[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

[Kevin Venzke]

 Hello,

Feb 28 2024 à 12:37:01 UTC−6, Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> a écrit :
> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods have
> plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable to
> court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in Germany.

No, I don't think Condorcet can be weakened and result in anything interesting.
Participation is just too demanding. I have a calculator where I try to show
most single-winner rank ballot methods of interest:
votingmethods.net/calc

The methods here that satisfy Participation are just FPP, Borda, DAC, DSC, and
I guess "implicit approval." If I could think of more Participation methods
(other than additional Borda variants) I would probably add them.

Kevin
votingmethods.net