[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

[Closed Limelike Curves]

My current line of thinking is that you could say a candidate needs a
pairwise supermajority, rather than just a majority, for a defeat to count
as a "real defeat" instead of a tie. Perhaps there's some way to choose
this margin that guarantees no participation failures?

On Fri, Mar 1, 2024 at 9:48 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:

> But Steve is right: For any one of us, the minuscule chance of a
>> preference of ours being negatively responded-to doesn’t even come close to
>> outweighing the strategy-freeness for which RP(wv) is being used.
>>
> Agree that if RP improves strategy-resistance in practice, a tiny risk of
> participation failures is worth it. But courts might not agree. More
> importantly, it means you can't challenge IRV in court on the basis that
> participation/monotonicity failure violates a fundamental human right (if
> your own proposed alternative also violates that right).
>
> That occurred to me too. Well I’d say that the important thing is that
>> after the illegal Participation-failure result is discarded, then even if
>> IA gives the same winner, this time it didn’t happen as a
>> Participation-violation.
>>
> It's still a participation violation--the whole combined electoral system
> violates participation, even if the specific steps don't. In the same way,
> there's no individual step of IRV that violates participation (each round
> is just a plurality vote). It's the process as a whole that does.
>
> On Fri, Mar 1, 2024 at 7:49 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Yes, just a matter of, for each voter, decrementing the population-total
>> of every pairwise-preference s/he voted.  …& applying RP(wv) to that
>> modified population preference-totals set. But, other than looking at that
>> voter’s ballot, no new votecounting is needed.
>>
>> The entire Participation-check only takes half as long as the original
>> exhaustive pairwise-count used by Condorcet.
>>
>>
>>
>>> Couldn't this new procedure still violate participation?
>>>
>>
>> Not if it’s Implicit-Approval (ranked = approved).
>>
>>
>> What if adding ballots[i] with A>B would cause B>A, but B also happens
>>> to win under implicit approval voting?
>>>
>>
>> That occurred to me too. Well I’d say that the important thing is that
>> after the illegal Participation-failure result is discarded, then even if
>> IA gives the same winner, this time it didn’t happen as a
>> Participation-violation.
>>
>> The discarding makes the election innocent.
>>
>> But Steve is right: For any one of us, the minuscule chance of a
>> preference of ours being negatively responded-to doesn’t even come close to
>> outweighing the strategy-freeness for which RP(wv) is being used.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 4:02 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Yes, I too feel that though Consistency-failure is an embarrassment,
>>>> it’s Participation-failure—where a particular voter should have stayed
>>>> home—that is the rights-violation.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, maybe there’s some big subset of the voters, say 37%, such that,
>>>> if they’d stayed home the result of applying the method to the other 63%
>>>> (which would then have been the actual election-result) would have been the
>>>> same as the result of applying it to them separately…but, because they
>>>> voted, a different result happened.
>>>>
>>>> That doesn’t sound as bad as Participation-failure.
>>>>
>>>> 1. That 37%’s hypothetical collective-choice by the method isn’t as
>>>> definite & stark as a person’s expressed-preference.
>>>>
>>>> 2. A *different outcome* from the hypothetical result of applying the
>>>> method to the 37% isn’t as concretely clearly wrong as outright
>>>> negative-response to someone’s expressed preference.
>>>>
>>>> …& that’s a good thing, because checking for Consistency-failure is
>>>> what DOES sound computationally infeasible due to the many ways of dividing
>>>> a large electorate into 2 par.
>>>>
>>>> Checking for Participation-failure would just be a matter of, for each
>>>> voter, doing the count without hir ballot & determining whether that
>>>> changes the winner to someone s/he ranked above the actual winner.
>>>>
>>>> With 300,000,000 voters that isn’t infeasible with today’s computers is
>>>> it?
>>>>
>>>> I should have asked:
>>>>
>>>> In Germany, is Consistency-failure unconstitutional? That might be a
>>>> problem for Condorcet. If only Participation-failure is unconstitutional,
>>>> then wouldn’t Kobe computationally-feasible to check for that?
>>>>
>>>> When a Participation-failure is found, then elect the winner by
>>>> Implicit-Approval.
>>>>
>>>> In wv, not ranking candidates you don’t like is good defensive-strategy
>>>> anyway. If it’s known that many people vote that way, wv’s already good
>>>> burial-deterrence is further enhanced.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 10:06 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> That seems to exclude participation failures except in the case
>>>>> of near-ties; I think adding a batch of ballots, all of which rank A>B,
>>>>> shouldn't cause B to defeat A.
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't think we need perfect consistency, just participation.
>>>>> Consistency failures are paradoxical, but consistency is a very
>>>>> strong criterion and isn't needed for the weaker case of participation
>>>>> (which limits consistency to the ). It's also strong enough that it
>>>>> could lock you into Kemeny-Young (the unique order-consistent Condorcet
>>>>> method).
>>>>>
>>>>> Checking for participation naively definitely isn't feasible, so we'd
>>>>> need a more elegant approach.
>>>>>
>>>>> Alternatively, we could try finding a Condorcet system that violates
