[EM] No. Condorcet and Hare do not share the same problem with computational complexity and process transparency.

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at t-online.de
Tue Mar 19 05:30:02 PDT 2024


On 2024-03-18 14:51, Toby Pereira wrote:
> I don't think Approval strategy is overly burdensome. As an honest 
> voter, you just pick your least favourite candidate to approve, so one 
> decision. Approval has advantages outside the usual criterion compliance 
> as well. The results of an approval election are easily published and 
> digested, as with a FPTP election. It's simply a list of votes 
> (approvals) for each candidate. I think this is worth more than it gets 
> credit for. In a Condorcet election, how would the result be published? 
> Every head-to-head separately? Also in a debate versus FPTP, approval is 
> the only method that has no real disadvantages relative to FPTP. FPTP 
> proponents can always fall back on saying their method is simple, much 
> simpler than the proposed alternatives. Well, approval is essentially 
> the same level of simplicity. FPTP passes the rarely passed 
> participation criterion, which approval also does. FPTP proponents don't 
> really have anywhere to go, except to make the spurious claim that 
> approval violates one person, one vote. But this is easily countered.

As I mentioned in my reply to Rob, I agree that Approval wins the "bang 
for the buck" awards.

But talking about voting methods has to involve some amount of 
future-proofing. Otherwise there's a risk that the method will merely 
clear the current hurdle and then get stuck on the next one -- like how 
IRV clears the "fringe party" hurdle and then gets stuck when there are 
more than two serious candidates.

Suppose there are three serious candidates: A, B, and C. Your preference 
is A>B>C. Do you approve of A and B, or only A? Who knows. It's only one 
decision, sure, but it's not an easy one.

Condorcet's future-proofing would handle that case easily. What's the 
next hurdle? That would be sincere cycles or comprehensive coordinated 
strategy. For sincere cycles, something like RP is good; strategy? 
Condorcet-IRV hybrids or (hopefully) something better... which is part 
of the draw of tinkering with the resistant set.

If you want the simplest method that's better than FPTP, yes, go 
Approval. But beware the hidden cost that comes with offloading the 
dynamics on the electorate.

-km


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