[EM] Poll, preliminary ballots

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 21:08 Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods at votefair.org> wrote:

> On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
>
>  > On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
>  >> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
>
>  > So why not change to writing numbers in boxes?  Aren't the
>  > voters there numerate?
>
> Numerate?  Probably some aren't.
>
> Also remember some voters are reading the ballot in a non-English language!
>
> Also remember that ALL ballots are counted by machine.  And fast.  There
> isn't time to deal with handwriting issues.
>


I believe that the current idea is to use reliable machine-reading of the
handwritten numbers.

>
>  > (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
>
> Of course.  But asking voters to write numbers would be harder to "sell"
> to voters than "selling" ranked choice ballots (regardless of how they
> are counted).
>

You forgot to tell why you think so.



> I've heard Australians suggest boxes before.  THEY WILL NOT WORK HERE IN
> THE UNITED STATES!  For multiple reasons, including others I don't have
> time to explain.


How regrettable that you don’t have time to explain any valid reason why
written numbers won’t work in the United States.

I wasn’t going to start commenting on statements yet, but this time I
couldn’t resist saying something.

>
>
>
>  > ... that causes mono-raise (aka monotonicity) failure ...
>  > ... meets Dominant Candidate ... and Later-no-Harm and
>  > Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
>  > criterion ...
>  > ... fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition ...
>  > ... Condorcet criterion ...
>  > ... fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top.
>
> Pass versus fail criteria are meaningful to math savvy folks, but
> meaningless to voters.
>
> What voters want is a method that rarely fails to elect who they think
> should have won.  Yes, that's subjective.
>
> HOW OFTEN a method fails -- according to what they think is "common
> sense" -- is much more meaningful than pass-versus-fail!
>
> I'll continue to repeat this point if you continue to talk about
> pass-fail criteria as if voters care about well-defined criteria.
>
> This includes the Condorcet criterion, which not all voters think is the
> best kind of "majority" support the winner needs.  You can blame
> FairVote and Star fans for undermining the importance of the Condorcet
> criterion (in favor of other ways to judge "majority" support).
>
> BTW, I used to believe the Condorcet winner always deserves to win.  And
> I reserve the right to claim that in the future.  But while I'm fighting
> misinformation from FairVote and Star fans I'm needing to relax the
> importance of Condorcet failures somewhat.
>
>
> Again, thank you for writing clearly so that it takes me less time to
> answer.
>
> Richard Fobes
> The VoteFair guy
>
>
> On 4/24/2024 1:46 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
> > Richard,
> >
> >> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
> >> in a box.  So you only need one box per candidate.
> >>
> >> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
> >
> > So why not change to writing numbers in boxes?  Aren't the voters there
> > numerate?  (And wouldn't that use less paper?)
> >
> >> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
> >> choice columns as candidates.
> >
> > With that limitation my enthusiasm for both IRV and Benham evaporates.
> > Instead I would recommend Smith//Approval(implicit) with of course
> > equal-ranking allowed.  That might be my high Social Utility
> > bang-for-buck champion in any case.
> >
> >> IRV's rule of assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking
> >> marks is least popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
> >
> > Let me offer two versions of Hare (aka IRV) explaining its
> > motivation/justification as an improvement on FPP (aka the Single
> > Non-Transferable Vote, aka plurality).
> >
> > *1. I see plurality has a "spoiler" problem and sometimes the winner
> > doesn't get a "majority". I'll fix that by one-at-a-time eliminating
> > weak candidates because I'm too stupid to realise that causes mono-raise
> > (aka monotonicity) failure, and my measure of weakness will be
> > favourite-of-the-fewest-among-remaining- candidates because I'm lazy and
> > simple-minded and too stupid to realise that causes failure of Condorcet.
> >
> > So I really am a very badly designed and flawed method, so even STAR is
> > better and nearly every Condorcet method is much better in every way.
> >
> > 2.  The SNTV meets Dominant Candidate (meaning that a candidate X that
> > is voted below no others on a number of ballots that is greater than X's
> > maximum pairwise opposition must win), and Later-no-Harm and
> > Later-no-Help and Clone-Loser and Mono-add-top and the Plurality
> > criterion.  In these ways I refuse to be worse. But unfortunately SNTV
> > fails Clone-Winner and (therefore) Dominant Coalition.  I will fix that
> > without losing any of those previously mentioned good properties.
> >
> > So I am doing that in the only way possible. Therefore I am well
> > designed method and not "flawed".  Any modification of my algorithm or
> > any kludge stuck on me will cause me to lose some of my good properties.
> > For example forcing me to meet the Condorcet criterion will cause me to
> > fail Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top.  If you don't share
> > my criteria priorities you don't have to like me, but maybe you now have
> > some idea why some people like and/or respect me.*
> >
> > Guess which one I think is correct.   "Dominant Candidate" and "Dominant
> > Coalition" are irrelevant ballot independent (stronger) versions of
> > Majority and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions) that I
> > coined.
> >
> > Chris B.
> >
> >
> >
> > On 25/04/2024 4:04 am, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
> >> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> >>
> >> > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
> >> > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
> >> > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
