[EM] Reply to Rob regarding RCV
Rob Lanphier
roblan at gmail.com
Sun Sep 24 23:00:58 PDT 2023
Hi Michael,
I've been letting this thread go without me, even though my first name is
in the title (and presumably doesn't refer to the ED of Fairvote or the CEO
of RealNetworks).
I think I largely agree with Kristofer Munsterhjelm and Forest Simmons in
this thread, but admittedly, I've only skimmed the conversation
(which...has a lot of words). Earlier this weekend, was inspired to copy
over some prose from English Wikipedia to create the following page because
of your mention of "L02E":
https://electowiki.org/wiki/LO2E
It would seem that you are deep into the community/tribe of the Greens
based on this quote:
"Greens win all of our non-mass-media polls."
I don't think the Greens are a mainstream party. They seem to be quite
happy being a niche party complaining about how the Democrats are not as
pro-socialism and pro-environment as they are. I'm going to guess that the
Greens are fighting for fully compostable voting booths right now, and for
all of the weapons used by the police and the military to be fully
compostable. You know, the important stuff ;-)
I have two sets of recommendations based on whether discussing
single-winner reform or mult-winner reform.
- STV for multi-winner elections -- I like the proportional aspect of
STV, and the biggest problems of STV are masked by its strength at
selecting multiple candidates proportionally. I suspect that's why the
Greens are super into it. The Greens probably look at European democracies
and at Australian/New Zealand politics and believe that STV is FANTASTIC.
But if one imagines a circular, 2D space where voters' beliefs are
scattered throughout it, then I would suggest that STV is great at
selecting candidates near the perimeter of the space (proportionally
equidistantly around the edge), but does a poor job of picking candidates
in the middle of the space.
- Approval, STAR, or a Condorcet-consistent method for single-winner
reform -- this is how we plug the donut hole created by STV, and get .
We're polarized enough as a country (here in the U.S.) such that it's going
to be difficult for people who identify as Democrat/liberal/left-wing are
going to have a difficult time trusting anyone who is
Republican/conservative/right-wing. I'm cautiously optimistic that Dr.
Nicolaus Tideman's Condorcet group will actually start a well-funded
organization to match the organizations behind Approval (the Center for
Election Science) and STAR (the Equal.Vote Coalition). Very cautiously
optimistic. I think that ANYONE starting a new group may underestimate the
challenges of doing so. I also generally trust that Dr. Ka-Ping Yee did
the analysis correctly in 2005 (<https://electowiki.org/wiki/Yee_diagram>),
and that Approval and Condorcet-consistent methods perform roughly
equivalently.
Having met some folks I like from FairVote (they exist...or at least, they
did in 2018 or so), I believe their analysis regarding
Condorcet-consistency of past IRV/RCV (i.e. the vast majority have picked
the Condorcet winner). However, my fear is that we're going to see
more-and-more close RCV elections in the very near future. Most
responsible political organizations hire quants to crunch numbers (if they
have the money to do it), and/or listen to their quant volunteers who offer
compelling data-backed advice. EVERYONE is against corruption (right-wing
voters and left-wing voters), and hence why I suspect Tishuara Jones and
Cara Spencer both clobbered Lewis Reed in the first St. Louis mayoral
primary using approval (<
https://electowiki.org/wiki/2021_St._Louis_mayoral_election>).
Lewis Reed was one of the first on the bandwagon to repeal approval voting:
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/effort-underway-to-repeal-approval-voting-in-st-louis-replace-it-with-new-system/article_2c3bad65-1e46-58b6-8b9f-1d7f49d0aaeb.html
However, I wouldn't be surprised if it was an open secret among St. Louis
voters that Lewis Reed was on the take (including Republican, Democratic,
Green, and Libertarian voters among others):
https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/politics/newly-released-photos-show-st-louis-aldermen-lewis-reed-jeffrey-boyd-john-collins-muhammad-taking-thousands-in-bribes/63-e17024ae-eba0-4f6a-af9c-adeaa1d2a04c
I have no idea if it was corruption, incompetence, or both when it comes to
Bob Kiss in Burlington Vermont in 2009. I'm virtually certain, though,
that the numbers show he primarily appealed to his base, and only threw his
his opponents (even a substantial number of Democrats) a bone:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/2009_Burlington_mayoral_election
And mind you, this was with all of the advantages of incumbency. If Kiss
was any good at his job from 2006 until 2009, he should have won the 2009
election in a landslide. The fact that he won in 2006 (and was presumably
Condorcet winner in that election), and then wasn't able to pull together
THE SAME VOTERS in 2009 who ranked him first place in 2006 just goes to
show that there was a lot of regret about him. The biggest problem in this
election was that many Republican voters ranked Montroll (a Democrat), Dan
Smith (an independent), and even Jason Simpson (a Green) higher than Kiss.
