[EM] Definition of proportional electoral system
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_elmet at t-online.de
Mon Aug 28 09:35:30 PDT 2023
On 2023-08-28 13:46, Luděk Belán wrote:
> Thank you for answer.
> I didn't express myself accurately. I wanted to know whether the
> mentioned principle is a necessary condition of a proportional electoral
> system, not a sufficient condition.
It might be, for quota-based proportional representation.
The Droop proportionality criterion says that if a solid coalition (in
this case, a party) obtains more than 1/(n+1) of the vote, it should get
at least 1/n of the seats.
So if we have two parties for two seats, and one party has more than 33%
of the vote, then it must get at least one seat. Then the other party
also has more than 33% and must get the other seat. So there's no room
for nonmonotonicity in the mono-add-plump sense (i.e. additional votes
for A won't harm A).
For things that generalize Webster and other divisor methods, it's even
easier: the party list case is just Webster (or D'Hondt or etc.), which
themselves are monotone functions and so pass your condition.
Things get a lot messier for ranked voting methods, though, because
"votes for" someone don't neatly map into "support for" everybody in his
party. I'd say the obvious generalized criterion is mono-add-plump (i.e.
if you only use your first preference, then whoever you vote for
shouldn't be harmed), which I'd say that most sensible methods should
pass; but I don't think it's *necessary*.
So to sum up, I think proportional methods have to pass your condition
in the "party list, each voter chooses one party" case.
-km
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