> >> recent one.
> >>
> >> Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors,
> >> etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive
> >> train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new
> >> engine, new drive train, etc).  Later we can replace the poorly
> >> designed body with a better-looking body.  Then we'll have a
> >> well-designed car.
> >>
> >> To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked
> >> choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy.  IRV's rule of
> >> assuming the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least
> >> popular is the "body" that isn't well designed.
> >>
> >>
> >> > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
> strict
> >> > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively
> >> benign
> >> > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
> >> > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
> >> > "informal".  Normally there should be nothing stopping you from
> ranking
> >> > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
> >>
> >> In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate)
> >> in a box.  So you only need one box per candidate.
> >>
> >> Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.
> >>
> >> Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper
> >> ballot size to unreasonable dimensions.  Already, with just one oval
> >> per candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot,
> >> and sometimes there are two ballot pages.
> >>
> >> As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many
> >> choice columns as candidates.
> >>
> >> This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or
> >> more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops
> >> us from being able to rank all other candidates above our
> >> most-disliked candidate.
> >>
> >>
> >> > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
> >> this
> >> > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
> >> > that sum to 1.
> >>
> >> Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers
> >> work fine.  But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math.
> >> Especially fractions and decimal numbers.
> >>
> >> > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
> >> > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
> >>
> >> That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the
> >> nearest smallest integer.  The "almost" refers to a few ballots that
> >> can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.
> >>
> >> That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three
> >> top-ranked candidates.  And it works with four ballots ranking the
> >> same four candidates highest.  Etc.
> >>
> >>
> >> >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
> >> >>> from giving them names? ...
> >>
> >> >> Time and money.
> >>
> >> > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
> >> > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I was
> >> > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
> >> > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
> >>
> >> My time is still a huge limiting factor.  I'm juggling lots of
> >> projects.  That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages
> >> here as I'd like.
> >>
> >>
> >> Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written.  That makes
> >> them easier to reply to.  Thank you for taking the time to write
> clearly!
> >>
> >> Richard Fobes
> >> The VoteFair guy
> >>
> >>
> >> On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> >>> Richard,
> >>>
> >>>> Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
> >>>> single-winner score voting.
> >>> It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and
> >>> Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is
> >>> an attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty
> >>> believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
> >>>
> >>>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
> >>>> from
> >>>>   > giving them names? ...
> >>>>
> >>>> Time and money.
> >>> I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass
> >>> media or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I was just
> >>> talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous)
> >>> discussion here.
> >>>
> >>>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting limitations of
> >>>> plurality is unnecessary.
> >>>>
> >>>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
> >>>
> >>> I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my
> >>> previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the
> >>> voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
> >>>
> >>> Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong
> >>> Push-over incentive.
> >>>
> >>>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> >>>>   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
> >>>> point.
> >>>>   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> >>>>   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
> >>>> Push-over
> >>>>   > strategy.
> >>>>
> >>>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
> >>>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation means the
> >>>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
> >>>>
> >>> For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited
> >>> strict ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable
> >>> relatively benign way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of
> >>> the ballot rules. In Australia I think the whole ballot is not
> >>> counted, and binned as "informal".  Normally there should be nothing
> >>> stopping you from ranking the most evil candidates strictly below all
> >>> the others.
> >>>
> >>>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."  It's
> >>>> not
> >>>> a "complex procedure":
> >>>>
> >>>>
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
> >>>>  When shared preference levels are encountered,
> >>>> //  the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
> >>>> //  not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
> >>>> //  decimal portions.  For example, during a
> >>>> //  counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
> >>>> //  rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