But because of the way the rules worked, their preferences with respect to
all of the candidates other than Kiss were ignored BECAUSE Republican Kurt
Wright made it to the last round. They would have gotten one of their
compromise candidates (e.g. Andy Montroll) if Kiss had not been as popular.
I've thought about that election a lot, because I've put myself in the
shoes of the Wright voters, and just imagine if Kurt Wright was the
vaguely-left-of-center Democrat, and Montroll was a vaguely right-of-center
Republican, and Bob Kiss was a far-right extremist who managed to get
elected to his first term because of a new election method. I would have
been pissed if the same system RE-ELECTED the crazy right-winger, even
though Kiss's support CLEARLY eroded since the initial election. But
(flipping the electoral spectrum back around) it would seem that Burlington
repealed IRV because it didn't do its job (i.e. letting the opposition to
the incumbent have some say).
I was recently made aware of a paper published by researchers at Yale that
suggests that RCV makes polarization and extremism even more likely:
https://isps.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/di-pb-2-3-23-v3.pdf
I haven't read the paper yet, and I could be summarizing it incorrectly,
but it matches my intuition about RCV. We discussed the paper quite a bit
at Sass's weekly Open Democracy Discussion a week or two ago:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/Sass_Open_Democracy_Discussion
I'll probably be attending again this coming Tuesday as I often do. All
y'all are welcome to join, and if you join, you can learn more about it
from some of the people who likely have read it (or you might learn about
other research).
Rob
On Sat, Sep 23, 2023 at 11:19 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:
> Hi Rob—
>
> …
>
> You wrote:
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> Oh Michael...where do I begin? Your apparent move to the dark side makes
> me sad. I realize that this intro may sound condescending, but I truly
> don't mean it that way. I deeply respect your opinion. YOU were the one
> who taught me about "center squeeze" in 1995 or so, and made me rethink
> AV/PV/IRV/RCV (or whatever the name of the week is).
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> Yes, earlier I was quite critical of RCV (called IRV in those days, before
> San Francisco insisted on RCV, because “instant” was misleading people to
> expect an instantaneous count).
>
> …
>
> I was wrong.
>
> …
>
> You know that often the relative merits, advantages & disadvantages of
> single-winner methods aren’t what they at first seem. Never be prematurely
> sure that someone is wrong about such matters.
>
> …
>
> But I would like to remind you that I also continue to say that Condorcet,
> in its best versions, is my favorite, because, always electing the CW, it
> best gets rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem (LO2E) for any & every kind
> of voter, thereby accommodating even the most timid LO2E giveaway voter.
>
> …
>
> As I said, RCV only works & has merit if the voters aren’t timid
> overcomromising LO2E giveaway voters.
>
> …
>
> I don’t deny that Condorcet-failure is a disadvantage, but, with a good
> electorate, it doesn’t matter. I used to say that Approval’s equal-givaway,
> amounting to an abstention between Favorite & Lesser-Evil, is better than
> RCV’s favorite-burial…but not if you have an electorate that won’t do the
> burial !!!
>
> …
>
> Approval & STAR encourage Mr. Timid to do giveaway. RCV encourages
> everyone to be frank, honest, ambitious, hopeful !!!
>
> …
>
> …because, as I said, that won’t be a problem, because an electorate that
> has enacted RCV didn’t do so because they want & intend to vote a
> hold-you-nose lesser-evil over their favorite (They can & do do that now,
> in Plurality). If they enact RCV it’s because they want & intend to
> sincerely rank the candidates, expressing & fully-supporting their favorite.
