[EM] Condorcet meeting

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 8/30/23 09:17, Chris Benham wrote:
> 
> Kristofer,
> 
> IMHO this is all far too complicated and completely wrong-headed.
> 
> For one thing, it seems to assume that major candidates have some 
> interest in, or in some way benefit from, displacing minor candidates
> off the final ballot.
> 
> In fact, with voluntary voting, they are just as likely to be harmed
> by them doing that as helped.  Major moderate wing candidates can
> benefit by minor (sure loser) more extreme candidates on the same
> wing being on the ballot, because they inspire more voters to turn
> out who will help that moderate wing candidate to defeat the other
> major candidate/s.

Then I'm sorry, but I don't know what the desiderata are.

First I suggest using Approval, to which you say this will lead to the 
selection of a bunch of clones.

Then I construct a method that's intended to be cloneproof, and then you 
say that clone independence is a bad thing, because more extreme clones 
can support more moderate ones and make the latter win.

So which is it? Should this kind of method pass clone independence in 
the sense that cloning some group's candidates should never change the 
number picked from that group to be finalists -- or not?

Maybe this shows that we need to nail down what the method is supposed 
to accomplish before designing it.

-km