[EM] Fwd: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Sat, Mar 16, 2024 at 11:27 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:

> Score's partial ratings provide more information if you release the full
> ballots (w/ noise added to preserve privacy). There's a big difference
> between a candidate receiving 1/5 on 100% of ballots vs. 5/5 on 20% of
> ballots.
>

I said that, for polls, I like RP(wv), with Score(0-5) & maybe Score(100,
99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0).

>
> It also makes the method simpler for voters who want to be honest. In
> studies, people find binary ratings harder than ratings out of 5, because
> it's hard to pick when you're on the fence between 2 options.
>

I said that the legitimate valid use for Score’s partial ratings is for
when it’s genuinely uncertain whether a candidate deserves approval.

I said, how hard is it to flip a coin, to probabilistically give a
candidate half an approval?

Don’t complicate the method because you want Score to do that for you,
because you don’t want to do it for yourself.

I just finished listing a lot of important unique Approval advantages that
Score loses.



>
> And if voters want to do their part to elect the best candidate, instead
> of playing strategic games, we should let them!
>

I give them permission to approve the candidates they like or regard as the
better set,  or the ones who aren’t below-expectation.

In Score,  in a public political election under current conditions, if they
want to be suckers by rating estimated-merit-proportional instead of
Approval-style all-or-nothing, that’s their
(sucker) choice.

In polls, with RP(wv) to show the CW, & Score to measure likedness, no one
ha reason to not rate sincerely (estimated-merit-proportional).

As I said I rate sincerely in our current poll, & no doubt every
participating does.

We want honest voting to be as easy as possible, because honest voting is a
> public good. Filling in a bubble labeled 5/5 is no harder than filling one
> labeled 1/1. But in real life I don't carry dice around very often.
>

Don’t take dice to the polling-place to do probabilistic approving. That
would make other voters wait unnecessarily while you decide your vote. It
would delay & slow the voting process.

Instead, make out your ballot at home, before you leave for the
polling-place.

…& no, you needn’t go out & buy dice. Do you not have a coin? You don’t
even have a penny?

I’ll send you one.

…or (for probabilistic approvals other than.5) a paper bag & a piece of
paper from which to cut (or tear if you don’t have scissors), & a pencil or
pen with which to number 10 paper-squares. If you don’t have those things,
then I’ll send you those.

Yes, when it’s genuinely uncertain whether a candidate deserves approval,
it’s easier to let Score do the partial rating for you.

Don’t give up Approval’s important unique advantages because you don’t want
to do something for yourself.

>
> On Thu, Mar 14, 2024 at 6:14 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Reply continued:
>>
>> Anyone who votes other than all-or-nothing in a public political election
>> is using poor strategy.
>>
>> Anyone who gives any support to an evil (even if lesser) is being a
>> sucker.
>>
>> As for Score’s partial-ratings, useful only when it’s genuinely uncertain
>> whether a candidate qualifies for approval: How hard is it to flip a coin,
>> to probabilistically give someone half an approval?
>>
>> … or draw numbers from a bag, to approve someone with any probability you
>> want.
>>
>> You want Score to do that for you, so that you won’t have to do it for
>> yourself?
>>
>> Don’t complicate the method because you don’t want to do something for
>> yourself.
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 14, 2024 at 16:34 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> For me, personally, I'd probably minmax with range voting. But I don't
>>> think score is any more complicated than approval voting, and Warren D.
>>> Smith argues (IMO convincingly) that Score is more likely to stick in the
>>> long run because it reduces the number of voters who bullet vote, which deals
>>> with one common concern, and because it's more popular with third parties
>>> because of the nursery effect. (STAR is even better for this, since it
>>> makes bullet voting less attractive strategically and appeals to people who
>>> like IRV'S runoff.)
>>>
>>> On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 12:54 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>> Date: Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 12:52
>>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18
>>>> To: robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Who knows. I hope Progressives don’t. In public political elections
>>>> with Score, all-or-nothing rating is optimal, & I’d advise Progressives to
>>>> rate all-or-nothing.
>>>>
>>>> The legitimate use for Score’s partial ratings would be only for when
>>>> it’s genuinely uncertain whether or not a candidate should get an approval.
>>>>
>>>> That’s Score’s luxury-convenience.
>>>>
>>>> But I don’t want it. In Approval, you can give a probabilistic partial
>>>> approval when it’s uncertain whether a candidate rates approval:
>>>>
>>>> Flip a coin, to give hir 50% probability of approval. Or draw one of 3
>>>> numbers from a bag , for a 1/3 approval-probability.
>>>>
>>>> Or number 10 paper squares of paper from 0 to 9, & twice draw one from
>>>> the bag (with replacement), to write a 2-digit number from 0 to 99.  …in
>>>> order to approve the candidate with any desired probability from 1% to 99%.
>>>>
>>>> But don’t complicate & elaborate the method, don’t lose Approval’s
>>>> absolute minimalness & unique complete unarbitrariness, because you don’t
>>>> want to do something for yourself.
>>>>
>>>> Don’t lose Approval’s uniquely easy proposal, implementation,
>>>> administration & security-auditing because you want Score to do partial
>>>> rating for you.
>>>>
>>>> At EM, Robert recently made the same comment that he made here. I
>>>> answered it there.  …a long & thorough answer.
>>>>
>>>> In the current poll, everyone participating, including me, is rating
>>>> sincerely in the Score ballotings because there’s no reason not to. Nothing
>>>> is at stake.
>>>>
>>>> We have a rank-balloting, to be counted by RP(wv), to, strategy-free,
>>>> show the CW.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 22:07 robert bristow-johnson <
>>>> rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> > On 03/11/2024 11:22 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> >
>>>>> >
>>>>> > I wonder if what we really want is to take pairwise differences in
>>>>> scores, then calculate the median difference for each pair of candidates.
>>>>> That might give you a system that behaves like Condorcet but still accounts
>>>>> for intensity of preferences. (Is that a thing?)
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>> Do you actually think that in a competitive partisan political
>>>>> election where voters have a stake in the outcome, want to prevail
>>>>> politically, and vote by secret ballot that they would mark their ballots
>>>>> honestly about intensity of preference?
>>>>>
>>>>> "My system is only intended for honest men." Jean-Charles de Borda
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>>>>>
>>>>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>>>>>
>>>>> .
>>>>> .
>>>>> .
>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>> list info
>>>>>
>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>>
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