>
>
> …
>
> …& so THEY WILL DO SO !!!
>
> …
>
> So don’t worry about LO2E strategy in RCV voting.
>
> …
>
> Anti-RCVists often say that RCV doesn’t really honor majority.
>
> …
>
> But, as I’ve been saying, though RCV doesn’t meet the Condorcet Criterion,
> it meets the Mutual-Majority Criterion (MMC). Let me state an improved &
> expanded definition of MMC:
>
> …
>
> MMC:
>
> …
>
> If there are 1 or more sets of candidates such that a majority of the
> voters prefer the candidates of that set to everyone outside the set, then
> the winner should come from such a set.
>
> …
>
> (Then it goes without saying that, when there’s a Mutual-Majority (defined
> below) the winner will come from that Mutual-Majority.)
>
> …
>
> [end of MMC definition]
>
> …
>
> A majority who all prefer some set of candidates to everyone outside that
> set, I call an Agreeing-Majority.
>
> …
>
> A majority who all prefer *the same* set of candidates to everyone outside
> that set, I call a Mutual-Majority.
>
> …
>
> (Arguably a weaker definition of a Mutual-Majority would do: A majority
> who all prefer all of their favorites to everyone outside the set of all
> their favorites.)
>
> …
>
> When there are 1 or more Agreeing-Majorities, RCV always elects the
> candidate of the largest faction of an Agreeing-Majority.
>
> …
>
> i.e. under those conditions, RCV always elects the favorite of an
> Agreeing-Majority.
>
> …
>
> RCV always elects the candidate of the largest faction of the
> Mutual-Majority.
>
> …
>
> i.e. RCV always elects the favorite of the Mutual-Majority.
>
> …
>
> That candidate isn’t an unpopular extremist, but instead has strong
> genuine majority coalition support, as defined above.
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> I just think you're incorrect about FairVote.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> I didn’t say anything about FairVote.
>
> …
>
> Whether you like FairVote or not, that has no bearing on the merits of RCV.
>
> …
>
> FairVote, from the start, has insisted on offering the traditional RCV. We
> should respect that choice. RCV has about a century of precedent in
> Australia & Ireland. Proposing a traditional method with long precedent is
> a valid practical choice, & one that we should respect.
>
> …
>
> …& that proposal has been enormously successful, & is sweeping this
> country. Maybe its century of traditional precedent has something to do
> with its success.
>
> …
>
> When RCV was initially being adopted, of course there were no computers,
> & so Condorcet’s complete pairwise-count would be infeasible in a large
> election. Sure, the Sequential-Pairwise (SP) pairwise-count only needs
> about twice as much vote-counting as RCV.
>
> …
>
> (Approval, Score, STAR & RCV all need roughly the same amount of
> vote-counting (they all vary greatly), & SP needs about twice as much.)
>
> …
>
> Maybe people didn’t want twice as much vote-counting. Or maybe they were
> afraid that SP would be rejected because of its Pareto violation (which I
> consider irrelevant, just like MinMax’s Condorcet-Loser violation).
>
> …
>
> Then there’s Coombs, which I guess would have about the same amount of
> vote-counting as RCV. But maybe they didn’t like Coombs because things
> could get ridiculous, like when I nominate Dracula in the primary, so that
> we can bury the Democrat under Dracula.
>
> …
>
> …but of course there are worse things than ridiculous. Maybe we haven’t
> been fair to Coombs.
>
> …
>
> As I said, I prefer Condorcet, in its best versions, but it’s RCV that has
> the activist movement, big well-funded national organization, lobbyists,
> experienced & active campaign-managers, & big successes all around this
> country.
>
> …
>
> …with (I’ve read) on the order of 60 municipalities & 2 states having
> adopted RCV.
>
> …
>
> If RCV, & not Condorcet, is succeeding, we Condorcetists have nothing to
> complain about. When the RCVists were doing the work, we weren’t out there
> enacting anything. Don’t blame the RCVists for that..
>
> …
>
> We should acknowledge, commend & appreciate what the RCV organization has
> accomplished.
