>>>>>>>>>> > important for most voters to vaguely know what the election
>>>>>>>>>>>> is going to
>>>>>>>>>>>> > look like in order to be comfortable using the system.  I
>>>>>>>>>>>> don't think
>>>>>>>>>>>> > most folks here in the SF Bay Area really understand RCV.
>>>>>>>>>>>> The topic
>>>>>>>>>>>> > frequently comes up on the nightly news, for example here:
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>>>>>> <
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.ktvu.com/news/lawsuit-filed-to-overturn-oakland-mayoral-election
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > My fear is that RCV makes fraud easier, because few people
>>>>>>>>>>>> truly
>>>>>>>>>>>> > understand what's going on under the hood, and the founders
>>>>>>>>>>>> of FairVote
>>>>>>>>>>>> > don't help educate; they obfuscate.  I'm hopeful that
>>>>>>>>>>>> FairVote will get
>>>>>>>>>>>> > over their nasty case of "founder's syndrome" soon, so that
>>>>>>>>>>>> they will
>>>>>>>>>>>> > become better partners in electoral reform efforts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> IRV RCV is entirely nonsummable. (Summable) Condorcet should do
>>>>>>>>>>>> better,
>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly in the absence of cycles. One could possibly do
>>>>>>>>>>>> reporting
>>>>>>>>>>>> by saying something like "candidate X is still the champ, but
>>>>>>>>>>>> his match
>>>>>>>>>>>> against candidate Y is evening out - what does that mean, is
>>>>>>>>>>>> this region
>>>>>>>>>>>> a stronghold of Y's? Did the voters here prefer Y to X because
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> economic reasons?", etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> When things get cyclical it gets a lot tougher. But simple
>>>>>>>>>>>> rules could
>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly still work, e.g. minmax as "your strength is the
>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the most unfavorable matchup". Reporting could talk about how
>>>>>>>>>>>> X's
>>>>>>>>>>>> apparent comfortable margin is taking a beating on some issue
>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>> candidates Y and Z are strong at, and that X's victory is
>>>>>>>>>>>> looking slim
>>>>>>>>>>>> because Y is already doing a good job in the X vs Y contest.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Who the
>>>>>>>>>>>> current champ is and how his winning chances are either being
>>>>>>>>>>>> shored up
>>>>>>>>>>>> or eroded by more votes coming in.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Copeland is probably quite easy to understand although
>>>>>>>>>>>> indecisive and
>>>>>>>>>>>> not cloneproof. Brackets could be simple, but I don't know of
>>>>>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet method that uses them -- and the seed order would
>>>>>>>>>>>> have to be
>>>>>>>>>>>> set in advance. Otherwise, as more votes come in, it could
>>>>>>>>>>>> alter the
>>>>>>>>>>>> seed order and make the comparisons seem like an unpredictable
>>>>>>>>>>>> mess.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> >> [1] Both honest voters in the rank-consistent sense and in
>>>>>>>>>>>> the von
>>>>>>>>>>>> >> Neumann-Morgenstern sense.
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>> > Could you explain what you mean by this?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> What I mean is that both honest voters who have a particular
>>>>>>>>>>>> rating in
>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, but not a ranking; and honest voters who have strengths
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> preference in mind, have multiple honest ballots to choose
>>>>>>>>>>>> between. So
>>>>>>>>>>>> the choice of which one to use becomes a matter of what others
>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>> doing, even for people who would rather not do strategy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This is most obvious for ranked voters: if your opinion is
>>>>>>>>>>>> A>B>C, you
>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know if you should approve only A or both A and B.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is a way to quantify strength
>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> preference by using lotteries and expected utility.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Suppose that your preference is A>B>C, and that you think that
>>>>>>>>>>>> getting B
>>>>>>>>>>>> for sure is as good as a gamble with a 40% chance of A, and a
>>>>>>>>>>>> 60% of C.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Then your von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for B is 40% of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> one for A
>>>>>>>>>>>> plus 60% of the one for C. E.g. if your rating of C is zero and
>>>>>>>>>>>> A is 10,
>>>>>>>>>>>> then B is 4.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> By considering what gamble you would find about as good as
>>>>>>>>>>>> getting a
>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate for sure, you can (theoretically) determine your
>>>>>>>>>>>> strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>> preference for all other candidates once you have two of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>> So that
>>>>>>>>>>>> allows a more meaningful theory about what strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>> preference really
>>>>>>>>>>>> is, and to say that a ballot is honest if it's consistent with
>>>>>>>>>>>> these
>>>>>>>>>>>> preference strengths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> But there's still a problem: you're left with two free
>>>>>>>>>>>> variables - the
>>>>>>>>>>>> ratings of your favorite and least favorite. So there are still
>>>>>>>>>>>> multiple
>>>>>>>>>>>> honest Range ballots. And if we suppose that Approval works by
>>>>>>>>>>>> approving
>>>>>>>>>>>> every candidate above the halfway point on the rating scale,
>>>>>>>>>>>> then there
>>>>>>>>>>>> are still multiple honest Approval ballots, too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We could get around this by fixing the voter's favorite
>>>>>>>>>>>> candidate to a
>>>>>>>>>>>> rating of 100% and the voter's least favorite to 0%. Now there
>>>>>>>>>>>> is only
>>>>>>>>>>>> one honest rated-like ballot. But methods that automatically
>>>>>>>>>>>> normalize
>>>>>>>>>>>> like this fail IIA, and both in Range and (above mean utility)
>>>>>>>>>>>> Approval,
>>>>>>>>>>>> there can exist an incentive to not cast that honest ballot.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> (In practice, people don't like risk and so prefer a sure deal
>>>>>>>>>>>> over a
>>>>>>>>>>>> gamble, but there are ways to compensate for this too.  The
>>>>>>>>>>>> point is
>>>>>>>>>>>> that it provides a formalization of the idea of "strength of
>>>>>>>>>>>> preference".)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> -km
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
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