[EM] Two election method observations
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_elmet at t-online.de
Tue Feb 21 06:29:05 PST 2023
On 2/21/23 02:24, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Cool ... I think you're onto something good!
Thanks :-)
Observations for three candidates: Let a candidate who is barred from
being included in an n-1-seat council due to Droop criterion constraints
be called "unfortunate".
For three candidates, the Droop quota is |V|/3. The possible exclusion
scenarios are:
If A has more than |V|/3 first preferences, A is not unfortunate. Ditto
B and C.
If there exists some solid coalition {A, B} supported by more than two
Droop quotas, then C is unfortunate. In other words, if C's last
preference count is greater than 2|V|/3, then C is unfortunate.
If a solid coalition of two candidates is supported by more than one
Droop quota, but not more than two, then we don't need to care about it
because we can never eliminate both members of the solid coalition. Even
in a case where we have a Droop quota voting B>A and another Droop quota
voting C>A, we don't necessarily need to preserve A (although it may
seem natural to do so).
Hence A is unfortunate if
fpB > |V|/3 and fpC > |V|/3
or lpA > 2|V|/3.
Note that an unfortunate candidate may not necessarily exist. E.g.
34: A>B>C
33: B>C>A
32: C>A>B
So if we were to create a method that finds a loser candidate, every
unfortunate candidate should lead to that unfortunate being kicked out,
but it should also kick out a candidate that's not unfortunate in the
cases when such doesn't exist.
Some people have suggested using IRV for this purpose, but the criteria
for unfortunates show that it doesn't work. For instance:
1: A>B>C
3: C>B>A
B has no first preferences and is eliminated first, but A is unfortunate
because more than two Droop quotas support {B, C}.
Two interesting questions I don't know the answer to:
1. Is it possible to create a method that in the three-candidate case
always evicts unfortunates, is decisive, and only uses pairwise information?
2. For higher number of candidates, do we only have to look at "a
single Droop quota supports this candidate" and "more than n-1 Droop
quotas support everybody but this candidate" criteria? Or can size-k
solid coalitions interact in complex ways to protect certain candidates
from elimination?
-km
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