[EM] Poll, preliminary ballots

[robert bristow-johnson]

On 04/24/2024 11:10 AM EDT Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
> 
>  
> 
> > The RCIPE advocate only asks for a rule change that seems modest and logical within the context of IRV: If the candidate was destined to lose *in IRV* anyway, then eliminate him sooner. 
> 
>  Why? All the IRV non-winners were "destined to lose", and the easiest way to identify them is to complete the IRV count. That seems easier than looking for Condorcet Losers.
>  

Finding the Condorcet winner is easier than finding the Condorcet loser.

> 
> > In exchange, RCIPE achieves quite a lot.
> 
>  Really? As a modification of IRV how much does it "achieve" in comparison with what it loses? Rescuing the occasional Condorcet winner to make the method a lot more complicated and trash a lot of IRV's popular criterion compliances??
>  
>  I can't see how looking for Condorcet losers is any way easier than looking for Condorcet winners. So why don't we just do that (before each elimination, among the remaining candidates) instead?
>  
>  That method (Benham) is a Condorcet method and quite a bit simpler to operate than RCIPE. So the argument for RCIPE versus Benham is ...what??
> 

<applause>  But Chris, BTR-IRV is even simpler than Benham.  What advantage does Benham have that BTR-IRV does not have?
 
>  Can anyone show us a single example in which RCIPE appears to give a better result (or in some way behave better than) Benham?

I'm still trying to figure out why RCIPE or Benham or any of these "Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods" are preferable to just straight-ahead Condorcet with a simple completion method (say Plurality or Top-Two Runoff).

I *do* see why MinMax or Ranked-Pairs or Schulze might be preferable over straight-ahead Condorcet.  I can also see why BTR-IRV might be useful, because it is the simplest modification to existing Hare IRV that makes it Condorcet-consistent.

But there are a lotta goofy methods that are complicated flying around out there, and to be honest, I don't get it.  The priorities for me are:

1. Fairness (valuing our votes equally - majority rule for single-winner)
2. Simplicity and meaningfulness on the ballot
3. Simplicity and meaningfulness in the legislative language to implement
4. Disincentivize tactical voting (compromizing) for the individual voter
5. As much process transparency as we can possibly get
6. Disincentivize strategic voting (burial, etc.) for the campaigns.

For me, those are the things we want to promote, at least for public elections for government office.

Approval is good for 2, 3, and 5.  Not so good for 4.  Nor for 1.

Score is also bad for 4.

STAR is just weird.

IRV is demonstrably flawed.  Not good for either 1, 4, and 5.

Let's just always elect the Condorcet winner for the 99% of the time that such a CW exists.  And when the CW does not exist, let's make rules that the public and policy makers can understand the basis of those rules, and elect the candidate that can be best justified to the public.

--

r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

.
.
.