[EM] Borda-likes (was: Just to let you know...)

Richard Lung voting at ukscientists.com
Tue Jan 17 11:11:07 PST 2023

  Hello Kevin,

Yes there is a lot of confusion of my meanings, here. My own ideas have 
been evolving, also.

My main purpose is democratic representation, which single members don't 
fulfill, even if BSTV is more rational than trad STV.

BSTV both elects and excludes candidates, in the same rational way, 
whereas trad STV is not a dually rational election, but fairly stable 
and robust, the more seats per constituency.

STV including BSTV has nothing to do with a multi-seat Borda. The 
Gell-Mann reference is to possible Borda method affinities with found 
patterns from statistical analysis of miscllaneous data.

You are quite right if you think trad STV does not obey information 
conservation; that is, not in its exclusion count. I don't know any 
election system that does obey it, apart from Binomial STV. The Gregory 
method or (extended use of) keep values, deploys the most powerful 
scales of measurement, including interval and ratio scales, which 
amounts to the best use of information. BSTV extends its use to 
candidates in deficit, as well as surplus, of a quota, and to (reversed 
preferences) exclusion counts, as well as election counts.

I am talking about two candiates always being a cycle, in the same 
manner of abstract logic, as the scissors, papar, rock argument is held.

I have published a book and booklets on Binomial STV. My ideas have 
grown, tho.


Richard (Lung).

On 17/01/2023 13:58, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Richard,
> Thanks for your response. I am always confused when you write about a relationship or
> similarity between traditional STV and BSTV, given that in the single-seat 3-candidate
> case of BSTV which has been detailed, there seems to be no need to invoke STV, and the
> results of the two are certainly not similar.
>> Borda may have the last word, however. The Quark and the Jaguar, by
>> Murray Gell-Mann discusses series patterns found in nature. (I made a
>> few notes on it, in an e-book, Science and Democracy Reviews.) For
>> instance the statistics of city populations follow a common series. The
>> biggest city as unity population, the next biggest city as roughly half
>> the size and so on. I forget now, all the examples, whether they were
>> harmonic, geometric or arithmetic series. Gell-Mann said they didn't
>> know why they did that. Maybe they have found out, by now. It may be
>> that similar marked patterns will also be found in voting data. In fact,
>> we already know that there is an exponential falling off in voters
>> stating their orders of preference. It may be possible to state more
>> precise similarities.
> Just to check my memory, in the past haven't you stated that elections with partial rankings
> are flawed? If voter truncation patterns are dictated by laws of nature, maybe it's best
> not to disturb this.
>> Binomial STV differs from the general usage, and Borda, in that it
>> counts all the preferences, including abstentions, relative to the
>> available vacancies.
> Well, I only want to ask about the single-winner case. I'm not familiar with any definition
> of multi-seat Borda.
>> The law of conservation of information is an inter-disciplinary rule
>> that, in a closed system, information, like energy, can neither be
>> created nor destroyed. In physics, energy and information are being
>> translated. The holographic principle was introduced to refute the
>> supposed loss of information from an object passing beyond the point of
>> no-return, the event horizon, to a black hole. (Leonard Susskind
>> discusses it online.) In "electics" or election method, all the
>> preference votes are counted. The binomial count is by STV, because
>> traditional STV already makes the best use of the information, in a
>> rational election count. Binomial STV duplicates a rational count in the
>> exclusion count, replacing a crude "last past the post" type exclusion,
>> not a lot better than first past the post or simple plurality. ----- For
>> Binomial STV, I use a more convenient form of Gregory method, the keep
>> value, introduced by Meek method, but capable of much wider use.
> Above you say that traditional STV "already makes the best use of the information" but I am
> not sure whether you are suggesting that traditional STV obeys the "law of conservation of
> preference information." The latter I am sure is not true, because traditional STV will
> never regard some lower preferences. So in what way could it be called "conserved," if
> nothing ever sees it or uses it.
>>    Two candidates are always in a cycle, with just two perms: AB versus
>> BA. Three candidates perms display only some cyclicity, which decreases
>> exponentially with the number of candidates.
> Are you talking about candidate sequences that might occur on individual ballots?
> Usually "preference cycle" refers to group preferences. So A and B can't be in a cycle
> alone, because the electorate *as a whole* will prefer one of the two (or it's a tie).
> Kevin
> votingmethods.net

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