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> RCV is already poorly understood.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> RCV is enormously popular with progressives & progressive organizations &
> parties, such as the GPUSA, the U.S. Greens. …because they understand
> that rank-balloting will allow them to express all of their preferences
> among the candidates.
>
> …
>
> …& because they’ve been correctly informed that RCV has genuine strong
> majority properties, when it coalesces the Mutual-Majority. ..even if
> they haven’t heard about the details of those properties.
>
> …
>
> As for RCV’s definition, RCV can be defined very briefly, in one sentence:
>
> …
>
> Repeatedly eliminate the candidate who tops fewest rankings, till someone
> tops most of them.
>
> …
>
> [end of brief RCV definition]
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> When I moved to San Francisco in 2011, I expected to grudgingly like
> voting in RCV elections, and I expected to enjoy ranking my choices What
> I found instead was that very few people here understand how votes are
> counted
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> They would if they heard RCV’s brief definition.
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> , and many folks in my lefty political tribe here take great pride in
> their ignorance of math and the inner workings of their electoral system,
> trusting that the powers-that-be will count things correctly.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> …& they’re right, when the method is RCV. (…& likewise would be, with a
> good Condorcet version too.)
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> As "exhibit A", I will point to the recent clown show in Alameda County
> (i.e. just a few miles east of me, on the other side of a puddle known as
> the "San Francisco Bay"):
>
> …
>
>
> https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Alameda-County-admits-tallying-error-in-17682520.php
>
> …
>
> It would seem that they had been counting RCV elections wrong for
> DECADES, and only noticed the problem in 2022. Simplicity and precinct
> summability matters.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> RCV’s brief definition is simple. RCV is simple, natural & obvious.
>
> …
>
> There’s a lot of mis-statement about “Precinct-Summability”, &
> questionable-ness about what “Precinct Summability” is supposed to mean..
>
> …
>
> Plurality, Approval & Score:
>
> …
>
> Candidates’ vote totals are summed in each precinct & sent to a central
> count-place, where there’s a central tabulation.
>
> …
>
> STAR:
>
> …
>
> Same, at first. Then the central counting place determines the two top
> scorers, & then presumably sends that information to the precincts, which
> still have the rankings, & the precincts each total the pairwise votes for
> each of the finalists over the other, & they all send that back to the
> central location, where the results are summed & the final winner reported.
>
> …
>
> Condorcet:
>
> …
>
> Each precinct counts the preference votes for A over B, & for B over A,
> for each of the N(N-1)/2 pairs {A,B}. …& those totals are sent in to the
> central location, where the winner is determined according to the rules of
> whatever Condorcet version is being used.
>
> …
>
> RCV:
>
> …
>
> Each precinct counts the top-count score of each candidate, & sends that
> in to the central location.
>
> …
>
> The central location totals that count for each candidate, to determine
> which has lowest top-score, & sends that information back to the precincts.
>
> …
>
> Each precinct eliminates that candidate from its rankings, & repeats the
> first line above.
>
> …
>
> Repeat till the central location finds that one candidate tops most of the
> rankings.
>
> ---
>
> Notice something similar about those? Every one of those procedures
> requires counts at the precincts, & also at the central location, &
> communication between the two.
>
> …
>
> How is RCV different? It does such a procedure a number of times. That’s
> it. That’s the difference.
>
> …
>
> So it’s questionable regarding what is this “Precinct Summability” that
> Plurailty, Approval, Score, STAR & Condorcet all have, but RCV allegedly
> doesn’t have.
>
> …
>
> The same security measures, precautions & audits can be done with RCV as
> with any of the other methods whose procedures are described above.
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> [quote]
>
> Strategy-evaluation for Condorcet-complying pairwise-count methods has
> proven to be complicated & more difficult than one would expect.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> This I will agree with. That is why I've hopped on the approval voting
> bandwagon for single-winner reform.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> That’s a bit hasty. Undeniably some of the pairwise-count
> Condorcet-compliant methods thwart &/or deter offensive strategy so well
> that it won’t be a problem, & the election of the sincere-CW will virtually
> always be elected.
