[EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 234, Issue 11

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Thu Jan 11 17:17:32 PST 2024 

Opponents can then criticize the proposal because of its undisclosed
indecisiveness & tiebreaker-need. If advocates don’t mention it, opponents
will.

Only *sincere* top-cycles are rare. A faction would often be able to make
one via burial.

…& well might, unless there’s a feature that can be expected to make it
backfire. That’s the goal of the Condorcet versions that I propose.

…in order to minimize  or eliminate need for defensive-strategy.

On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 17:04 Sass <sass at equal.vote> wrote:

> The tiebreaker does have hypothetical cloning problems, but it's only in
> the case of ties, which are rare. The whole point of framing it as a
> tiebreaker is that we only have to specify it in the law, not in the
> marketing.
>
> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 4:57 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Okay, but I’m just saying that having to specify a tiebreaker loses some
>> brevity & simplicity.
>>
>> …&, should my candidate win instead of yours because one issue-space
>> persuasion had more candidates running than another one did?
>>
>> My candidate beats more candidates than yours does, merely because their
>> faction was more split.
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 16:36 Sass <sass at equal.vote> wrote:
>>
>>> It already covers some scenarios that do not have a Condorcet Winner.
>>> Other scenarios should be framed as ties; that allows us to be wonky (or
>>> random) with our tiebreaking mechanic without scrutiny from the public. For
>>> Ranked Robin, the tiebreaker is to elect the tied candidate with the best
>>> average rank. Put another way, call the tied candidates finalists and the
>>> finalist with the greatest sum of margins over other finalists is elected.
>>> In the case of two finalists, this just elects the finalist preferred over
>>> the other, which would be the most palatable to the public.
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 4:11 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Yes, that has a bestness-sound that would appeal to people. But so do
>>>> some of the other simple Condorcet versions.
>>>>
>>>> …& its need for a tiebreaker counts against its simplicity.
>>>>
>>>> CW,Fav & CW,IA intuitively choose someone superlative too.
>>>>
>>>> Admittedly MinMax(wv) needs specification of how to measure
>>>> defeat-strength. …thereby lengthening the definition.
>>>>
>>>> CW,IA beat it in the STAR-poll that I conducted.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:26 Sass <sass at equal.vote> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> What I like about Ranked Robin is that it's still "elect the candidate
>>>>> with the most _____", which I think will be an easier cognitive
>>>>> transition for voters, and you get a results screen where each candidate
>>>>> gets a (usually) different number of things and the one with the most wins.
>>>>> Transparent results is a big block for Condorcet methods.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 8:52 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because
>>>>>> Topcount is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing
>>>>>> the favorite.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t
>>>>>> mentioned here:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the
>>>>>> most favorite candidate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide.
>>>>>> Yes, median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have
>>>>>> a median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense
>>>>>> that the middle is between Democrat & Republican.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a
>>>>>> strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the
>>>>>> buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of
>>>>>> offensive strategy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for
>>>>>> autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular
>>>>>> one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s
>>>>>> some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been
>>>>>> the best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that
>>>>>> Condorcet is ideally capable of.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of
>>>>>> Condorcet.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t
>>>>>> realize that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will
>>>>>> keep trying.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere
>>>>>> CW in a strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise,
>>>>>> it’s just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the
>>>>>> electorate are.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <sass at equal.vote> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet
>>>>>>> Winner, then it elects the candidates with the most first choices.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the
>>>>>>> candidate preferred over the most others:
>>>>>>> https://rankedrobin.org
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM <
>>>>>>> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
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>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Today's Topics:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>    1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
>>>>>>>>    2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Message: 1
>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800
>>>>>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>>>>>> To: EM list <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>>>>>>> Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>>>>>>>> Message-ID:
>>>>>>>>         <CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa==
>>>>>>>> 1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ at mail.gmail.com>
>>>>>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That question was recently asked.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an
>>>>>>>> organization.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few
>>>>>>>> candidates, in
>>>>>>>> the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its
>>>>>>>> particularly great unfamiliarity.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully
>>>>>>>> reassure our
>>>>>>>> thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t
>>>>>>>> too-vote an
>>>>>>>> evil.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> various nonpolitical votes.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright
>>>>>>>> enact a
>>>>>>>> voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise
>>>>>>>> happened for
>>>>>>>> RCV.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards,
>>>>>>>> online, in
>>>>>>>> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee,
>>>>>>>> for the
>>>>>>>> pursuit of an initiative.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions,
>>>>>>>> such as:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> MinMax(wv)
>>>>>>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the
>>>>>>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like &
>>>>>>>> don?t wish
>>>>>>>> to beat the CW via burial.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or
>>>>>>>> online, to
>>>>>>>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of
>>>>>>>> initiative-enactment.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that
>>>>>>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be
>>>>>>>> asked to
>>>>>>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative.
>>>>>>>> -------------- next part --------------
>>>>>>>> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
>>>>>>>> URL: <
>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240110/880e78a2/attachment-0001.htm
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Message: 2
>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 20:07:35 +0000
>>>>>>>> From: "Bob Richard [lists]" <lists001 at robertjrichard.com>
>>>>>>>> To: election-methods at electorama.com
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>>>>>>>> Message-ID: <em781b1feb-15d0-4909-b320-c210a91db894 at 3fe7043c.com>
>>>>>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed"
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of
>>>>>>>> Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to
>>>>>>>> learn
>>>>>>>> why it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing
>>>>>>>> mention of this episode, so this research would probably involve
>>>>>>>> traveling to Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives,
>>>>>>>> county election records and the public library. On the other hand,
>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>> part of Michigan is a beautiful place to visit. Any takers?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --Bob Richard
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ------ Original Message ------
>>>>>>>> >From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>>>>>> To "EM list" <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>>>>>>> Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM
>>>>>>>> Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> >That question was recently asked.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an
>>>>>>>> >organization.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few
>>>>>>>> >candidates, in the days when Hare began being adopted a century
>>>>>>>> ago.
>>>>>>>> >Hence its particularly great unfamiliarity.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully
>>>>>>>> reassure
>>>>>>>> >our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t
>>>>>>>> >too-vote an evil.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating
>>>>>>>> it in
>>>>>>>> >various nonpolitical votes.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright
>>>>>>>> enact a
>>>>>>>> >voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise
>>>>>>>> happened
>>>>>>>> >for RCV.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards,
>>>>>>>> online,
>>>>>>>> >in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment
>>>>>>>> committee,
>>>>>>>> >for the pursuit of an initiative.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions,
>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>> >as:
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >MinMax(wv)
>>>>>>>> >CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the
>>>>>>>> >defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like &
>>>>>>>> don?t
>>>>>>>> >wish to beat the CW via burial.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or
>>>>>>>> online, to
>>>>>>>> >find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of
>>>>>>>> >initiative-enactment.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> >focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be
>>>>>>>> asked
>>>>>>>> >to approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an
>>>>>>>> initiative.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> -------------- next part --------------
>>>>>>>> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
>>>>>>>> URL: <
>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240110/41b5a0b6/attachment-0001.htm
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Subject: Digest Footer
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list
>>>>>>>> Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 234, Issue 11
>>>>>>>> *************************************************
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
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>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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