> >>>> //  highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
> >>>> //  transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
> >>>> //  will transfer to candidate 2.
> >>>> //
> >>>
> >>> Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way,
> >>> this seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal
> >>> fractions that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or
> >>> someone votes more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
> >>>
> >>> I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure"
> >>> I referred is the one I, not you, suggest.  I didn't bother
> >>> describing it.
> >>>
> >>> I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham,
> >>> then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one
> >>> candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the
> >>> candidates by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
> >>> (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
> >>> third of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on.  Now it would be
> >>> fine for this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to
> >>> next eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over
> >>> strategising easier.)  Then we count the equal top (among remaining
> >>> candidates) ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to
> >>> whichever of the ones they equal rank to the one that was highest in
> >>> the provisional order. (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to
> >>> whichever of A and B was higher in the provisional order, and of
> >>> course nothing to B.)
> >>>
> >>> This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
> >>> think you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
> >>> above-bottom equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I
> >>> think there would be any significant demand for that from voters, so
> >>> I don't advocate allowing it for those methods.
> >>>
> >>>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But those were
> >>>> not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
> >>>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
> >>> It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods
> >>> fail  IIA, so why are we even mentioning that?  And isn't
> >>> "center-squeeze" just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda?
> >>> What is the precise definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
> >>>
> >>> Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a
> >>> car or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge
> >>> on it designed to only guard against another crash just like the most
> >>> recent one.
> >>>
> >>> Chris B.
> >>>
> >>> *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org
> >>> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com
> ?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%
> 40votefair.org%3E>
> >>> /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>
> >>> On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> >>>
> >>>   > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
> >>>   > ...
> >>>   > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
> >>>   > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
> >>>
> >>> Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
> >>> single-winner score voting.  It's useful among friends when voting is
> >>> not anonymous.  Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
> >>>
> >>>   > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
> >>> you from
> >>>   > giving them names? ...
> >>>
> >>> Time and money.  Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
> >>> academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
> >>> election-method reform.
> >>>
> >>>   >>   Approval voting requires tactical voting.  There's no way to
> >>> avoid it.
> >>>   > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
> >>>   > FPP.  ...
> >>>
> >>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting limitations of
> >>> plurality is unnecessary.
> >>>
> >>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
> >>>
> >>>   >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
> >>> "overvotes."
> >>>   >> RCIPE counts them correctly.  ...
> >>>   > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> >>>   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
> >>> point.
> >>>   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> >>>   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
> >>> Push-over
> >>>   > strategy.
> >>>
> >>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
> >>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation means the
> >>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
> >>>
> >>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's not
> >>> a "complex procedure":
> >>>
> >>>
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
> >>>
> >>>   >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
> >>>   >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
> >>>   > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
> >>> failures, you
> >>>   > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
> "Let's
> >>>   > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
> >>> we can
> >>>   > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
> >>>   > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
> >>> that
> >>>   > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
> >>>
> >>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But those were
> >>> not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
> >>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
> >>>
> >>> I want fewer failures in real elections.  I don't care about convoluted
> >>> scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
> >>>
> >>> Again, thank you for this useful discussion.  I appreciate that you
> >>> really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
> >>>
> >>> Richard Fobes
> >>> The VoteFair guy
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> ----
> >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
> >>> list info
> >> ----
> >> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> >> info
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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