[EM] Relative vs. Majority Condorcet

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin Venzke wrote:

> The second option doesn't offer Smith, but if it did, I would note that Smith is a
> poor guarantee of quality. Here's a 1025-voter election where a 2-vote candidate is
> in the Smith set (along with all other candidates):
> 
> 2: A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
> 1: B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
> 2: C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
> 4: D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
> 8: E>F>G>H>I>J>K
> 16: F>G>H>I>J>K
> 32: G>H>I>J>K
> 64: H>I>J>K
> 128: I>J>K
> 256: J>K
> 512: K
> 
> While this is not realistic, I do think it is realistic that a candidate of limited
> interest to most voters would sometimes manage to pairwise defeat a more viable
> candidate. And we should be ready to interpret this as noise.

That was phrased a bit oddly in the context of the rest of your post, 
but I understand you to be saying "the worst method that passes Smith 
may still be pretty bad", not necessarily that proposed methods passing 
Smith are actually bad. Is that right?

-km