>
> …
>
> There’s the argument that there are so many good Condorcet versions that
> choosing between them is prohibitively problematic, preventing the adoption
> of any of them.
>
> …
>
> No, several of the best versions can be offered to a proposal-committee, &
> it can discuss & evaluate them & then choose a proposal.
>
> …
>
> …& there are a few obviously simplest proposals, making the choice a lot
> less complicated & difficult than antii-Condorcetists claim:
>
> …
>
> MinMax:
>
> …
>
> Elect the candidate whose greatest defeat is the least.
>
> …
>
> (…implying the election of an unbeaten candidate when there is one ( as
> there nearly always is) ).
>
> …
>
> Condorcet//Approval:
>
> …
>
> Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. If no one is
> pairwise-unbeaten, then elect the most approved candidate.
>
> …
>
> Majority-Defeat Disquaification//Approval (MDDA):
>
> …
>
> Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. Elect any unbeaten
> candidate. If there are none, then every majority pairwise-beaten candidate
> is disqualified, & the un-disqualified candidate with most approvals is
> elected.
>
> …
>
> (I’ve added a Condorcet-winner electing clause, because I now feel that
> Condorcet’s failure-betrayal scenario is so rare & unpredictable as to be
> irrelevant to strategy.)
>
> …
>
> Sequential-Pairwise:
>
> …
>
> Order the candidates in a list such that the ones topping more rankings
> are listed below the ones topping fewer rankings.
>
> …
>
> Find the pairwise-winner among the top 2 candidates in the ordering. Then
> find the pairwise winner between that winner & the next candidate down the
> list. Condtinue until you’ve found the winner of the then-current winner
> & the last candidate in the list. S/he wins.
>
> ----------
>
> I’d offer those 4 simple pairwise-count versions.
>
> …
>
> I’d also offer Approval, in case the jurisdiction either couldn’t afford,
> or didn’t want to spend for, rank-balloting equipment & software.
>
> …
>
> I’d also offer RCV & STAR, because some proposal-committee members might
> prefer them.
>
> …
>
> I’d personally propose & justify the choice of a Pairwise-Count, with RCV
> as next choice, & of course Approval if rank-balloting is infeasible or
> rejected.
>
> …
>
> If there were a ranked vote in the proposal committee, of course my
> ranking would be:
>
> …
>
> 1. Some ordering of the above-listed four Pairwise-Count methods
>
> …
>
> 2. RCV
>
> …
>
> 3. Approval if ranked-balloting is infeasible or rejected.
>
> -----
>
> Yes, I like Approval. Under different conditions, normal conditions, it
> would be my suggestion, though STAR would then be okay too.
>
> …
>
> But our voting-conditions are anything but normal.
>
> …
>
> We always have a sleazy & corrupt POS “lesser”-evil, & a
> dramatically-horrifying greater-evil. (…& some better candidates who,
> our media insist, are unwinnable, minor, not-serious, candidates.)
>
> …
>
> We’re constantly told that the greater evil is the only bad result, & so
> we have to support the “lesser-evil” against the greater-evil (…& against
> our favorite).
>
> …
>
> Always.
>
> …
>
> It’s always this same discouraging, dismal & hopeless situation.
>
> …
>
> That isn’t normal. It certainly isn’t natural.
>
> …
>
> So yes, I’d suggest Approval under normal conditions. But our highly,
> bizarrely, abnormal & unnatural conditions require special methods to deal
> with the (allegedly) hard choice between genuinely-wanted outcomes, &
> odious dismal regrettable & deplorable “lesser” evils.
>
> …
>
> For these conditions, we need something more powerfully-discriminating: a
> rank-method, to let everyone vote all their preferences among as many
> candidates as they want to. …to elicit & count genuine favoriteness immediately.
>
>
> …
>
> (…not after several election-cycles, because a lot of harm can be done in
> 4 years or 8 years.)
>
> …
>
> It’s like when, in _The Godfather_, Michael says to his attorney:
>
> …
>
> “No, you’re a peacetime consiglieri, but right now we need a wartime
> consiglieri.”
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20230924/7d5e02ab/attachment-0001.htm>
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list