[EM] Fwd: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Sat, Mar 16, 2024 at 11:52 robert bristow-johnson <
rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:

>
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 14, 2024 at 6:14 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > > Reply continued:
> > >
> > > Anyone who votes other than all-or-nothing in a public political
> election is using poor strategy.
> > >
>
> But requiring voters to use **any** strategy at all is IMO just
> undesirable.


Wouldn’t it be nice to have a ranked-method do it all for you !!

I listed a lot of important unique Approval advantages that are lost by the
complicated automatic-machines that are called “ranked-methods”.

Compared to those important advantages, the matter of voters’ qualification
to use Approval well are the least of our concerns.

Even the best ranked-method won’t help if it doesn’t get enacted because it
doesn’t have Approval’s simplicity, absolute minimalness, unique
unarbitrariness, & completely cost-free implementation.

…or if its results are easily falsified by count-fraud that’s difficult to
detect due to an elaborate complex count.



>
> > On 03/16/2024 2:27 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > And if voters want to do their part to elect the best candidate, instead
> of playing strategic games, we should let them! We want honest voting to be
> as easy as possible, because honest voting is a public good. Filling in a
> bubble labeled 5/5 is no harder than filling one labeled 1/1. But in real
> life I don't carry dice around very often.
>
> I'm really with Limelike here.  Except I think filling in a Score bubble
> *does* require more thought than ranking even if the voter ends up bullet
> voting.
>
> BTW, I posted at r/EndFPTP a derived scenario that shows how STAR fails to
> disincentivize tactical voting, even with the head-to-head runoff.
> https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/1bbq6hu/heres_a_good_hypothetical_for_how_star_fails/
>
> We don't wanna burden voters with any pressure to vote tactically, do we?
> Why are people (equal.vote, CES) promoting methods that, whenever there
> are 3 or more candidates, **inherently** forces voters to make tactical
> consideration of how they're going to vote for their 2nd-favorite candidate?
>
> RCV can screw up.  And because of Condorcet cycles, even Condorcet RCV
> will have those very few elections where it cannot prevent a spoiled
> election (and the bad things that come along with spoiled election) because
> of a cycle.  But, if we're gonna evaluate all of our votes equally, the
> ranked ballot asks exactly the right questions whereas the Score ballot
> requires more information from voters than should be demanded of them (or
> the Approval ballot requires too little information, but there is *still*
> tactical considerations required).  But with RCV, we **know** what to do
> with our 2nd-favorite candidate: rank them #2.
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
> ----
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> info
>
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