>>>>> participation "as little as possible," in the sense that any participation
>>>>> failures are forced by Condorcet-compliance. A judge might be willing
>>>>> to sign off on that, since it's a tradeoff between two similarly-important
>>>>> values (equal protection and majority rule).
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:30 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Maybe it might be good enough to just require that there must not be
>>>>>> a Participation-violation with respect to any one of the voters, had s/he
>>>>>> voted last?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 22:17 Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Well I don’t know if the Consistency-check would be
>>>>>>> Computationally-feasible, because of course there are a lot of ways to
>>>>>>> divide a large electorate into 2 parts.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That might be one more good reason to use Approval instead, for
>>>>>>> those single-winner elections.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 22:07 Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I call RP(wv) with that modification “Nonsense-Free RP(wv)”, &
>>>>>>>> propose it for Germany’s single-winner elections, including the single
>>>>>>>> member district elections in their Additional-Member proportional
>>>>>>>> topping-up Parliamentary elections.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:47 Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:07 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> . Some alternative criterion that gets us "99% of the way to
>>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet," so it behaves like Condorcet except in the rare cases where it
>>>>>>>>>>> conflicts with participation (or maybe just mono-add-top/remove-bottom).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There might be better ways, but there’s always the lexicographical
>>>>>>>>> way. The criterion could require that Participation (& other
>>>>>>>>> non-opposite-response criteria) & Consistency be met.  …& that the voted
>>>>>>>>> CW, when there is one must be elected when that doesn’t conflict with the
>>>>>>>>> above requirements.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A complying method could just repeat that wording, along with a
>>>>>>>>> specification about what to do if there’s no voted CW, & what to do if the
>>>>>>>>> ballot-configuration is such that additional of a new ballot could violate
>>>>>>>>> Participation, or if some division of the electorate into 2 parts could
>>>>>>>>> show a Consistency violation.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Maybe apply Implicit-Approval to the ballots then. (Ranked =
>>>>>>>>> approved)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 8:57 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional
>>>>>>>>>>>> in Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled
>>>>>>>>>>> on , and courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone
>>>>>>>>>>> voting rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
>>>>>>>>>>> challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
>>>>>>>>>>> possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
>>>>>>>>>>> monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for
>>>>>>>>>>> Begich's campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate
>>>>>>>>>>> Republican plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme
>>>>>>>>>>> Court, without being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes
>>>>>>>>>>> his case look even stronger.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in
>>>>>>>>>>> front of a judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop
>>>>>>>>>>> caring about all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain
>>>>>>>>>>> participation failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska
>>>>>>>>>>> Republicans that Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?"
>>>>>>>>>>> (Voting should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call
>>>>>>>>>>> monotonicity failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of
>>>>>>>>>>> its way to do the opposite of what you ask it to).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is
>>>>>>>>>>>> unconstitutional in Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater
>>>>>>>>>>>> nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet
>>>>>>>>>>>> isn’t. Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
>>>>>>>>>>>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are
>>>>>>>>>>>> mutually incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable
>>>>>>>>>>>> price for the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings
>>>>>>>>>>>> strategy improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is
>>>>>>>>>>>> probably irrelevant to strategy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow
>>>>>>>>>>>> pointed-out, shows that single-winner elections aren’t perfect.  …making a
>>>>>>>>>>>> good argument for PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries),
>>>>>>>>>>>> Germany feels no need to compromise participation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the world’s countries for about a century.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re
>>>>>>>>>>>> stuck in the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has
>>>>>>>>>>>> moved on to democracy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation?
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing
>>>>>>>>>>>>> participation are vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> unconstitutional, as seen in Germany.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em
>>>>>>>>>>>>> for list info
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240301/7c169b52/attachment-0001.htm>