[EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections

[Michael Ossipoff]

>
> I didn’t answer your other question:

>
>>  And surely anyone here on this list can nominate any method they choose
>> (and have it accepted/acknowledged) regardless of whether or not the
>> method's supporters want it nominated.
>>
>
Yes, I have to agree that that sounds fair.

But don’t you want the STAR initiative next month in Eugene, Oregon to pass?

We’re mostly Condorcetists here. STAR would finish below everything but IRV
& Plurality. It would finish 3rd-from-bottom.

The IRVists would call attention to that in Eugene.

I don’t think you want that any more than I do.

EqualVote has worked long & hard on that initiative.

…&, unlike the dishonesty & fraud of FairVote, the EqualVote people have
been honest.

Of course anyone can nominate anything, because the poll would lose
democratic-legitimacy & if I tried to say otherwise. But surely you don’t
want to do that to them.

Anyway, wouldn’t it be a step up, to demonstrate in Eugene that there are
better things than Plurality?

>
>>
>> Chris Benham
>>
>>
>> On 6/04/2024 10:46 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>>
>> This is to acknowledge the nominations of Smith//Default-Approval,
>> Smith//Explicit-Approval, Margins-Sorted Approval, & Smith//DAC.
>>
>> I’d say include STAR, because that’s what its advocates would want.  …or
>> would they? Its enactment is going to be voted-on in Eugene next month, &
>> what if it finishes low here? That would be worse for the Eugene initiative
>> than not including it.
>>
>> Of course showing voters about methods’ popularity here is my
>> stated-purpose for the poll, & the fact that it’s about to be voted on for
>> enactment would seem to suggest including it.
>>
>> But the advocates of STAR have been working hard, completely in good
>> faith, & STAR is a lot better than IRV. Those are two good reasons to let
>> EqualVote decide on STAR’s inclusion in the poll.
>>
>> I’ll ask the EqualVote group, & go by what they say.
>>
>> (In fact STAR, while more complicated than Approval, has nothing like the
>> amount of count-complexity of Condorcet, or the consequent amount of
>> count-insecurity & count-fraud vulnerability. I personally don’t propose
>> STAR, because I regard it as an inbetween compromise between Approval & the
>> ranked-methods, & I want the absolutely minimal. (I only propose Condorcet
>> to jurisdictions where people insist on rankings.) …but, by my
>> simplicity-standard, STAR scores high, even though I don’t propose it.)
>>
>> So the nominations list so-far is now (listed in order of nomination):
>>
>> Approval
>> RP(wv)
>> Schulze
>> IRV
>> Plurality
>> MinMax(wv)
>> Black
>> Baldwin
>> Benham
>> Woodall
>> Schwartz-Woodall
>> Smith//Approval (of all ranked)
>> Smith//Approval (of what is specified)
>> Margin-Sorted Approval
>> Smith//DAC
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 04:03 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I would like to nominate several methods.
>>>
>>> Smith//Approval (Ranking):
>>>
>>> Voters rank from the top only those candidates they "approve",
>>> equal-ranking allowed,
>>> the most approved member of the voted Smith set wins.
>>>
>>> Smith//Approval (specified cutoff):
>>>
>>> Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can also
>>> specify an approval
>>> cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked below
>>> no others (i.e. ranked top
>>> or equal-top).
>>> The most approved member of the Smith set wins.
>>>
>>> Margins Sorted Approval (specified cutoff):
>>>
>>> Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can also
>>> specify an approval
>>> cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked below
>>> no others (i.e. ranked top
>>> or equal-top).
>>>
>>> A Forrest Simmons invention. Candidates are listed in approval score
>>> order and if any adjacent pairs
>>> are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by flipping the
>>> out-of-order pair with the smallest
>>> margin. If there is a tie for this we flip the less approved pair.
>>> Repeat until there are no adjacent pairs
>>> of candidates that are pairwise out of order, then elect the
>>> highest-ordered candidate.
>>>
>>> Smith//:DAC
>>>
>>> Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish,
>>> equal-ranking allowed.
>>> Eliminate candidates not in the Smith set and then apply
>>> Woodall's Descending Acquiescing Coalitions method.
>>>
>>> There is a method I hate that is apparently contending in the real
>>> world: "STAR". Given the stated purpose of
>>> this poll, is there a case for including it?
>>>
>>> Chris Benham
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Michael Ossipoff* email9648742 at gmail.com
>>> <election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAOKDY5BkSGJkX%3D7zWXBr2t1SBNVMNj96wm-T8ubvr_wGM5h51w%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
>>> *Wed Apr 3 22:13:28 PDT 2024*
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> EM used to do a lot of polls, but now never does. So I wouldn’t propose
>>> one, if it weren’t for the fact that, this year, the voters of at least two
>>> states are going to vote on whether to enact a certain voting-system.
>>>
>>> It seems to me—tell me if I’m wrong—that those people have a right to know
>>> how people familiar with voting-systems feel about the relative merits of
>>> some voting-systems.
>>>
>>> So, though I claim that polls are valuable for demonstrating the experience
>>> of using the voting systems, & how they work, & what they’ll do—& are
>>> therefore useful & worthwhile for their own sake—this poll that I now
>>> propose isn’t a poll for its own sake.
>>>
>>> It is, as I said, proposed for the important practical purpose of letting
>>> the voters in the upcoming enactment-elections know how we feel about the
>>> relative merits of some voting-systems, including the one that they’re
>>> about to vote on the enactment of.
>>>
>>> The voting-method for the poll:
>>>
>>> It seems to me that Schulze is the most popular ranked voting-system, among
>>> the people at EM.
>>>
>>> …& it seems to me that the last time we voted on EM’s collective favorite
>>> voting-system, Approval won.
>>>
>>> Those seem the top-two, in EM popularity.
>>>
>>>
>>>
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