[EM] Fwd: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18

[Closed Limelike Curves]

Score's partial ratings provide more information if you release the full
ballots (w/ noise added to preserve privacy). There's a big difference
between a candidate receiving 1/5 on 100% of ballots vs. 5/5 on 20% of
ballots.

It also makes the method simpler for voters who want to be honest. In
studies, people find binary ratings harder than ratings out of 5, because
it's hard to pick when you're on the fence between 2 options.

And if voters want to do their part to elect the best candidate, instead of
playing strategic games, we should let them! We want honest voting to be as
easy as possible, because honest voting is a public good. Filling in a
bubble labeled 5/5 is no harder than filling one labeled 1/1. But in real
life I don't carry dice around very often.

On Thu, Mar 14, 2024 at 6:14 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Reply continued:
>
> Anyone who votes other than all-or-nothing in a public political election
> is using poor strategy.
>
> Anyone who gives any support to an evil (even if lesser) is being a sucker.
>
> As for Score’s partial-ratings, useful only when it’s genuinely uncertain
> whether a candidate qualifies for approval: How hard is it to flip a coin,
> to probabilistically give someone half an approval?
>
> … or draw numbers from a bag, to approve someone with any probability you
> want.
>
> You want Score to do that for you, so that you won’t have to do it for
> yourself?
>
> Don’t complicate the method because you don’t want to do something for
> yourself.
>
> On Thu, Mar 14, 2024 at 16:34 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> For me, personally, I'd probably minmax with range voting. But I don't
>> think score is any more complicated than approval voting, and Warren D.
>> Smith argues (IMO convincingly) that Score is more likely to stick in the
>> long run because it reduces the number of voters who bullet vote, which deals
>> with one common concern, and because it's more popular with third parties
>> because of the nursery effect. (STAR is even better for this, since it
>> makes bullet voting less attractive strategically and appeals to people who
>> like IRV'S runoff.)
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 12:54 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> Date: Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 12:52
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18
>>> To: robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com>
>>>
>>>
>>> Who knows. I hope Progressives don’t. In public political elections with
>>> Score, all-or-nothing rating is optimal, & I’d advise Progressives to rate
>>> all-or-nothing.
>>>
>>> The legitimate use for Score’s partial ratings would be only for when
>>> it’s genuinely uncertain whether or not a candidate should get an approval.
>>>
>>> That’s Score’s luxury-convenience.
>>>
>>> But I don’t want it. In Approval, you can give a probabilistic partial
>>> approval when it’s uncertain whether a candidate rates approval:
>>>
>>> Flip a coin, to give hir 50% probability of approval. Or draw one of 3
>>> numbers from a bag , for a 1/3 approval-probability.
>>>
>>> Or number 10 paper squares of paper from 0 to 9, & twice draw one from
>>> the bag (with replacement), to write a 2-digit number from 0 to 99.  …in
>>> order to approve the candidate with any desired probability from 1% to 99%.
>>>
>>> But don’t complicate & elaborate the method, don’t lose Approval’s
>>> absolute minimalness & unique complete unarbitrariness, because you don’t
>>> want to do something for yourself.
>>>
>>> Don’t lose Approval’s uniquely easy proposal, implementation,
>>> administration & security-auditing because you want Score to do partial
>>> rating for you.
>>>
>>> At EM, Robert recently made the same comment that he made here. I
>>> answered it there.  …a long & thorough answer.
>>>
>>> In the current poll, everyone participating, including me, is rating
>>> sincerely in the Score ballotings because there’s no reason not to. Nothing
>>> is at stake.
>>>
>>> We have a rank-balloting, to be counted by RP(wv), to, strategy-free,
>>> show the CW.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 22:07 robert bristow-johnson <
>>> rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> > On 03/11/2024 11:22 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > I wonder if what we really want is to take pairwise differences in
>>>> scores, then calculate the median difference for each pair of candidates.
>>>> That might give you a system that behaves like Condorcet but still accounts
>>>> for intensity of preferences. (Is that a thing?)
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> Do you actually think that in a competitive partisan political election
>>>> where voters have a stake in the outcome, want to prevail politically, and
>>>> vote by secret ballot that they would mark their ballots honestly about
>>>> intensity of preference?
>>>>
>>>> "My system is only intended for honest men." Jean-Charles de Borda
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>>
>>>> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>>>>
>>>> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>>>>
>>>> .
>>>> .
>>>> .
>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240316/ddb3b1a1/attachment.htm>