[EM] My CTE post to EM

Sun Oct 8 15:40:04 PDT 2023

On Sun, Oct 8, 2023 at 15:33 C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

> Michael,
>
> What if there are more candidates? What if there’s an additional Bus?
>
> What in your terminology, in this context, is a "Bus"?
>

In my terminology a “Bus” is what I defined it as in my previous reply.

I refer you to that reply.

>
>
> An optional added rule could specify that the 1st elimination is of
> whichever of the 2 candidates with worst base-method count-score is
> pair-beaten by the other.
>
>
> That doesn't make any difference in the example I gave.
>

Yes, BF loses in your example anyway. But that alternative rule might deter
burial better. I don’t know. It could be offered as an alternative.

>
> Chris
>
> On 9/10/2023 8:13 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> Oops!! I think I list-replied to an individual e-mail. I appreciate the
> consideration, not posting a proposal-debunk, but I don’t consider the
> proposal debunked.
>
> Anyway, I’d mistakenly assumed that I was replying to a posting, but now
> that I’ve sent my reply to the list, I might as well leave it there, when
> there’s more to add.
>
> Even if randomness determines which of the 3 candidates gets eliminated
> 1st, there’s a 2/3 probability that BF loses.
>
> …backfire is equally likely as success.
>
> But it isn’t random:
>
> You’ve insincerely  bottom-ranked CW.
>
> …thereby increasing hir probability of being the 1st eliminated.
>
> …&, with 3 candidates, you’ve upranked Bus from bottom, decreasing hir
> chance of being 1st eliminated.
>
> An optional added rule could specify that the 1st elimination is of
> whichever of the 2 candidates with worst base-method count-score is
> pair-beaten by the other.
>
> What if there are more candidates? What if there’s an additional Bus?
>
> Then BF loses, no matter who is eliminated.
>
> That’s fact obtains when there are more than 1 Bus, but no candidates who
> aren’t CW, BF or a Bus.
>
> I’ll collectively refer to CW, BF & Bus(es) as “the principals”.
>
> Any candidates who aren’t  principals, I  refer to as “other candidates”.
>
> If there’s an other candidate who pair-beats the Bus, & gets eliminated
> 1st, of course that takes down the Bus. But the same thing could happen to
> any one of the principals.
>
> The possibility the takedown of a principal by 1st elimination of an other
> somewhat dilutes the greater likelihood of CW being the 1st eliminated
> principal, & of Bus not being the 1st eliminated principal.
>
> Because of the burial-thwarting effect of having more than 1 Bus, then,
> with many candidates, the buriers have the problem of burying CW to make
> the strategic cycle, without creating more than 1 Bus.
>
> Could the buriers get lucky & succeed? Sure.
>
> But then you’re raising the philosophical question:
>
> If a strategy doesn’t have a positive result-change expectation, is it
> really a strategy?
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
> On Sun, Oct 8, 2023 at 01:14 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> There’s good reason to choose Coombs as the “base-method”, the
>> elimination-method to which to apply CT-.
>>
>> The use of Coombs maximizes the lowering of the base-method count-score
>> for the buried CW.  (We haven’t discussed fractional vs whole, but my first
>> impression is that whole would best deter & thwart burial.)
>>
>>
>> …making the CW more likely to get eliminated 1st.  …thereby taking-down
>> the buriers’ favorite (BF), & electing the less-liked candidate whom under
>> whom the buriers buried CW.
>>
>> (Let’s call that candidate “Bus”, because the buriers are throwing CW
>> under the bus.)
>>
>> That wasn’t the scenario in your example, but BF still lost.
>>
>> When there’s only one Bus, which of course is the case in all 3-candidate
>> cases, then whether or not BF wins, & the burial succeeds, depends on who
>> is eliminated 1st.
>>
>>  Could there be a 1-Bus example in which Bus gets eliminated 1st, thereby
>> taking down CW & electing BF? Yes, but, with Coombs as base-method, the
>> burial of CW is particularly likely to give CW the worst base-method
>> count-score.  …& thereby the  1st elimination.  …thereby taking down BF &
>> electing Bus.
>>
>> So the burial is likely deterred, unless the buriers have very detailed &
>> reliable predictive information.
>>
>> I’m not a fan of LNHa, but when speaking of advantages of STE (Successive
>> Topcount Elimination), one of course mentions LNHa among them.
>>
>> But, though we need rank-balloting, & STE is a rank-method, & obviously
>> people who enact STE don’t want or intend to bury their favorite under a
>> disgusting lesser evil, & though I’d accept STE’s top-end defensive
>> strategy-need in order for people to have rank balloting so that they won’t
>> elect despicable POS lesser evils…
>>
>> …I’m not going to defend STE anymore…or vote for its enactment…or
>> participate in its enactment campaign…
>>
>> …because we do such things for principle…
>>
>> …&, if principle means anything, we don’t condone lying & dishonesty.
>>
>> FairVote is still using the lie that STE don’t have a spoiler problem.
>>
>> …using that lie not only with voters, but also to get money from donors.
>>
>> I couldn’t bring myself to help that lie-based project or its proposal.
>>
>> Did you know that FairVote is claiming that it’s Condorcet that has the
>> spoiler problem?
>>
>> I guess, to borrow from a famous statement, that proves that there’s no
>> such thing as an unutterably blatant lie.
>>
>> So, as I said, I won’t defend STE or in any way support its enactment
>> campaigns.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Oct 7, 2023 at 23:16 C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Michael,
>>>
>>> ... there's no offensive strategy for changing the winner from the CW
>>> to one's own favorite,
>>>
>>>
>>> Say sincere is
>>>
>>> 46 A
>>> 44 B
>>> 10 C
>>>
>>> A is the CW (as well as being every other type of winner).
>>>
>>> Now suppose the B voters all decide to bury against A by ranking C
>>> second:
>>>
>>> 46 A
>>> 44 B>C
>>> 10 C
>>>
>>> Now  C has the lowest Borda score and the lowest "top count", so if we
>>> are using
>>> IRV/RCV or Baldwin  C is eliminated, "taking down" A and leaving B
>>> elected.
>>>
>>> The "offensive strategy" has succeeded. This is the same outrageous
>>> failure of
>>> the Later-no-Help and Plurality criteria that we see with Margins.
>>>
>>> I'm not clear how Coombs (or your preferred version of it) handles
>>> truncation.
>>>
>>> Is the "bottom count" Fractional (in other words based on the
>>> symmetrically completed ballots)
>>> or Whole (so that truncated ballots give a whole vote to each of the
>>> bottom-counts of the truncated
>>> candidates)?
>>>
>>> In this case neither version eliminates C, but I'd be surprised if
>>> examples couldn't be made of
>>> them also failing those criteria.
>>>
>>> You implied that you are a fan of Later-no-Harm.  If that is the case I
>>> don't think you will find a better
>>> method than plain IRV/RCV
>>>
>>> Chris B.
>>>
>>> Here are 3 elimination-methods that eliminate 1 candidate at a time:
>>>
>>> …
>>>
>>> RCV/IRV:  Eliminates lowest topcount
>>>
>>> …
>>>
>>> Coombs: Eliminates highest bottomcount
>>>
>>> …
>>>
>>> Baldwin; Eliminates lowest Borda-score.
>>>
>>> …
>>>
>>> Any one of those can be the “base-method” .
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Michael Ossipoff* email9648742 at gmail.com
>>> <election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20My%20CTE%20post%20to%20EM&In-Reply-To=%3CCAOKDY5CU-zc3Y%3DC%3DrFWagy3zVw5Px6KPaULqW89gHdxshRZh8A%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
>>> *Fri Oct 6 14:33:40 PDT 2023*
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>>  When I said:
>>>
>>> "There’s no offensive strategy for changing the CW to one’s own favorite."
>>>
>>> I meant, there's no offensive strategy for changing the winner from the CW
>>> to one's own favorite.
>>>
>>> On Fri, Oct 6, 2023 at 5:21 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com <http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com>>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> >* Name of Method:
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* CW,Takedown-Elimination (CTE)
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* or
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* Simmons-Ossipoff  Method
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* Okay yes, I like the 2nd one.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* It adds an enhancement to any of several already-existing
>>> *>* elimination-methods.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* Here are 3 elimination-methods that eliminate 1 candidate at a time:
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* RCV/IRV:  Eliminates lowest topcount
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* Coombs: Eliminates highest bottomcount
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* Baldwin; Eliminates lowest Borda-score.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* Any one of those can be the “base-method” .
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* Method rule:
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* Ranked balloting. Equal-rankng & truncation allowed.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* 1)  Check for a CW & elect hir.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* 2) If none, do the base-method.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* 3) During the doing of the base-method:
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* When the base-method’s rule eliminates a candidate, eliminate additionally
>>> *>* anyone who is pair-beaten by that candidate.  …& additionally any
>>> *>* candidate beaten by that 2nd candidate.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* That’s takedown & secondary takedown.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* 4) If anyone becomes un-pairbeaten due to elimination of who beats hir,
>>> *>* s/he wins.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* 5) Continue till only one candidate remains uneliminated.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* [end of count-rule definition]
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* Though it was Forest who introduced the unprecedentedly gamechanging
>>> *>* Takedown, & applied it to Coombs & Baldwin, the bombast in this post is all
>>> *>* mine.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* Obviously a CW wins if voting is sincere.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* There’s no offensive strategy for changing the CW to one’s own favorite.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* There’s no need for defensive strategy to protect the win of a CW.
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* While MinMax(wv), Schulze, RP(wv) & Smith//MinMax(wv) require defensive
>>> *>* truncation to deter burial strategy against the CW, the above-defined
>>> *>* method requires no such defensive strategy, & voters can rank all the way
>>> *>* down to the bottom if they want to.
>>> *>>>* PS. I added a statement that, for the purposes of takedown & secondary
>>> *>* takedown, "pair-beaten" should probably mean "pairbeaten according to the
>>> *>* rankings before any eliminations."
>>> *>>* …
>>> *>>* Michael Ossipoff*
>>>
>>>
>>>
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